Perception of geographical distance and the philosophy of space by Musson, R.M.W.
THE PERCEPTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL DISTANCE










Part I - Introduction 7
Part II - The Philosophy of Space 24
Part III - The Global Experiment 72
Part IV - The Scottish Experiment 152





The author would like to express his gratitude to the following:
firstly, my main supervisor, Mr. R.L. Hodgart for his continual help
and guidance, and my second supervisor, Professor J. Wreford Watson,
for his constructive and helpful comments. In connection with part
II, I should like to thank Mr. Stephen Winspur of Columbia
University, N.Y., for reading the text and commenting as a
philosopher. With regard to part III, I must thank Dr. A. Dawson of
St. Andrew's University, and Mr. Terry Anderson of Queen's University
Belfast for their assistance in carrying out student questionnaires
in those two universities. Similarly, I should like to thank the
library authorities of the towns I visited in connection with the
surveys in part IV, and in particular the library staff in Airy Hall
Public Library, Aberdeen, Forehill Public Library, Ayr, Berwick on
Tweed Public Library, Menzies Hill Public Library, Dundee,
Stockbridge Public Library, Edinburgh, Inverness Public Library,
Lerwick Public Library, Denton Public Library, Newcastle on Tyne,
Stirling Public Library and Stornoway Public Library for their help
and co-operation. In the initial stages of this work I received
advice and encouragement from Professor David Stea of the University
of Los Angeles and Dr. David Canter of the University of Surrey, for
which I should like to express my thanks; as also to Professor
W. Kirk of Queen's University Belfast for providing the stimulus for
the whole idea. I should also like to thank: the Edinburgh Regional
Computing Centre for all their help in preparing data, etc.;
Dr. Jurek Kirakowski for writing the REGAN programme; the Department
of Education, Northern Ireland, for funding the research, Mr. Ray
Harris for his advice regarding the drawing of the diagrams, all the
3
people too numerous to mention who provided little anecdotes and
comments, and last but not least, the many students and library users
who so patiently answered so many peculiar-looking questions.
4
ABSTRACT
The thesis is divided into five parts.
I) In the introduction, the existing theory of cognitive distance is
discussed and amplified, with emphasis on the differences between a
psychological and a geographical approach to the subject.
II) A brief thematic history of the philosophy of space is given,
from the behavioural geographer's point of view. The ways in which
the nature of space could affect the perception of distance are
discussed.
III) An account of a large experiment investigating the perception of
global distances is set out. Students from three universities
estimated distances to 24 places ranging in distance from Dublin to
Christchurch, N.Z. In the analysis of the results a completely new
methodology is introduced to deal with misestimation. Consideration
is given to globe and map distances, degree of certainty on the part
of the subject, cognitive barriers, 1ogarithmicity of estimation and
descriptive statistics.
IV) The second major experiment involved asking citizens in ten
Scottish and North British towns to estimate distances to all the
other towns in the experiment. Investigation is made of the
commutativity of cognitive space, road and direct distances,
1ogarithmicity, familiarity of destination, attractiveness of
destination, the effects of travel time, certainty on the part of the
subject, four different cognitive barriers and the comparability of
the different subject groups.
V) A brief recapitulation of the results, linking some of the themes
from the preceding four parts, forms the conclusion of the work.
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While every effort has been made to keep the text of this thesis
up to date, obviously there is a limit to the amount of last-minute
alterations that can be made. The bibliography should be considered
as dating from June 1978, and material published after that date will
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At the Dublin wedding of President O'Kelly's daughter, not so
very long ago, one of the guests, a Belfast member of the Irish
Association, was complimented by the President on having come so far
to attend. The Ulsterman respectfully pointed out that Belfast was
no further from Dublin than Cork was, and surely travelling from Cork
to Dublin was no feat worthy of mention.
Clearly something other than spatial separation was influencing
the President in the formation of his judgement of relative distance.
Some factor, the Irish border, perhaps, was making the distance to
Belfast appear longer than it really was, and the subsequent
behaviour of the President (making the particular compliment to the
Belfastman) was therefore based on a conception of distance which,
objectively speaking, was erroneous. Nor is this exceptional;
misunderstanding about distance is rife. When Donald Klein wrote to
Newsweek in 1971 picking them up for misrepresenting distance in a
headline that described Chile as on the "U.S. doorstep" (Moscow, he
pointed out, was closer to New York than Santiago was), he can hardly
have expected that his letter would be reproduced in academic books
on both sides of the Atlantic in the next six years. But it serves
as an excellent example of how expected distance relations, based on
non-spatial information (for example, the similarity of place names:
North America and South America) often turn out to be false when
compared to an accurate geographical treatment of distances.
The problem is a complicated one, with many twists and turns.
Klein is in turn criticised by Canter (1977) for representing New
York as being the whole of the U.S.A. - as Canter rightly points out,
if the relative distance to Moscow and Santiago is compared from
other points in the United States, different relations occur. (But
then again, Moscow is not all of Russia, nor is Santiago all of
Chile.) What makes matters worse is that these relationships also
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change according to how one defines one's "real" standard - if one
turns to an atlas map for such information as distances between the
United States and Chile, one can be dangerously misled, for atlas map
distances and great circle distances are very different things. On a
map, Vancouver may appear to be twice as far from London as New York
is; when one takes into account trans-polar flight the relationship
is considerably altered.
Somewhere, there is a message for geography. If human spatial
behaviour is based on objectively incorrect conceptions of relative
distance, then theories that posit particular patterns of human
behaviour based on correct knowledge of distance will tend to break
down. But if it is possible to build a predictive model of the ways
in which people distort distance, then the position can, one hopes,
be salvaged. However, research into this topic of distorted distance
conceptions is still in its early stages; there is some pratical work
extant, but very little theorisation.
Before we proceed further, it is necessary to deal with some
technical terms. There is a tendency to deal with that part of
behavioural geography which concerns itself with man's conceptions
and misconceptions of his environment under the heading of
"perceptual geography". We talk about man's perception of the
environment, his perception of natural hazards; we might very well
talk about his perception of geographical distance.
Technically speaking, this would be wrong. Convention has laid
down strict parameters for the use of the word "perception", and the
phrase "perception of distance" is taken to refer exclusively to
distance perceived directly and in toto by the visual process. One
may perceive the distance across a field, but not down a winding
street, or on a map. Nor may one talk about the perception of
distance with regard to the drawing upon of stored memories of
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distances once directly observed. Instead the word "cognition" is
used. The various processes by which one might build up an idea as
to how far it is from Edinburgh to Aberdeen are cognitive processes,
inasmuch as they are a mixture of direct experience (but over a
course of time, and not instantaneous) and remembered information of
various sorts, from maps, conversations, road signs, books and so on.
The distances on wtiich we base our spatial behaviour are cognitive
distances; it is the cognitive distance from New York to Chile that
Klein found shorter than physical distance, while President O'Kelly
cognised Belfast as being, relatively speaking, further away than it
really was.
However, there is a danger here of splitting hairs. Is an
aerial view of the distance between two points a perception or a
cognition? If the former, the same must go for the observation of
distance on an accurate map. Furthermore, "perception" is a more
familiar word, and more useful when addressing the uninitiated; it is
not helpful to have its use so strictly curtailed. As evidenced by
the title to this work, the author has no intention of strictly
adhering to this convention. At the geographical level, there are
few distances that qualify as "geographical distances" that can be
perceived instantaneously and in the approved manner rather than
cognised; in the work that follows, there are none. Therefore, with
the reader's indulgence, we shall regard the phrases "the perception
of geographical distance" and "the cognition of geographical
distance" as interchangeable in the text that follows, on the
understanding that we shall never be dealing with distances to a
destination that can be directly observed from the origin.
The further term "subjective distance" might appear, on the face
of it, to be also synonymous with distance perceived or cognised, and
indeed, some researchers may have assumed this to be so. However,
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the phrase has a specialised usage in meaning "distance as it is
imagined to be, irrespective of what the respondent in question knows
it actually to be". In other words, a respondent asked to estimate
subjective distance to two places must, if he knows the actual
distances to these places', forget this and imagine what answer he
would give if he didn't know. If this sounds to the reader like an
artificial construction, be assured that the author agrees entirely.
(However, it is perhaps unfair to introduce the term in such a way.
In part III, section (v), a background is provided to illustrate the
origin of the term in its specialised usage.) Cognitive distance,
unlike subjective distance, is what the individual really thinks the
distance is, right or wrong, and- it is on this that he bases
decisions.
Ultimately, if we are going to understand cognitive distance, we
will need to propose some sort of theoretical model to represent the
mechanisms by which the cognitive processes operate. The greater
contribution to the development of theory in this respect has come
from two researchers, Briggs (1973a) and Canter (1975); but here a
curiosity arises: going by university departments, Briggs is a
geographer, while Canter is a psychologist. What is the effect of
this interdiscipiinary split? Before discussing their theoretical
propositions in depth, it is necessary to establish the position of
cognitive distance vis a vis the two disciplines of geography and
psychology.
It has already been mentioned that cognitive distance is of
concern to geographers. What has not been shown is that cognitive
distance studies lie within the competence of geographers. Three
elements can be discerned in any perceptual problem: the objective
world, the geographical or phenomenal environment (to use Kirk's
(1951) phrase) which acts as initial material; the "world in the
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head", the cognitive or behavioural environment which is the "end
product"; and, in between, the complicated processes that turn the
one into the other. These last are the perceptual mechanisms,
cultural conditioning, and so on, that we can call (rather loosely)
"mind". Cognitive distance'itself takes its place as part of the
behavioural environment. The real distance that it mirrors is
clearly part of the geographer's world, but the mental mechanisms
that lie in between, the perceptual processes, are equally clearly
the psychologist's domain.
If there is going to be any fruitful investigation of cognitive
distance at all, it is going to be necessary that cognitive distance
should display regularities; if, as a phenomenon, it is totally
chaotic, nothing significant can be said about it by any discipline.
If on the other hand, it is found that order and regularity can be
established by the investigation of cognitive distances, the
important question is this: does this order mirror regularities in
the geographical environment, or variations that are purely
psychological? Or are both sorts of dependencies observable?
Clearly, if it can be shown that patterns detectable in the cognition
of distance are purely conditioned by the people involved; that
theories are likely to take the form "distances will be overestimated
by people who are x" where x is some physiological/psychological
characteristic, then there is little the geographer can contribute.
It is necessary that one should be able to formulate theories along
the lines of "distances will be overestimated to places that are y",
where y is an appropriate geographical variable. Unless this can be
established, there is little point in attempting a geography of
cognitive space.
Assuming that this can be established, various correlative
positions can be reached. If it is found that the phenomenal
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environment contributes sufficently to cognitive distance for a
geographical approach to the topic to be undertaken, it may still be
true that psychological variables play a sufficently significant part
to make a psychological perspective equally valid. Or it is
possible, though, we suspect, unlikely, that if the mechanisms of
perception process distance without passing on to it any pattern of
their own, a psychological approach to the topic is not appropriate
after all. The third possibility is that a sociological approach may
also be valid - were it discovered that significant theories could be
formulated along the lines of "distances will be overestimated by
people who are z" where z is a sociological variable, such as
membership of a particular income group. However, as yet,
sociologists do not appear to be all that interested in this
potential.
The psychological and sociological aspects of cognition are not
intended as the subject matter of this thesis. The fundamental aims
of this thesis are threefold: firstly, to investigate the validity of
a geographical approach to cognitive distance (as outlined above), in
which variation in the perception of geographical distance is shown
to relate in some significant manner to spatial or place
characteristics. Secondly, it is intended to examine some of the
potential components of a geographical theory of cognitive distance.
Thirdly, since distance is a spatial variable, and the existence of
cognitive distance invokes a correlative cognitive space, it is
intended to make comparisons between cognitive space and the theories
of physical space put forward by various philosophers. Our
hypothesis in this is that the nature of physical space itself may
encourage the mind in translating physical space into cognitive space
in a particular manner. Just as the structure of a language may
encourage thinking that uses the ideas of that language in a
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particular pattern related to the language's structure, so the
structure of physical space may similarly affect the way we deal with
such spatial phenomena as distance and the estimation of distance.
That said, we can now return to the theories of Briggs and
Canter for the mechanisms of distance cognition, and add a
contribution of our own.
Briggs (1973a) postulates five possible mechanisms by which
distance can be cognised, as follows:
(i) Motory response - judging distance by the amount of
effort expended in overcoming it, i.e. by walking. Distances uphill
should presumably appear longer than ones downhill by this
hypothesis.
(ii) Time and velocity - if one knows the speed at which one
travels, plus the time taken to traverse a particular distance, one
can calculate the approximate distance covered.
(iii) Perception - if the whole distance cannot be
simultaneously perceived, it can be divided up into segments or links
which can be perceived separately, and these perceptions can then be
fused into one composite image.
(iv) Patterns within the structure of the external
environment if a distance includes a regular patterning, for
example, telegraph poles every so many hundred yards apart, by
counting the number of regular elements passed, one may estimate
distance travelled.
(v) Symbolic representations - maps, roadsigns, etc.
Briggs himself suggests that "although all five of these
mechanisms may operate... the third... is the most general and
critical." (Briggs, 1973a, p 188) To Downs and Stea "the answer
probably lies in a combination of all of them." (Downs & Stea, 1977,
p 140) Certainly all of them bear closer examination, perhaps with
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the exception of (iv), which can be viewed as a specialised occurence
of (iii). The first important point to note is that the fifth
mechanism, cognition derived from symbolic representation, is very
different from the other four. It is an indirect mechanism, whereas
the others are all direct, experiental measures of distance. It is
possible to estimate distances to places one has never visited, but
only by recourse to the fifth method. Furthermore, if a distance has
been personally traversed, but information from a roadsign is also
available, the roadsign distance will almost certainly override any
of the other possible mechanisms for arriving at an estimate of the
distance travel 1ed.
Secondly, note that the fifth mechanism is not homogenous. Road
signs and guide books give information about distance in miles or
kilometres, and this needs no secondary processing; it is pure
information. On the other hand, maps, when recalled rather than
directly viewed, can act as a substitute for experiencing the
distance, and still be subject to the effects of (iii) and (iv). A
combined mechanism can operate whereby a distance is envisaged on a
map, or series of maps, in which the entire distance can still not be
perceived as a whole, but is thought of in terms of internal
segments.
Thirdly, all five mechanisms are to some degree specialised and
only applicable in certain conditions. Motory response is only valid
for distances actually traversed on foot. Time and velocity can only
be used where information on velocity, and, to some extent, time, is
available. Regular patterns in the environment are relatively
\
uncommon. Perception requires the distance to be actually perceived
(it is not sufficent to have merely read the mileage without
experiencing the journey), while symbolic representation is subject
to availability. Nevertheless, (iii) and (v) are evidently the most
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widely applicable, and, as Briggs comments, probably segmental
perception is the most general, even though symbolic representation
may supercede it where available.
However, there is another point to be made. We have considered
here how distance is cognised, but have not asked the question what
is it cognised as? A distance exists as so much space, but it must
be expressed as something else if it is to be expressed at all. The
two most important means of expression to be considered in this
context are as absolute distances (in miles or some other measure) or
as relative distances (compared to some other distance). To some
extent these are similar. One can derive mileage estimates by
comparing the set distance to another distance which one knows (or
thinks - perhaps incorrectly) to be one mile. But the mechanism one
uses for deriving cognitive distance may be deliberately selected
according to the required expression. I might use motory response to
make a decision as to whether I buy groceries at shop A or B on the
basis that as I always feel more tired on returning from shop A, it
must logically be that shop A is further to walk to than shop B. On
the other hand, were I specifically asked how far it was to shop A in
miles, in replying I might use the fact that I have a steady pace
(the speed of which I know from measurement) and that I know the
average time it takes me to walk the distance in question, and make a
time/velocity calculation to arrive at an answer. Similarly,
perception of a distance tends to be a relative measurement, whereas
symbolic representation tends to be in absolute terms. Further
mixing of methods is possible. If I am required to estimate the
mileage to place X, I might reason that, on grounds of perception, it
would appear to be twice as far to X as it is to another place Z.
Then, since I know the distance to Z from symbolic representation, I
have simply to double this figure in making my reply. With such a
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range of alternative methods available, one cannot predict in any
simple form the precise mechanism that will be used in any instance
of distance estimation and cognition.
Canter (1975) is more concerned with providing an overview of
the cognitive process. Figure 1.1 shows the model he suggests. The
two initial elements are described as "geographical factors" and
"psychological factors." The former include the actual physical
distance, also the topography across which the distance runs; the
latter are envisaged as including preferences and knowledge as well
as cognitive abilities. As for the third group:
"We call these mediational factors because they appear to be
made up of variables representing interactions between psychological
and geographical variables. They are the variables by which the
geography of a city comes to have an impact upon the conceptual
system of an individual... The most obvious example of a mediational
variable which was identified was that of transport mode, but
residential location, type of work, or training, may also be
considered in this way." (Canter, 1975,p8)
The box labelled "process of estimation" is presumably Briggs1
five mechanisms, or something similar.
In seeking to expand on this model, one aim was to illustrate
more clearly the process of estimation, and here an important
distinction must be made between perception (or cognition) and
estimation. We have a classic "black box" problem; perceptions "go
in" and estimations "come out", but there is no way of opening up the
box to see what happens in between. It is quite possible that
cognitions of distance are distorted in the estimation process, for
purely psychological reasons. It is useful, therefore, to
distinguish between the stages at which distortion can occur. The
position is analagous to the examination of a text which one knows
17






Figure 1.1 (From Canter,1975,p.8)
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was translated into English from a Greek translation of a Hebrew
original; deficiencies in the text may have crept in as a result of
the first translation, or the second translation, or both, and one
cannot determine which translator was at fault without a copy of the
Greek document. In the cognitive/estimation process the middle
document is the cognition stored in some form or other by the brain,
and it cannot be accessed to see if the greater error stems from the
first translation (perception) or the second (estimation).
Figure 1.2 provides a revised model of the distance estimation
process, which, it is hoped, is clearer than figure 1.1. The
vertical section labelled "the cognitive process" shows the three
main stages: the perception of distance - an input of information
either of a direct (experiential) nature or indirect (symbolic)
nature. This is then transmitted to some form of storage in the
memory. To make a distance estimation, it is necessary to access
this stored information by a process of recall, which includes the
estimation process itself, and the estimated distance is the final
product of the system. The physical distance itself is the starting
point of the system as a whole, but it also deserves a mention in the
column which we have headed as "geographical variables". This column
represents those factors influencing the system which are related to
places rather than to persons. These comprise geographical factors
of an objective character, such as topography and nature of route,
and what we have termed psycho-geographical factors, the subjective
characteristics of the places involved. Examples of these are the
degree to which the distance is familiar to the respondent, the
attractiveness of the destination, and so on; all these are to some
extent psychological, but they are place-related. It will be noted
that the influence of geographical and psycho-geographical factors is
depicted as being different. This is because it seems likely that
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geographical factors may act most as a purely spatial analogue for
distance, as for instance, when the degree of physical segmentation
of a route results in information being recorded along the lines of
"distance AB is x number of links in length". However, when we look
at the effect that more subjective attributes are likely to have, it
seems probable that they are active at other stages of the process.
For instance, we might hypothesise that when a subject recollects the
distance to place X, he may remember at the same time that place X is
somewhat unpleasant, and this will subconsciously influence his
recall of the distance, perhaps persuading him to overestimate.
However, psycho-geographical factors may be active at other stages of
the process as well (we really don't know), so they are shown in the
diagram as directed to all three stages. The same is true of what we
have labelled as "pure" psycho!ological factors. These are taken to
be personal characteristics totally unrelated to place, but including
physiological characteristics. Mental aberrations, character type,
sex, degree of astigmatism and so on, all come under this category.
How they affect distance cognition is uncertain, and, in terms of
this thesis, not relevant.
The box labelled "social factors" represents approximately the
same thing as Canter's "mediational factors"; such variables as
occupation and length of residence. These are seen, in terms of the
model, not as directly influencing the cognitive process, but rather
as forming a background against which the cognitive process operates.
Social factors are likely to decide such questions as to which
distances will actually be perceived, how often, and in what
circumstances. They are considered as more indirect variables than
the others, and again, since they are not directly related to place,
they are not considered as falling within the bounds of this study.
(Although a word might be said here about travel mode, which is in
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some ways a special case, in that there is a very loosely discernable
link with place, since certain journeys are restricted in terms of
available transport mode. One cannot sail to Stirling, nor go by
train to Stornoway. However, no place is accessible by one unique
transport mode only, and So transport mode per se cannot really be
considered an attribute of the place in question. We therefore feel
justified in classing it with the non-geographical variables.)
In terms of this model, we are now justified in asking which of
the two sets of variables, the geographical or the non-geographical,
have the most important influence over the process as a whole? Or,
to re-frame the question, does the impact of geographical variables
have any influence over the process as a whole? If it does, then we
can justify further investigation of the subject using a geographical
methodology. This will not in itself, of course, invalidate a purely
psychological or psycho-sociological methodology, but we must
obviously leave the investigation of non-geographical variables to
the non-geographer.
The key difference between the two approaches in terms of
examination of results is that the geographer will essentially be
looking for variation in results with variation in place, whereas the
non-geographer will be primarily concerned with variation in results
with variation in person. If results of a cognitive distance study
show that it is possible to identify a significant result associated
with a particular place, then that is a geographical result; if the
identification is of an image held in common by a certain class of
person, that, on the other hand, is a psychological or sociological
result. There is, of course, no reason why both should not occur.
But it has not been shown that they do.
Incidentally, it may be felt that the author is taking an
unaccustomedly place-oriented view of what constitutes "geography".
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It should be emphasised that this is a pragmatic decision; the
implied definition of the borders between the geographical and the
non-geographical is a helpful one in delimiting the parameters of
this cognitive problem, and no wider implications are intended. What
the author has described as sociological factors do, of course, have
a geographical component themselves. Should other geographers feel
it within their scope to investigate the influence of such factors on
cognitive distance, there is no reason why they should not do so.
To recapitulate: the problem that will be examined in this
thesis is that of the perception of geographical distance, and the
extent to which it is influenced, controlled or distorted by the
physical and non-physical attributes of place, and by the physical
attributes of distance. However, to touch on the attributes of
distance is to enter upon an interesting and complicated
philosophical problem in itself. For distance is synonymous to a
large degree with the term extension; and extension is the basic
parameter of space. What space is, distance is, but what is space?
We now turn to a brief examination of the philosophy of space, to see
what attributes it may have that could affect the transmission of
physical distance into the cognitve system.
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PART II
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPACE
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1) THE GEOMETRY OF SPACE
(i) Introduction
"Space is a necessary a priori representation, which underlies
all outer intuitions. We' can never represent to ourselves the
absence of space, though we quite well think it as empty of objects.
It must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of
appearances, and not as a determination dependent on them. It is an
a priori representation which necessarily underlies outer
appearances." (Kant, 1929, p.68)
Thus did Immanuel Kant seek to demonstrate the Newtonian concept
of absolute space; what the passage better demonstrates is not the
absolute nature of space but more the absolute importance of space as
a fundamental concept in any natural philosophy. Space is so
pervasive a phenomenon, that attempting to define geography as the
study of spatial distributions, though it establishes a general
frame, is deficent unless particular sets are also distinguished. It
is scarcely possible to study anything that is not, in at least a
loose sense of the term, a spatial distribution, whether it be a
distribution of cities, bones, or atoms themselves. However, the
extent to which space itself is a ground for active discussion varies
from discipline to discipline. Philosophy, being (at least up to the
last fifty years) an enquiry into the ultimate nature of the
fundamental phenomena of the universe, has been much concerned with
the discussion of so basic a matter. Mathematics, being to a large
extent a theoretical subject, has the free range of an infinite
number of possible spaces, each of which is theoretically valid and
in which consistent geometries may be constructed. Physics is more
practically oriented and physicists have concerned themselves from
time to time with the possibility of experimentally determining which
25
mathematically possible spaces are of principal utility in the
contemplation of natural phenomena, just as the philosopher attempts
the same thing from a logical rather than an experimental viewpoint.
On the other hand, the anatomist, though concerned with spatial
arrangements, is able to takd the nature of space as an unvarying
constant throughout all his studies. Since it is unvarying, it can
be ignored.
Geography, being essentially a varied discipline, is in a more
complex situation. Branches of the discipline, especially on the
physical side, are in much the same position as anatomy and other
subjects that can disregard considerations of the nature of space on
the grounds that this is a constant having no active effect on data.
However, other parts of the discipline are more specifically
spatially oriented. Often the geographer is concerned not only with
objects themselves, but with the abstract spatial relationships
between them, "abstract" in the sense that they are being considered
in purely mathematical terms, rather than merely as an implication of
the data. Using anatomy as an illustration again, the distance
between the tarsus and the cranium is important in a concrete sense,
in that if it were of insubstantial magnitude, a queer physique would
undoubtedly result. But the nature of the distance itself, in the
philosophical sense, is not important; as long as there is a distance
of appropriate magnitude, that suffices. In geography, on the other
hand, there may be different measures of distance possible and the
variance between these may be crucial. Between two points A and B we
may find the walking distance to be 10 km, the railway distance 12
km, and the road distance 15 km; now in Euclidean geometry, the
shortest distance between two points is a straight line, and if our
walking distance is a straight line, then we can discuss the
relationships of A and B in terms of Euclidean geometry. However, if
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we are restricted to road distance, and the shortest road distance,
15 km, is not a straight line, then we must think about describing
the relationships of A and B in terms of some other geometry. The
geographer has become involved in the nature of the distance itself,
and therefore the nature of space, of which distance is but a
function, has become relevant to geography. And in geography, as
Harvey points out, an appropriate metric must be taken for each study
in which distance is a variable, to be chosen with regard to the
process being studied. (Harvey, 1969)
(ii) Metric Spaces
The debate on space engaged in by various philosphers in the
past was largely a debate concerned with the idea of extension - the
extension of matter which takes up space and the extension of
whatever separates bodies, which also defines space. The measurement
of extension, be it length, breadth or height, is primarily a measure
of distance and hence it becomes sensible to think of space in terms
of the distance function by which it is measured. The concept of
metric space is an attempt to make this explicit in terms of a
mathematical definition of a space by the nature of the structuring
of distance within that space. This can be formalised in an
equation, but is a reflection of the mathematical processes involved
in measuring distance. This is not measuring in the usual sense, of
comparing lengths to arbitrary units marked on rigid rods, but a
loose usage of the term to include the calculation of distances by
such purely mathematical means as the Pythagorean square-of-the-
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hypotenuese method. The precise defintion of a metric space in
A
general is a set E for which for any pair of members (M,N) a real
number d(M,N) is generated where d is the distance function. There
must be only one value for d(M,N) and various other conditions (the
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network properties) must be met:
symmetry d(M,N) = d(N,M)
non-negativity d(M,N) > 0
nondegeneracy d(M,N) = 0 only when MsN
the triangle inequality d(M,L) + d(L,N) > d(M,N)
where L is any point not on the line MN.
Now, in fact it is perfectly acceptable to regard Euclidean
space as a subset of metric space rather than as a different sort of
space. To be precise, Euclidean space is a metric space defined as
having a distance function such that, with points M(x,y) and
N(x1,y1),
d(M,N) = (|x-xj|2 + |y-yx|2)1/2.
But use of different metrics results in different spaces being
defined; the formula
d(M,N) = |x-x1| + |y-y j|
provides us with the so-called "Manhattan Space" where movement is
restricted to routes parallel to rectangular axes (see fig. 2.1).
This evidently has a geographical counterpart, as its name suggests,
in the geometry of grid plan cities where movement is constrained in
this way.
When dealing with metric spaces in a geographical context it is
possible to incorporate irregularities occuring in the geographical
environment into the formulation of an irregular metric space. This
concept, though not so mathematically neat as the orthodox metric
space, retains most of the network properties and is just as relevant
geographically. For example, given the grid plan city used to
illustrate "Manhattan Space", and assuming that the grid is not
perfectly regular - a ring road might be added, for instance - it
will be seen that though the experiential effects of this "space" are













Manhattan Space - showing two possible routes from 0 to (x,y)
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possible to calculate the distance between any two points by means of
a simple function similar to the ones given above. It becomes
necessary to think of d not as a mathematical constant that can be
expressed by an equation, but rather as an instruction to consult a
predetermined table of route'distances (back, alas, to rigid rods)
for the relevant value. This means that we are no longer
specifically defining distance as such, since we are virtually saying
that
d(M,N) = d(M,N)
in a roundabout way. But though we may not be defining the distances
geometrically, we are still defining space in terms of these
distances; the irregular "metric" space could be defined as the set E
for which for any pair of members (M,N) a real number d(M,N) is given
by the value (M,N) in a matrix of all possible values for
interdistances between members of the set. Although this space could
be represented using a Euclidean geometry, and though the distance
values for the matrix have been measured in a fashion no different
from measurement in a conventional Euclidean sense, it is to be
emphasised that this is not to say that the irregular metric space is
/
merely a Euclidean space manque; geometrically it may operate quite
differently. For example, the ordinal ranking of a given number of
points might be quite different in terms of proximity from one
particular point depending on whether one used a metric or a
Euclidean geometry (see fig. 2.2).
In fact an irregular metric space constructed to fit a
geographical environment may be sufficiently irregular to
A
conspicuously lack some of the defining properties of metric spaces
previously listed. In terms of the urban example, the introduction
into the geographical environment of a one-way street system does not
affect the viability of the representation of the network as a metric
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Irregular metric space where movement is confined to network links.
Note that in the metric space the order of points in terms of
proximity to A is C,E,B,D, whereas if a Euclidean geometry were used
the order would be D,B,E,C.
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space in the manner outlined above, but it does mean that the
property of symmetry will not longer be maintained. The matrix of
distance values for Mn,Nn will not be symmetrical and the value for
d(M,N) may well be different from the value for d(N,M).
The point of looking at' space in this way for our present
purposes is this: we cannot assume that perceptual space in the
geographical sense will turn out to have a Euclidean geometry. If we
are concerned with the geometry that perceptual space does exhibit,
we must consider some of the possibilities. As can be seen, the use
of metric geometries provides a number of ways of diverging from
Euclidean principles; the concept of an irregular metric space
enlarges the scope still further. We can therefore consider the
concept of metric spaces as a useful tool that we may be able to draw
upon when wishing to describe the geometry of cognitive distance.
If we wish to represent perceptual space as a metric space,
either regular or irregular, we must consider to what extent does it
hold to the network properties just discussed? The principle of
non-negativity we can expect to automatically apply to cognitive
distance for obvious reasons. The question of symmetry is less
certain. To a single observer at A, we might expect the distance AB
to be considered identical to BA, if only because we expect the
observer to be familiar with the "rules" of orthodox geometry. But
supposing we use different groups of observers at A, asking one to
estimate the distance from A to B, and the other to estimate the
distance from B to A, will the result be the same? Or supposing we
locate one group of observers at B? The commutativity of cognitive
distance is something we cannot take for granted, and therefore we
must regard the symmetry of perceptual space as an open issue. Nor
can we take the triangle inequality as automatically holding.
With regard to the metric itself, one can easily think of the
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illustration of intercity distances being cognised exclusively in
terms of the road distance - thus framing cognitive distance as an
adjunct of the road network. If we discovered road distances to be
the foundation of all ideas about intercity distance, we could posit
a network cognitive space. Straight line distances appearing in the
estimates, on the other hand, would suggest a Euclidean approach.
(iii) Curved Spaces
The use of metric spaces is one way of diverging from the
traditional Euclidean framework; different geometries may also be
constructed by reference to the notion of curved space. This concept
was evolved in the debate on the famous fifth axiom of Euclid, that
if a straight line meets two other straight lines so as to make the
two interior angles on one side of it together less than two right
angles, the other straight lines, if extended indefinitely, will meet
on that side on which the angles are less than two right angles (see
fig. 2.3). This axiom was known to be thoroughly consistent in all
its applications, but it did not seem to be provable in terms of the
other four axioms. So in the last century, a reductio ad absurdum
proof was attempted by two mathematicians, the Hungarian Bolyai, and
the Russian Lobatchevsky, both working independently of one another.
The basis of the proof was the implication of the axiom that only one
line could be drawn through a given point parallel to a given line
not passing through that point. What happened if one made the
illicit assumption that more than one parallel could be drawn through
any given point? The mathematicians were looking for some inherent
self-contradiction, but the "absurdum" was never reached. It was
discovered that this new axiom was perfectly tenable, and led to a
new geometry of space that was curved and hyperbolic, in which the





The line AB cuts the lines CD and EF at X and Y respectively; the
angles CXY and EYX add up to less than the sum of two right angles,
so the lines DC and FE will meet when produced towards C and E. If
CXY and EYX summed to 180°, the lines CD and EF would be
parallel and would not meet except at infinity; given EF, only one










Hyperbolic Geometry - CD, EF, and GH are lines through X all of
which are parallel to AB. To be parallel they must therefore be
"straight" in a space which is itself curved.
Figure 2.4(b)
Spherical Geometry - no line can be drawn through X parallel to AB,
therefore lines CD and EF must cut AB somewhere. Since these lines
are also straight, we must require the medium in which the lines are
drawn, space itself, to be curved. Space must also be finite, for if
it could be said that EF did meet AB but only at infinity, then EF




new geometry turned out to be completely consistent and congruent, as
was the geometry the young and brilliant German mathematician,
Riemann, constructed when he attempted a similar reductio ad absurdum
proof based on the new assumption that no parallel could be drawn
through the given point. This time the new geometry turned out to be
curved and spherical, in which the angles of a triangle added up to
more than 180°. Riemann then constructed a systematisation of the
new discoveries; Gauss had recently found that the shape of a curved
surface could be described by the geometry upon it, and this led to
the development of a system of curved spaces in which the curvature
could be expressed by a single exponent; if this was constant and
negative, a hyperbolic geometry was indicated, if constant and
positive a spherical geometry, and if it was zero, the exponent
described the old familiar plane geometry of Euclid. So just as
Euclidean space can be as a subset of metric spaces rather than as
inherently different, it can also be regarded as a subset of
"Riemannian" spaces, produced by one particular value (zero) of the
Riemannian curvature variable.
Previously, since Euclidean geometry was the only one that did
not contain self-contradictions, it had gone virtuallly unchallenged.
With the discovery of new congruence geometries there was new
material for dispute as to which was the "true" geometry of space.
So Gauss attempted to settle the matter by surveying a huge triangle
formed by three mountains, the Brocken, the Hoher Hagen and the
Inselberg, to see if he could detect curvature in the geometry so
formed by demonstrating that the angles of the triangle did not add
up to 180°. This he failed to do, but this is not necessarily
significant; just as there is very little observable difference
between very small angles when the lines bounding them are short (yet
when the angles are projected for long distances the discrepancy
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becomes more noticeable), so too, Euclidean and curved space behave
in very much the same way over relatively small areas (such as
Germany) yet anomalies might be detected over interstellar distances.
Now, of course, it is possible to measure the parallax of distant
stars, but the problem is still not solved. Rather than measuring
space itself, both Gauss' and astronomers' experiments only tackle
sensible measures of space, in this case light rays. So as Poincare
has pointed out, all these experiments can ever hope to show is the
geometry of light rays, not of space. Establishing a Riemannian
geometry of light rays would not be sufficent grounds for abandoning
a Euclidean geometry of space, and would be no grounds at all if the
latter were a more convenient assumption to make. Since space can
only be measured in terms of light rays, rigid rods, etc., the
geometry of space itself, divorced from these intermediaries, remains
inaccessible. Consequently it makes no difference what geometry we
assume to hold for space; the most convenient one (with regard to
whatever process is being studied) is best:
" ...the axioms of geometry therefore are ... conventions.
no geometry is either true or false ..." (Poincare, 1900, pp 65,
73)
The geographical implications of curved space are perhaps less
interesting than those of metric spaces. Apart from the obvious
importance of spherical geometry to the geodesist and cartographer,
It has been suggested that it might be possible to treat spatial
interactions on the side of a hill as operative over a surface
possessing a geometry of variable curvature. (Abler, Adams & Gould,
1971)
There is a temptation to regard Euclidean geometry as being
somehow more "natural" than curved geometries; Kant specifically
maintained that the only space that could be conceived of by the
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human intellect was Euclidean space; Helmholtz, however, has
f
demonstated this to be a result of the limited extent of mathematics
A
and also of sensory physiology at that time (Helmholtz, 1968).
Recent approaches to the subject have produced evidence to query the
primacy of Euclidean space. The psychologists Luneberg and Blank
produced experiments designed to test the geometry of visual space.
(It is worth noting Helmholtz's remark that locality - and therefore
space - is for us primarily a visual phenomenon; Helmholtz, 1968,
pl08). The problem that Luneberg encountered was that there is a
natural tendency to interpret visual phenomena in Euclidean terms
simply because it is so easy to use the various visual cues given by
perspective and parallax to do so. So in his experiments he had to
confine his subjects in a dark room in which they were presented
merely with point sources of light to interpret. Given these extreme
limitations, Luneberg did manage to demonstrate that the binocular
nature of human vision gives to visual space a hyperbolic geometry of
constant curvature - normally not detectable owing to interference
from the interpretative faculties (Luneberg, 1947; Blank, 1958).
There is, however, another way in which cognitive space can be
regarded as curved - should we find, for instance, that estimated
distance between points tends to decrease relative to actual distance
between points with increasing distance from the observer. In such a
case, estimated distance would bear a curvilinear relationship to
actual distance - a logarithmic curve. This is discussed at greater
length in part III, especially section 5.
These then, metric geometry and curvature, are two of the more
important properties that can be defined for space. A third one,
that of dimensionality, we shall return to later by way of a
conclusion. Next, however, we should consider again the model of
spatial cognition presented in part I. If a cognitive space can be
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defined, it may be analysable in terms of the metric and curvature
properties discussed above. These, though, will be properties of
that cognitive space and will not in themselves tell us anything
about the formation of the cognitive space. Implicit in the action
of the "geographical variables" in fig. 1.2 was the distortion of
real distance being caused by properties of that actual distance -
properties related to the nature of that particular space. And since
that distance is a part of space itself, it is ultimately the nature
of space itself that will lend itself to the operation of
distortionary processes in the cognition of space. In order to
examine other properties that may or may not be important, it will
perhaps be best to consider the discussion of the nature of space in
a historical context.
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2) THE HISTORY OF THE DISCUSSION OF SPACE
(i) Absolute and Relative
Geographers and psychologists are by no means the first to
consider space in terms of perception. Indeed, the use of the term
"perception" in a philosophical context may recall to many the famous
dictum of Berkeley, that the "esse is the percipi" - and indeed, for
that celebrated bishop it was space as perceived that was important,
and, as space can only be perceived by means of relationships, this
brought him into opposition to the absolutism of Newton. These two
positions, easily represented as polar opposites, were actually more
a matter of different emphasis. The contrasting ideas, that space is
an absolute and invisible entity in its own right, a setting for
spatial relationships which it must precede a priori (as Kant
maintained), on the one hand, and that spatial relationships are
et*
derived from material phenomena a postiori and build up a pattern of
space relative to those phenomena, on the other, both had to be
conceded as reasonable by either side. Neither side could really
deny the existence of the "other sort of space", at least as a
philosophical thesis. One senses a sort of philosophical snobbery
when Newton writes:
" I do not define time, space, place and motion, as being
well known to all. Only I must observe, that the common people
conceive those quantities under no other notions but from the
relation they bear to sensible objects. And thence arise certain
prejudices, for the removing of which it will be convenient to
distinguish them into absolute and relative, true and apparent,
mathematical and common." (Newton, 1934, p.6)
He has to concede that relative space exists:
"But because the parts of space cannot be seen or
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distinguished from one another by our senses, therefore in their
stead we use sensible measures of them ... And so, instead of
absolute places and motions, we use relative ones; and that without
any inconvenience in our common affairs; but in philosophical
disquisitions, we ought to abstract from our senses and consider
*
things themselves... "(Newton, 1934, p.8)
Berkeley, one feels, sees the point of this quite clearly but is
more of a pragmatist; relative space takes on a greater importance by
being more of a real space rather than an intellectual space. If
there was only one body in the universe it could not be moved;
according to Newton it could, but even so, as there would be no way
of distinguishing between the isolated body moving and the body at
rest, there is little point in constructing the idea of absolute
motion. And if all bodies were annihilated there could be no motion
at all, for sure, and therefore no space at all; either that or
completely empty space, exclusive of all body which "seems
impossible, as being a most abstract idea." (Berkeley, 1938, para.
116)
But even if Newton allows some form of relative space, he still
insists on being rigorously scientific about it; a relative space
that incorporated perceptual distortions into its very framework
would doubtless have shocked him as being very base indeed. It is
the physicist who establishes relative space by careful measurement -
he still has to use his senses to do so, hence the relative element.
He can establish that A and B are 2.47m apart, and in this case,
"absolute and relative space are the same in figure and magnitude".
A and B are both relatively and absolutely 2.47m apart. The
difference is that whereas B is not moving relatively to A, it is
hurtling through absolute space at some phenomenal speed thanks to
the movement of Earth, Sun and Milky Way; either that or it is
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stationary in absolute space and all other bodies that appear to be
moving are performing elaborate gyrations with respect to it. Were
the latter geometrically possible, it could not be totally ruled out
without recourse to Occam's Razor.
Berkeley, however, allowed relative space to be:
"the immediately sensed spatial extension of sensed data
(which is a purely private space, varying with the degree of one's
astigmatism or the clearness of one's vision)" (Berkeley, 1938,
para.116) which is a step towards the 20th century philosophers
influenced by psychological studies, and the psychophysicist who
merges gradually with the behavioural geographer. By way of
illustration, depth has no significance at all as a concept,
according to Berkeley (this is, of course, depth as the third
dimension of a three dimensional object rather than the common usage
of depth as of, say, water). Depth can never be perceived as such,
being only breadth seen from the side. God, being everywhere, would
see everything perfectly as breadth, and thus the concept of depth
would make no sense to Him.
With the introduction of perception as an element in relative
space, a note of anthropocentrism has crept in. This reaches perhaps
its fullest sense in the phenomenological writings of Merleau-Ponty,
where space is seen not only as relative but relative to man alone.
Space is acutely tied up with the manner of its observation, and thus
the most important spatial relationships are those couched in the
form of "towards the observer" or "away from the observer" since this
is the way space is generally perceived. The sensation of space is
achieved through the medium of the human body and so the spatiality
of the body itself becomes of great importance, as well as the
position of the body in space. Anthropocentrism is taken to the
extent that relationships such as "the book is on the table" can only
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be posited by pre-reflectively associating oneself with either the
book or with the table and then comparing the relation of the other
body with oneself. Otherwise "on" becomes indistinguishable from
"under" or "beside". (Merleau-Ponty, 1962)
The significance of this should not be underestimated in a study
of cognitive distance. If we ask an observer to estimate the
distance from himself to a distant place, well and good. But if he
is asked to estimate the distance from one distant point to another,
to what extent will the distance between himself and the two distant
points affect the extent to which he can identify with them, and
affect his judgement of the distance? These are unknown variables.
(ii) Space and Divinity
When we allow space to be a result of perception, it is of
course the perception of matter that is in question. And here,
curiously enough, the absolute/relative controversy heads into
another dichotomous position, the spiritual/temporal. The absolutist
asks the philosopher to elevate himself from wordly considerations
and contemplate that which is without material aspect, is infinite,
immutable, in fact somewhat resembling the Divinity. This was not
lost upon a number of philosophers, among them Newton, who, though he
talked about absolute space in terms of a Divine "Sensorium" (Newton,
1952, p.403), appears not to have intended too close an association
between space and God to have been made. (Clarke, 1956, p.11)
But for people like the English scholar Jacob Raphson, writing
in 1702, and the 17th century Cambridge Platonist Henry More, the
similarity was more important; the very unmaterialistic nature of
absolute space but the very real nature of extension made the linking
of the spatial and the spiritual an excellent demonstration of the
reality of God, and a weapon against, inter alia, the Greek Atomists,
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whose materialism More found too atheistic. (Jammer, 1954)
So (from the geographer's point of view) here we have a new
twist to the position; we have assumed so far that space, as a
sublunary and material phenomenon, is a suitable topic for study by
geographers. But it would be a brave geographer who sought to bring
the Divine within the measuring sticks of his discipline. If space
and God are directly equatable, we might have to revise our plans to
make the nature of space part of our geographical theories.
The English were not the first philosophers to seek to equate
space with God. Jammer traces the idea right back to 1st century
Judaism where the word "place" (makom) was also used as a name for
God (Jammer, 1954). Jammer admits that this was quite likely to have
been no more than an abbreviation for "holy place" (makom kadosh),
but whatever the origin, it was a convenient theme for a theology
seeking the abstract above the material, and fitted in nicely with
Psalm 139. Jammer then attempts what appears a somewhat tenous line
of connections, through the Cabala, all the way to Newton via the
early 17th century Calabrian writer, Tomaso Campanel1 a. To quote
Jammer:
"In Campanella's conception, space becomes an absolute,
almost spiritual entity, characterised by divine attributes."
(Jammer, 1954, p.33)
On the other side of the coin is the relative space that in
comparison seems almost sordid: a a jumble of relationships between
bodies of base matter imperfectly perceived through failing material
senses... surely no philosophy fit to stand beside the lofty
aspirations of the absolutists? But in fact this material emphasis
is not so atheistic as More felt it to be. Berkeley was particularly
anxious to put down theological space as being itself a potentially
atheistic philosophy. By identifying God with space the Platonists
44
e
thought to show the reality of God even as space is real, but Berkely
A
saw that this also threatened the unreality of God should absolute
space turn out to be unreal. The concept of absolute space was not
secure enough to be used as a theological anchor, rocking, as he felt
it to be, under the strain of his arguments already quoted, and he
preferred to elevate God above space altogether.
A side track on the issue of the divine associations of space is
the identification of space with light - another attempt to find a
phenomenon in terms of which space might be illustrated. Jammer
adduces several examples of deific associations with light (some of
which are obviously metaphorical as in "lux mundi") and looks for a
pattern of space/light association running parallel to the space/God
philosophy (Jammer, 1954). One of the most interesting examples (not
so directly deific as some of the others) is that the first act of
creation in the Book of Genesis is the creation of light, not of
space. And if Kant was right about the primacy of space... The
argument is obvious, but unfortunately Genesis also details certain
waters which were never specifically recorded as being created; if
they got there, then space could presumably appear in a similarly
undocumented fashion.
Too close an identification of space with light leads to obvious
difficulties in matters of sealed boxes and suchlike, and this and
similar excursions into divinity are by and large more suited to the
mystic than the philosophical geographer. This brief discussion of
divinity and light has been included largely for the sake of
completeness; the two ideas do not lend themselves to further
development in a geographical context.
(iii) Space, Place and Matter
The theory of relative space, of space as a system of
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inter-relationships between material phenomena, does suggest
important ideas relating to the structure of perceptual space. If we
are seeking insight into the nature of space at a perceptual level,
we are looking for those properties of space that dictate the
differentiation of spatial location or spatial position to the
senses. We may have a relative space that is in fact an aggregate of
spatial relationships which are themselves a function of particular
perceptual parameters. The structuring of this perceptual space will
depend on the nature of these crucial parameters. In the words of
Helmholtz:
"An object's appearance at a certain definite place and not
at another must depend on the nature of the real conditions which
produce the idea. We must conclude that other real conditions would
have had to exist in order to cause the object to be perceived at
another location. Therefore in the real world, conditions or
complexes of conditions must exist which determine the position in
space at which an object appears to us." (Helmholtz, 1968, p.244)
These conditions Helmholtz calls topogenic factors.
"We know nothing about their nature; we only know, that the
occurence of spatial differences in perception presupposes difference
in the topogenic factors." (Helmholtz, 1968, p.244)
Now, in an ideal absolute space, the only topogenic factors
would be purely abstract geometrical relationships. The factors
which cause a certain point to appear to be a certain distance away
are limited to the fact that that point actually happens to be that
distance away. But in terms of a perceptual space, the matter is
obviously more complicated. An object placed in a specially
constructed room in which the irregular angles of the walls give
false perspective cues appears to be much closer or further away than
it really is. If space is dependent on the relationships between
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objects, then the nature and the placing of these objects should
constitute topogenic factors. Relative space is largely made up of
intervals; the German mathematician Cantor produced a proof showing
the equi-cardinality of all positive intervals independent of length;
(all positive intervals are, as it were, topologically equivalent)
according to Grunbaum, this suggests:
" ...there is no intrinsic attribute of the space between
the endpoints of a line segment AB, or any relation between these
points themselves, in virtue of which the interval AB could be said
to contain the same amount of space between the termini of another
interval CD not coinciding with AB." (Grunbaum, 1963, p.10)
The direct implication of this is that the perception of any
geographical distance would be a function of the number of intervals
between perceptual events contained within that distance; the
presence of an object C between the observer A and the object B is a
topogenic factor relating to the position of object B which is
"beyond C". (See fig. 2.5). If further objects, C^, C£, C3 and so on
are added to the line AB, the number of spatial relationships and
therefore the amount of space, at least of perceptual space if not of
absolute or Euclidean space, is theoretically increased. Perceptual
geometry becomes the study of relations and not of space defined by
means other than of relations; and number supercedes magnitude in
importance. This is Maxwell's dictum that: "We cannot describe...
the place of a body except by reference to some other body" in an
extreme form. (Maxwell, n.d., pl2)
Another possible direction of thought is the increasing
association of space with matter itself, and this, as will be seen,
may be of particular importance to the geographer. The material
components of any distance are of natural interest to the geographer,
and if these affect spatial cognition significantly, it will greatly
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Interval or Event Space - the line AB is four units long and
therefore longer than AD which is one unit long, even though the
single unit is longer than AB when measured in Euclidean terms.
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facilitate the arguments for a geographical approach to cognitive
distance. How strongly this relationship between matter and space is
to be emphasised is a matter of some divergence. In the above
arguments there is no need for the space under discussion to be
actually occupied. The definition of a section of space may depend
on the bodies surrounding it, but the space itself may be empty. But
when one maintains, as Leibniz did, that empty space is purely
imaginary, and that the vacuum of Guerike and Toricellus is a
chimera, then the relationship between space and matter is a much
closer one. Leibniz identified his position:
"I don't say that matter and space are the same thing. I
only say, there is no space, where there is no matter; and that space
in itself is not an absolute reality. Space and matter differ, as
time and motion. However, these things, though different, are
inseparable." (Leibniz, 1956, para. 62)
But to Descartes, the relationship was closer still. He argued
on the theme of the extension of bodies; the distinguishing feature
by which we acknowledge a phenomenon to be a body is not
hardness, colour nor heaviness but only its extension. A body is
only a body when it occupies a space, so:
" A space, or intrinsic place, does not differ in actuality
from the body that occupies it... " (Descartes, 1959, para. 10)
Extension is seen as the distinguishing feature of both space
and matter:
"It is easy to see that it is the same extension that
essentially constitutes a body and a space; that there is no more
difference here than there is between the essence of a genus or
species and the essence of the individual." (Descartes, 1959, para.
11)
And this, of course, makes a vacuum logically impossible:
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extension of space is identical to extension of body, therefore the
extension of nothingness or "no body" (when anything which possesses
extension is by definition body) is wholly contradictory.
Of significance is Descartes' use of the word "place". He
distinguishes between place and space in a manner somewhat akin to
the qualitative/quantitative distinction. The volume of a stone (or
the extension thereof) indicates how much space it occupies; if the
stone is moved it retains its extension and occupies the same space;
it no longer occupies the same place (position), which is invaded by
some other body, or by air, which, though it may be said to occupy
the same place as the stone did, may not occupy the same space.
Though we may say that the Belfast City Hall was built in the same
place as the old Linen Hall, the new building, the re-placement of
the old one, being larger and of different design, occupies a
different (and larger) space.
Descartes further divides place into intrinsic and extrinsic
place, either of which may be considered with respect to a particular
body. Intrinsic place turns out to be identical to space: the place
of a body is "where it is" relative to itself, i.e. its extension,
i.e. its space. Extrinsic place is the neo-Aristotelean bounding
surface of the body; which, it is important to note, is not part of
the body itself, nor part of the surrounding body or bodies, but is
the infinitely small juncture between them. This clears up the old
problem of the "motionless" boat going upstream as fast as the river
flows down; the boat's place is continually changing if we regard its
extrinsic place as being part of the water (the interface between the
boat and the water); but if we abstract the bounding surface we can
more sensibly regard the place as constant. But in fact we still
have to regard it as being constant with regard to something else.
"To determine the position we have to look to some other
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bodies, regarded as unmoving; and we may say - relatively to
different sets of bodies - that the same thing is simultaneously
changing and not changing its place." (Descartes, 1959, para. 13)
Eventually " ... we shall ... be deriving the determination of
place from some unmoving points in the heavens. But we may well end
by thinking that no such genuinely are to be found in the
universe... ; and in that case we shall conclude that no object has a
permanent place except by the determination of our thought."
(Descartes, 1959, para. 13)
There is in Descartes' writing on space and place a certain
similarity to Aristotle (despite Descartes' aversion to scholastic
philosophy); but for Aristotle the notion of place was more important
than that of space, which becomes merely a vague aggregate of places.
With the "abhorrence of the void" the universe must be a plenum and
space must be coterminous with matter. The fact that the universe
and therefore space is finite is, in Jammer's phrase, "an accident of
matter". (Jammer, 1954, p.20)
While Aristotle's views were the most enduring, there were other
thoughts on the nature of space in ancient times. Aristotle's pupil
o
Theophrastus appears to have been one of the first to propse a theory
of systematic relations with regard to space; (Jammer, 1954)
elsewhere there were notions of space as a primordial atmosphere, a
necessary precursor to existence, after the Kantian manner. Space
was something in which you could put things, a universal container,
and for the Atomists, void.
"All nature then, as it exists, by itself, is founded on two
things: there are bodies and there is void in which these bodies are
placed and through which they move about." (Lucretius, 1886, III,
p.23)
Thus Lucretius. Furthermore, space must be infinite, for, were
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it finite, and a man stood at its furthest extremity, and hurled a
javelin outwards, where would it go? And also, since Lucretius does
not understand gravity, it seems evident to him that if space were
finite we should have fallen to the bottom of it by now.
Of course, the boundary of Aristotle's finite universe is like
the boundary of an Einstein-Riemann finite universe (a space of
constant positive curvature must be finite) - it is a boundary, as it
were, with only one side, and at the edge of the universe "outwards"
does not exist - there is simply no such direction. Beyond it there
is not even nothing, there is no beyond. Sellar and Yeatman (1932)
neatly parody Einstein: space is curved and finite, and if you keep
on going you eventually bump into the back of your own head.
To Newton space was infinite and isotropic. To Aristotle it was
finite, to Lucretius it was anisotropic (possessing the direction
"down" - owing to the imposition of a primitive concept of gravity).
One may feel that Newton's position is the more "natural", but the
other two serve at least as illustrations of the fact that, in order
to keep an open mind on the subject when we come to regard the nature
of perceptual space, even what we may regard as elementary
assumptions can be, and may need to be discarded.
If we attempt to define space in terms of place we cannot easily
escape Swinburne's definition of place ("a place is identified by
describing its spatial relations to material objects forming a frame
of reference") and a circularity is reached. (Swinburne, 1968, p.13)
However, the above disquisition on space and place is important.
We are beginning to piece together two quite different attitudes to
space. On the one hand we have space conceived of as an infinite
ethereal container, absolute and unvarying. On the other, the idea
that space can be defined in terms of the things that it contains.
These may be what we have loosely termed "perceptual events",
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intervals, some form of division, or they may be material things, or
the places of material things.
We can very approximately put Newton, Kant and Lucretius in the
first camp. In absolute space geometry is regular and probably (but
not necessarily) Euclidean. In the second camp we find Berkeley,
Descartes and Aristotle appearing as unlikely bedfellows. It should
be pointed out, since these three philosophers really are very
unlikely bedfellows, normallly characterised as fundamentally opposed
to one another, that this association only occurs because of the
particular theme being followed. Though the philosophies these three
represented are very different, the effect, from the point of view of
the geographer studying space, is very similar. Though Berkeley and
Descartes might have disagreed on the objectivity of space, the
geographically important theme of the close relationship between
space and its contents is there in both. For different reasons,
perhaps, but it is still there. Associated with the second position
is a geometry of relations, not of absolutes. Space is finite if
matter and place are finite, and its properties are apprehended by
way of the properties of the contents of space.
In terms of our perceptual study, two corresponding positions
appear. We can hypothesise that space will be cognised in absolute
terms, or in relative terms. If the latter is true, we might expect
properties of cognitive space that are a result of the cognition of
the contents of that space. For instance, we have already mentioned
a hypothetical exaggeration of space close at hand relative to far
i
away, and a corresponding power function relating cognitve to
physical distance. This was given as an example of curved space, but
one could also interpret it this way: that as familiar areas contain
more (cognised) places than unfamiliar ones, familiar places occupy
more space. More places, the more space needed to hold them.
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(iv) Space and Time
God, light, matter, place, all have been the subject of attempts
to find a parameter by which space can be defined. There is, of
course, always the unpleasant possibility that no such parameter
exists, that space cannot be'described in terms of anything else and
therefore cannot really be defined. We can say that length is
defined by measurement with a rigid scale, and then define a rigid
scale as one which always keeps the same length. These circularities
are hard to avoid. The last attempt to understand space in terms of
something else that we can look at here is the association of space
with time. And this, perhaps, is no longer a search for a simple
definition of space, for time is as problematical a phenomenon as
space, if not more so. Rather it is, since philosophy is by and
large more disingenuous than it used to be, a linking up of two
difficult questions in the hope that they may shed some light on one
another. But before discussing at length the arguments that lead up
to the space/time analogue, it will be worthwhile to consider the
more mundane aspects of the matter.
Conventionally we tend to think of miles and kilometres as being
spatial measures, and of hours and days as being purely temporal
ones. This is an educated viewpoint, even an academic one. To
primitive man, the position was different. The length of a journey
in miles was not relevant to him; one mile of plain and one mile of
mountainous terrain are very different quantities from an
experiential point of view. However, the experiential (that is, the
important) effects of distance could be quite adequately measured and
expressed by the use of temporal units in the place of purely spatial
ones. If a journey was three days long, that was sufficent
knowledge. The traveller then knew when he would arrive, how many
nights he would have to sleep on the road, and how much food he would
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need on the journey. How many miles the journey involved was of no
consequence in comparison. Such measurements were irrelevant, and
the irrelevant tended to get left out. So the Eskimos made maps for
their own use which showed direction graphically, and distance by
re
marking the^on of a number indicating the number of days travel each
journey might take. For the Eskimos this was a functional
arrangement; but one can see in it an implicit philosophical
statement: that space is a function of time.
Even in contemporary Western society, where signposts and maps
are all in miles or kilometres, one still finds a "how far?" question
getting a temporal answer. It has to be regulated with regard to
different modes of transport possible, true, but the greater
relevance of temporal information, particularly in a world
increasingly temporally-oriented, overrules the logical objection
that a temporal answer strictly should demand a "how long will it
take?" question. One also notes that metric experience of distance
is harder to come by as regards miles travelled unless (as was
briefly discussed in part I) one has a habit of watching car
milometers, or of carrying a pedometer. The temporal extension of a
journey, on the other hand, is easily measured with a pocket watch or
even by observation of the passage of the sun. Furthermore, one
notes that we use essentially similar adjectives to refer to both
spatial and temporal extent: a "long" time and a "long" distance, for
example.
Now, if this link between the temporal and the spatial does
exist in everyday reckoning, and if it is true that a degree of
priority adheres to temporal measures, this may give us a parameter
by which we may find space being perceived. It is possible that the
perception of the length of a space traversed by a subject is
influenced by the time it takes him to traverse that space. Thus
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given an equal length of motorway and mountain track, the mountain
track should appear the longer distance since it takes longer to
travel along. Obviously, the subject is well aware that he travels
at different speeds along the two distances, and that he will
necessarily take longer when travelling more slowly, but that is no
indication that he would be able to make sufficent allowance for this
when estimating the two distances. It is by no means uncommon for
someone walking for the first time a distance which he had frequently
driven along to dicover that the distance was "longer than he had
imagined".
The concept of dimension is an important one. We are accustomed
to using the word to mean size, which is equivalent to extension,
which is spatial extension, and, more particularly, extension in a
particular direction. The directions are distinguished by the
condition that each "dimensional" direction must be at right angles
to all other dimensional directions. Spatial description increases
with increasing dimension. At the lowest level we find zero
dimension or no dimension; a point, which has position but not
magnitude. One dimension, and we can talk about distance. With two
dimensions comes the plane surface and the description of area. With
three the solid and volume. And there it seems to stop. We can only
draw three lines all mutually perpendicular, and for this reason the
contention that three and only three dimensions exist in reality was
for a long time accepted as fact. However, in mathematics one can
add any number of extra dimensions, albeit in an artificial manner.
This can easily be illustrated with reference to the game of chess.
Chess, or at least, variations on the game, covers a wider
dimensional range than is generally supposed. Admittedly, it would
be difficult to produce zero-dimensional chess, which would have only
one piece and no possible movement. However, one-dimensional chess
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does exist, and is played on a board 27 squares long and one square
wide (Parton, n.d., p.l). A rook (an orthagonally-moving piece) can
only move in one possible direction from a corner (end) of the board.
Ordinary chess is, of course, two-dimensional, being played on an 8x8
board, and a rook in the corner of the board has two ways to move,
along the rank and along the file. Three-dimensional chess, so
beloved of novelists, with the addition of extra boards tiered one
above the other, gives the rook three distinctly different directions
in which to move. The game does exist independently of fiction, and
in its standard form is played on four 5x5 boards arranged in
cuboidal fashion (Dickins, 1969, p.16). But another game that also
exists is the extremely taxing four-dimensional chess, in which the
rook has four possible directions in which to move. The extra
dimension is accomplished quite simply; four three-dimensional
"boards" are arranged in a row, and moving from a square on one set
of boards to the equivalent square on one of the other sets of boards
constitutes the fourth move available to the rook. The whole playing
area, or four-dimensional board, is a 5x5x4x4 grid (also termed a
"space hyper-model"; Dickins, 1969, p.18). To obtain a game of
five-dimensional chess, all that would be necessary would be to
arrange twelve more three-dimensional sets in three more rows, to
give a 5x5x4x4x4 "board" (see fig. 2.6). And so on. The
mathematical multiplication of dimensions in this manner is
potentially infinite.
Nor is this the only way of producing higher dimensions in
mathematics. Another device, instead of multiplying the the axes of
conventional co-ordinate geometry, introduces co-ordinates for
phenomena other than points. Using only two conventional dimensions,
it is possible to construct a three-dimensional manifold of circles
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centre, and the radius. Similarly, a four-dimensional manifold of
ellipses given by (x,y,r^^) can be drawn. From there it is easy to
visualise a six-dimensional manifold of "flying saucers" represented
in three conventional dimensions by (x^z,^,^,^).
To return to the four-dimensional rook, it is still valid to ask
whether or not the four different moves are really four different
dimensions. It is obviously essential to sort out one's definitions.
This we shall attempt to do by means of two syllogisms.
First Syllogism
All dimensions are at right angles to one another.
All directions mutually perpendicular cannot be expressed in terms of
one another. (This is simple vector analysis.)
The vector x cannot be expressed in terms of another direction. (The
4D rook's move, treated as a vector, possesses this property.)
Therefore, x is not necessarily at right angles to all other
directions and is therefore not necessarily a new dimension.
Second Syllogism
A dimension is a direction which cannot be expressed in terms of any
other direction.
All directions mutually perpendicular are inexpressible in terms of
one another.
Therefore all directions at right angles to one another are
dimensions, but not all dimensions are necessarily at right angles to
one another.
The two syllogisms use slightly different definitions, but if
one uses the second definition, the first conclusion of that
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syllogism comes very close to the spirit of the original definition.
Consequently it is possible to view the second definition as being
more flexible and therefore potentially more fruitful for the
geographer interested in space and cognitive space. And if the four
dimensions we have here engendered are not strictly at right angles
geometrically in that one cannot take a protractor to the fourth rook
move as you can to the other three, one can still think of all four
as being at least "metaphysically perpendicular".
So far, so good; we have more or less arrived at Riemann's
general definition of space as an "n-dimensional manifold". Three of
the dimensions we label length, breadth and depth, but can we make
any more sense out of higher dimensions other than row piling on row
of multiplying chess boards?
The fourth dimension at least, may be susceptible to some sort
of concrete identification. (Obviously, we are not too likely to
deduce the "nature" of the 103rd dimension. The number of "real"
dimensions may be greater than three, but it is not necessarily
infinite.) Of passing interest in this context is a passage in
E.A. Abbot's "Flat!and" (Abbot, 1926) where "A. Square", the hero of
this tale of a two-dimensional world, meets a visitor from the
three-dimensional world, to wit, a sphere. Now, the square possesses
only two-dimensional senses, and can in no way directly perceive the
third dimension, and furthermore, he is quite incapable of conceiving
of it, as well. To him a third dimension is quite impossible; for a
start, he muses, only two lines can be perpendicular to one another
(!), therefore - only two dimensions can exist. As the sphere passes
up and down through the plane on which the square lives, it takes the
attributes of a circle of changing radius (since this is seen end on,
as it were, it appears as a line of changing length). This seems
strange, but is still two-dimensionally possible. However, when the
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sphere leaves the plane and then lightly descends upon the square's
interior, a spot inaccessible to two-dimensional manoeuvres (unless
the square's sides be breached), the square is forced to concede the
existence of another dimension imperceptible to him. (Thus
enlightened, he asks the sphere about the fourth dimension, to which
the sphere, no more broad-minded than the square was initially, gives
an off-hand dismissal.)
Now, one of the most significant points in the story is the way
in which the three-dimensional sphere appeared to the two-dimensional
square (possessed, of course, of only two-dimensional sensory
equipment); that is, as a series of cross-sections, the expanding and
contracting circles being cross-sections of a larger continuum
extending into this strange new third dimension. This does have its
equivalent in our three-dimensional world (we possessing only
three-dimensional sensory equipment). If one considers the history
of the world as a whole, then surely this is never perceived directly
in its entirety; we only see a series of cross-sections across it,
each a fraction of a second in duration. We cannot see the whole
history of an object at once, just as the square was not able to see
the whole of the sphere at once. By this analogy, we can begin to
think of duration as being in the nature of a new direction, and
approach the concept of a fourth dimension which is not so much time
in the layman's sense, but extension over time, or space-time.
In terms of the example just given of four-dimensional chess,
the array of boards can be seen as a representation of the life
history of one 3D "board", seen at time 1 (just after its creation),
time 2, time 3 and time 4 (just before its destruction). This is
what Minkowski (1923) called the "world-line" of an object;
Hagerstrand (1963) has used the phrase "life-line" to describe more
or less the same thing in a geographical context, since the concept
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lends itself to the geographical description of spatial processes.
The world-line of a human being would be comprised of all the
positions which that human ever occupied strung out in sequence like
a long pink tube (baby-width at one end, adult-width the other),
which at any point could be intersected by the plane of an instant
resulting in a three-dimensional object, the human being at that
instant. This intersection phenomena is in fact a property of
dimensions; the intersection of three-dimensional solids gives a
two-dimensional plane, and so forth (see fig. 2.7). Similarly, two
lines, when "joined" together, trace a plane; two planes imply a
solid between them, and two solids, say two identical cubes
temporally separated, could similarly be joined by tracing the
pattern of movement of one cube to the position of the other, tracing
out the four-dimensional world-line of the cube in the process.
It is important not to think of time as being something moving;
if time really did "pass", it would have to move at a speed, and
speed is given by the formula distance over time, and what time can
one measure the passage of time against? Time itself must be static,
a fourth co-ordinate in a map of the history of the universe, a map
across which stretch all our world-lines.
The distance that separates Edinburgh from London is not merely
spatial in a three-dimensional sense, for if I am in Edinburgh now,
it is quite impossible for me to reach "London now". The best I can
do is to visit "London six hours hence", which is a slightly
different place. In the course of my travelling, I alter all four
space/space-time co-ordinates; the distance which separates the two
cities, and therefore the space also, is essentially
four-dimensional.
However, if time is to be accounted as a fourth dimension, it




(a) Two solids, ABCDEFGH and IJKL, intersecting to give a plane, MNO.
(b) Two planes, ABCD and EFGH, intersecting to give a line, IJ.
E F A
D
(c) Two planes, ABCD and EFGH, being joined to give a solid,
ABCDHEFG.
(d) Two lines, AB and CD, being joined to give a plane, ABDC.
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three; space and time must be shown to be valid analogues. This has
been quite well accomplished in a paper by Richard Taylor (1955), who
argues that objections to this analogy do not hold water. For
example, the argument is quoted that a thing may be in one place at
two different times, but never in two different places at one time.
The answer to this is that a thing can occupy a single place at two
times if it occupies that, or another, place between the two given
times. Otherwise it ceases to be the same object. Similarly, an
object may occupy two places at the same time under the same proviso,
viz that it occupies some place between the two given places. One
end of a book occupies a slightly different place from the other end,
but the book as a whole must occupy space continuously between these
two ends.
One or two other common objections to the correspondance are not
dealt with by Taylor, but on examination they also must yield.
Mention has often been made as to how one can "predict" the past but
not the future in matters of temporal consideration, whereas no such
spatial discrepancy exists. Actually the positions are very similar.
I can predict certain things about the future given certain
assumptions of the absence of change. I can predict that three weeks
hence there will be a map hanging on my wall, because it is there now
and I have no intention of removing it. It may fall down of its own
accord, of course, in which case the prediction will be wrong. I can
make similar spatial "predictions" about the world "now" subject to
the same limitations. I can "predict" that a certain tree, many
miles away, exists at this precise moment, based on the evidence that
it was there when I last saw it. Of course, it may have been blown
down or cut down since, in which case the "prediction" is wrong. We
can make 100% certain "predictions" about the "immutable" past only
if we have some way of remotely sensing the events we wish to
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pronounce on. Similarly, we can make accurate statements about the
present state of spatially distant objects only if we can garner
evidence about them by means of "live" television broadcasts and the
1 ike.
Another objection, that'time is irreversible, is based on the
misconception that time somehow flows. Space too is irreversible if
one must use the word. How can space ever be reversed?
The interpretation of space in terms of time, particularly as a
feature of perceptual space, thus becomes a natural process something
akin to thinking of length in terms of breadth; it is an association
of two parameters of what is essentially the same thing: the
four-dimensional continuum. We can measure space in terms of time as
the Eskimos did; we can similarly measure time in terms of space as
when we talk about Cromerian, Anglian, Hoxnian and Walstonian periods
- measurements of Quaternary time which are defined relative to the
spatial extent of ice sheets. In fact, to use an ordinary clock is
to measure time by the space traversed by the hands. Where temporal
substitution becomes a distortionary feature in perceptual space is
where it is used inconsistently. In space-time London is closer to
me than Belfast is (since I can't afford the air fares); but I know
that in Euclidean 3-space, Belfast is the closer of the two. If I
did not know that from indirect sources, I might make an incorrect
judgement as to the relative positions of the cities in Euclidean
3-space which I should then place with other comparisons in 3-space
which might be perfectly accurate. If all my judgements were based
on time estimates, an arguably accurate (or at least, consistent)
account of the spatio-temporal relationships of the points under
question would be obtained. But when the perceptual process uses
both four and three dimensional estimates together, a perceptual
space is developed which has 4D elements without being accurate to
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either 4-space or 3-space.
The third dimension, according to Berkeley, is really the second
dimension seen from the side. As two dimensions, they are therefore
similar, and, from a perceptual point of view at least,
interchangeable. If we find that the perception of distance is
significantly affected by temporal considerations, that will be
considered as evidence for dimensional substitution; it will be
dimensional substitution we shall invoke to explain the phenomena.
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(v) The Fifth Dimension
Something of the indeterminacy of Riemann's definition now
appears more clearly: "n-dimensional manifold" can, in a realistic
rather than purely mathematical sense, refer to values of n=3 or n=4.
It now becomes tempting to see if any interpretation can be put on
the fifth dimension; success will give us another possible
dimensional substitution for consideration. The concept of the fifth
dimension has received very little discussion as such; there is an
interesting examination by Reichenbach of what the world would be
like if colour were the fifth dimension, but this is not intended to
be strictly relevant (Reichenbach, 1957). The following speculations
are purely tentative; they have no mathematical basis and the reader
may make of them what he likes.
Firstly, obviously enough, we can make no use of the "lines at
right angles" approach beyond remarking that the fifth dimension,
like the fourth, will have to be "metaphysically at right angles" to
the other dimensions, i.e. it will be metric but inexpressible as a
vector in terms of any other dimension.
Next we should examine the "intersection" and "join" approaches
outlined earlier. Though similar in appearance, these are not
different facets of the same process, as it were. If they were
simple reversals of one another, we should expect to find some
relationship between the interfacial plane produced by the
intersection of two solids and the plane surfaces that join to
produce at least one of the solids involved, but this does not happen
to be the case except in the special circumstance of an intersection
that is merely tangential.
Still, ideally both should hold for the fifth dimension, but not
necessarily so, for other properties of interdimensional
relationships do not hold for all four so far established. For
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example, a four dimensional object can be represented using only
three dimensions as in the case of the 4D chess set. A 3D cube can
be represented using only two dimensions by way of a perspective
drawing. But a 2D plane cannot be represented using only one
dimension.
The join theory is the less helpful of the two; it will be noted
that the joining of two lines to make a plane requires that the two
lines be separated in the second dimension, therefore the theory
already presupposes the existence of the second dimension and also
its nature - this could therefore not be predicted by the theory. We
cannot "join" two world-lines until we know what separates them.
It is much easier to work the intersection theory in reverse, as
was used in the discussion on the nature of the fourth dimension.
For a cube, a three-dimensional object to exist, it must satisfy
certain requirements. Firstly, it must possess the first three
dimensions, i.e. it must have length, depth and breadth. Secondly,
it must be suggested by a higher dimension - it must be part of a
cube world-line, and it must exist at a particular moment in time.
This is a form of the intersection theory. It can also be thought of
as the intersection of a four dimensional world-line with a three
dimensional universe (the universe at one particular instant),
producing a three dimensional object, part of that world-line, just
as the intersection of a cube with a plane produces another plane,
less than the first plane just as the cube is less than the universe.
The strict intersection of two world-lines again produces a
three-dimensional object (a cube in the example given), but this is
more easily thought of in purely geometrical terms. In simple common
sense terms, the intersection of the moment and the world-line can be
seen to be quite straightforwardly logical; in order for a cube to be
seen at a particular instant, it is necessary that the cube exist
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immediately prior and immediately subsequent to being seen, and, of
course, to be seen at that instant it must exist at that instant.
We must now look at the equivalent one step up the dimensional
ladder. The cube world-line must possess length, breadth, depth and
duration - are there any other metric properties that it must
suggest? It has, most likely, mass, colour, hardness and
temperature; do these help us any? On closer examination we find
that colour is a form (loosely speaking) of light, and light is a
form of energy. Hardness is dependent on arrangement of matter or
mass. Temperature is an index of energy. And energy, we understand,
is equal to mass times the square of the speed of light. In other
words, all our metric properties boil down to mass or energy, which
may well be entirely the same thing, especially if it be true that
sub-atomic particles are composed of packets of pure energy and no
more.
Furthermore, I think it is fair to say that it is a prerequisite
of our world-line that it possess mass, and that in order to produce
any spatial movement which that world-line might trace out, energy
must interact with that mass. Even if the object concerned stays in
exactly the same place for the entire duration of its existence,
energy is still necessary to bind particles into atoms, atoms into
molecules, and molecules into a solid object. The world-line, in as
much as it is an object, is the product of mass and energy, and since
these two are fundamentally identifiable with one another, I think it
is fair to suggest them as a fifth dimension.
Whatever the complexities of the physics implicit in all this,
from the geographical point of view it forms a convenient natural
philosophy of the geosphere, which can be viewed as a five
dimensional manifold, in which pattern and process can be represented
by five vectors. These for a flow pattern for example, would
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constitute: a NS distance component, an EW distance component, an
altitudinal component, a temporal component and a quantitative
component. These abstractions are inherent in the geographical
description of any material phenomena; they answer the questions
where? when? and how much? in a well-defined and systematic
framework.
This has interesting implications for our concern with
perception. Besides perception of space being a function of time,
the other suspected source of perceptual distortion mentioned in
connection with the philosophy of space was the possibility of space
being perceived in terms of the matter contained within that space,
discussed in the context of relative space and the philosophy of
Descartes. Now were this operational, it could be viewed as another
example of dimensional substitution comparable with that discussed in
the context of space-time. This time, however, it would be the fifth
dimension influencing the perception of the first, rather than the
fourth as in the case of time substitution. And if the dimensional
scheme suggested can be accepted, then both four and five dimensional
influences on distance perception are as natural and understandable
as Berkeley's depth being breadth seen from the side.
When we talk of "dimensional substitution" there are two
possible ways in which we can regard this, the conventional and the
influential. Under the first category we have in mind substitutions
of dimension that are in common usage and are conscious
implementations of conventions of expression. An example already
given is the temporal reply to a question about distance: the remark
that "town A is 30 minutes away". Similarly, when an American
describes a location as being "three blocks away" he is deliberately
using the dimension of matter as a substitute for the dimension of
distance. To speak of an office as being on the fifth floor is to
70
give its altitudinal component in the same way. With a little
thought one can produce plenty of other examples of this sort of
thing, for example, expressing the population of China in terms of
the time it would take for them to march past an observation post.
However, we are more concerned here with substitution in terms
of influence; the subconscious counterpart to the conventions above.
Can we say that attributes of a distance, in terms of its material
contents, or the time taken to traverse it, will affect the
estimation of that distance? Here we are not looking for the
translation of distance into other terms, but the distortion of
distance while retaining a spatial form of expression. Whereas the
substitutional conventions discussed above do obviously take place,
we have little evidence to consider with respect to subconscious
influence upon nominally spatial estimations.
To recapitulate then, when considering the nature of cognitive
space as shown by cognitive distance, we can consider the following:
(i) To what extent does it exhibit network properties, especially
symmetry or commutativity?
(ii) To what extent does its geometry suggest an absolute or a
relative space? Is the geometry regular or irregular, and if
regular, is it Euclidean?
(iii) Does cognitive distance suggest a curved cognitive space?
(iv) Can a relationship between estimated distance and time or matter
be demonstrated?






1) GLOBAL DISTANCE ESTIMATION - A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE.
(i) Introduction.
Cognitive distance being such a recent addition to the
geographer's field of interest, it is not entirely surprising to find
that the literature on the subject is fairly limited. Furthermore,
what there is is by no means equally divided between the various
scales at which the subject can be tackled. The great majority of
the published work is concerned with cognitive distance at an
intra-urban scale, using relatively short distances from city
landmark to city landmark. Very little has been done at an
inter-urban or regional scale; three studies will be referred to
later but only one of these has actually been published. There is
considerably more published work available at the global scale, most
of which straddles uncomfortably the gap between geography and
psychology. The bulk of this has come from the Psychological
Laboratories at Stockholm, with a line of dissonant counterpoint from
two psychologists in Australia. Virtually the only study of
specifically geographical intent is provided by a small-scale
experiment conducted by David Stea.
The consideration of work done at a regional or national scale
we shall leave until part IV, together with a brief account of some of
the more important material relating to the cognition of urban
distance. For the present we can look at the published work dealing
with cognitive distance at a global scale, and then consider the
problems that this sort of study presents to the experimenter.
(ii) Emotional Involvement.
The various studies that have been carried out at the
Psychological Laboratories at Stockholm have been chiefly concerned
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with studying the relationship between subjective distance and
emotional involvement, and in particular, the proving of what
Bratfisch terms "the inverse square root law". This hypothesis,
first published by Ekman and Bratfisch (1965), states that the
emotional involvement of subjects with a particular place varies
inversely with the square root of the subjective distance to that
place. This derived initially from an experiment in which 46
Stockholm students were presented with lists containing every
possible pairing of ten selected cities (Budapest, Copenhagen,
Hamburg, Kiruna, London, Montreal, Moscow, Peking, Reykjavik and
Vienna); they were "instructed to compare the distance from Stockholm
to the two cities of the pair, to indicate which of the two distances
was perceived as greater, and to estimate the smaller distance in per
cent (sic) of the greater distance." (Ekman & Bratfisch, 1965, p431)
The students were then asked to imagine hypothetical events of a dire
nature occurring in each city and to use the same method to determine
which city of each pair they would feel most involved with. Then,
using ratio scaling techniques of a complex nature (Ekman, 1958,
Kunnapas, 1960) absolute figures for subjective distance and for
emotional involvement were obtained. These figures were then plotted
to show that emotional involvement did indeed vary with the inverse
square root of subjective distance, except in the cases of London,
Moscow and Peking, which had figures showing a much higher emotional
involvement than was predicted. This was explained as resulting from
the fact that these three cities were more interesting than the other
seven.
This was followed up with a second study by Bratfisch in which
different groups of subjects (all students) were given different
lists of cities (three groups of ten - thirty cities in all - all of
them in Europe; Bratfisch, 1969). This time, it was intended that
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allowance should be made for the fact that larger cities might be
seen as especially interesting, as in the case of London, Moscow and
Peking cited above. Accordingly, the subjects were all asked to
estimate the importance of, their interest in, and their knowledge
of, each city in the list. This was to be done by giving each city a
point score on an arbitary scale.
At around the same time, Stanislav Dornic (1967) produced a
similar experiment under the aegis of Stockholm, but using Bratislava
as centre, and Czech students instead of Swedish.
The results of all this were that the values of exponents
obtained denoting the relationship between emotional involvement and
subjective distance were remarkably constant at about -0.5 . This
demonstrated conclusively (at least, to the satisfaction of the
Swedes) that emotional involvement varied inversely with the square
root of subjective distance, provided either (as Bratfisch would say)
that other factors were held constant, or (to quote the Austra 1ian
view of the proceedings) given "a considerable degree of data
manipulation to the extent that apparently complex scattergrams were
differentiated into up to three curves". (Walmsley, 1974, p. 12)
One of the first problems in considering this topic is to ask
whether emotional involvement or subjective distance is to be
regarded as the independent variable in this relationship. If one
accepted the "law1 it would still be valid to ask whether subjects
felt more involved with places which they thought were closer, or
whether they imagined that places with which they did happen to be
involved were closer than they actually were. This point is
mentioned in passing by Dornic, and is otherwise not touched upon at
all.
The second question is the matter of the relationship between
subjective distance and actual distance. For the three experiments
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constituting Bratfisch's second study he quotes as exponents (i.e.
gradients of the regression of log subjective distance on log actual
distance) the figures 0.58, 0.90 and 1.08 (Bratfisch, 1969,
p 249-50). It is not clear how these figures were obtained, but it
seems as though they were taken from a graph on which the data from
all the subjects in each group were plotted in one large
amalgamation. No regression coefficents are given, but we are told
"the scatter around the curves ... is very great. It is due, in
part, to the particular complexity of the present problem, which
involves ... several subjective partially independent variables."
(Bratfisch, 1969, p 251)
The third point worth mentioning is the rather curious discovery
V
by Dorm'c that "among European cities, all those situated north of
the observer's position were generally perceived as closer than
e.g. Geneva and Athens ... since most notions of the inter-city
distances in our subjects were probably formed on the basis of map
inspection, they might well have been influenced by purely perceptual
factors including shape, colour and direction on maps". (Dornic,
1967, p 5) However, we note that his figures for the actual distances
were obtained from "a large map" - he does not mention whether or not
he is aware that large maps are prone to distorting distances,
especially in northern regions.
Despite the consistency of involvement/distance exponents in the
Swedish studies, when Gordon Stanley (1968) attempted to replicate
the Bratfisch "law" using Armidale N.S.W. as centre, and a total of
32 cities scattered about the globe as stimuli, his results were
totally inconclusive. Stanley's view of this was that "the inverse
square root hypothesis is limited in its application to other
cultures and epicentres other than Stockholm". (Stanley, 1968, p 167)
However, Stanley's study is not really comparable with the Swedish
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work. Firstly, while Stockholm used an elaborate ratio scaling
technique involving comparisons between many pairs of distances,
Stanley asked his subjects to write down estimates of distance as the
name of each city was called out (at ten second intervals). Under
these somewhat severe conditions, the reliability of such distance
estimations as expressions of actual subjective distance is not to be
guaranteed. Secondly, all the cities that the Swedes used were more
or less in the same hemisphere, and only Montreal and Peking were
outside Europe (though Dornic did use Tokyo and Buenos Aires). But
with the peripheral position of Australia and the fact that some of
the stimulus cities were almost antipodal, Stanley's subjects had a
much harder job.
However, the reply made by the Stockholm researchers criticises
Stanley for a different reason; the accusation is made (Lundberg,
1970, p 63) that Stanley asked his subjects to estimate actual
distance (rather than subjective distance). This, on the surface of
it, may seem a little strange; after all, surely estimating actual
distance produces subjective distance? It might seem that asking for
estimates of subjective distance would produce subjective subjective
distance, a very curious stuff indeed. In fact, the matter hinges on
the specialised use of the phrase "subjective distance", which was
mentioned in part I. The difference between asking subjects to
estimate subjective distance and simply asking them to estimate
actual distance lies in the fact that the Swedish investigators
specifically instructed their subjects to ignore any knowledge they
might have (or think they had) as to the actual distances involved,
and rely entirely on superficial impression. Stanley can, I think,
be forgiven for overlooking the significance of this point, for the
phrase "subjective distance" is not clearly explained in any of the
various reports, and the above exposition is derived from a letter
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(unpublished) from Dr Bratfisch to the author.
The point also arises as to the significance of a study in which
subjective distance in the Bratfisch sense of the term is used. If a
subject does regard himself as well-informed on the matter of actual
distance relations, the ability with which he will be able to discard
this cognition is a moot point. It seems possible to the author that
in order to comply with the experimental demands, a subject might be
obliged to draw upon such things as emotional involvement to
fabricate answers that are sufficently "subjective". Were this to
happen, the experimental results would be trivial; on the other hand,
it is easy to see that if level of information is a major
contributory factor to cognitive distance, this is unlikely to have
any psychological variations with respect to emotional involvement.
The position can be viewed as a methodological dilemma, with the
Swedes on one horn and Stanley on the other (but see section 5).
Nothing daunted, Stanley came back with another study (Stanley,
1971) now centred on Melbourne instead of Armidale. This time he
took Lundberg at his word and split his subjects into two groups, one
of which was asked to estimate physical distance as before, but the
other was (according to the report) asked to estimate subjective
distance. It is not clear whether this instruction meant the same
thing to Stanley and his students as it did to Bratfisch and
Lundberg.
According to the Bratfisch hypothesis, the expected exponent of
emotional involvement and subjective distance should be -0.50;
Stanley got a range of values, but none of them exceeded -0.456 and
the median was -0.231 . The subjects who were asked to estimate
subjective distance did get consistently larger exponents than those
who estimated physical distance, if that is to be counted any
comfort.
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Stockholm produced their reply to this in a paper by Lundberg
and Ekman (1970), now suggesting that the location of Australia "may
have caused a different spacing of the stimuli" and also that "minor
differences in instructions and experimental conditions" could be
responsible for the variation in exponents. Bratfisch and Lundberg
then summed up their work as sufficently demonstrating the inverse
square root "1 aw"(Bratfisch and Lundberg, 1971).
Back in Armidale, Walmsley found this a case of "incongruent
findings ... dismissed all too easily on rather trivial
methodological grounds" (Walmsley, 1974, p 12); he also suggested
that the Swedish studies showed a range of distances that was
"strangely limited". He then conducted experiments to attempt to
reproduce the square root phenomenon in Australia, this time
following Lundberg virtually to the letter to allow no room for
equivocation. The result: as before, a range of exponents which
Walmsley suggests is a function of the range of stimuli presented.
There the matter rests at present.
What can the geographer draw from all this? Not, in fact, a
great deal. With all the argument as to whether any relationship
exists at all, there has been virtually no theoretical consideration
of what processes may or may not be at work. If emotional
involvement is dependent upon subjective distance, this is not
something that the geographer can contribute to or take an interest
in. But if the relationship is the other way round, and places that
are identified with strongly appear to be relatively closer than
neutral or even emotively hostile places (for instance, the
comparison between the distance from Dublin to Cork and the distance
from Dublin to Belfast mentioned in the introduction), this will be
of some concern to any geographer wishing to deal with the topic of
cognitive distance.
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Aside from that, one of the few conclusions is that the observed
relationship between cognitive distance and actual geographical
distance would appear to be logarithmic, with a wide range of
exponents.
One other point worth mentioning is a remark by Walmsley, who
hints that no consideration has been given to the question of whether
the subjects who were given the task of estimating distances felt
that they had given valid approximations relating to genuine feelings
about the distances, or whether they were, in fact, forced to guess
randomly. This matter of uncertainty in estimations (related,
perhaps, to geographical awareness) might have a significant bearing
on the validity of any results obtained from this sort of study.
(iii) Sphere and PIane
A different experiment carried out by Lundberg (1973) was
designed to determine, by measurements of subjective distance,
whether the world is perceived in planar or in spherical terms. His
experimental procedure was as follows: having selected thirteen
places around the globe, he asked 60 students for estimates of all
the possible subjective interdistances, and then processed these
using a multi-dimensional scaling technique to obtain the result that
the estimations could be contained on a Euclidean plane with 10%
stress ("stress" being a measure of preciseness of fit - the lower
the better). This constituted a "fair" result in Kruskal1s terms.
This particular experiment is also a departure from previous
practice in that, instead of asking subjects the distance from the
subject's location (i.e. in this case, Stockholm) to a remote place,
subjects were asked to estimate distances between two remote places.
This may be dangerous. If we consider man to be basically
anthropocentric, while it may be all right to ask him to estimate
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distances from "here", to ask him to estimate distances from some
remote place may be to force a shift of perspective which will have a
deleterious effect on the quality of the estimates obtained,
particularly in the degree of confidence the subject is likely to
express in his estimations. It seems not unreasonable to hypothesise
that a subject may be less aware of distant places than of close ones
in such a way that certain elements of the cognitive positions of the
former may be very much more shadowy than others. For example, the
subject may be aware that Tokyo is far away, and Sydney further
still, and even have reasonable confidence in estimating how much
further still, but this is in terms of distances away from him.
Estimating how much further Sydney is from Stockholm than Tokyo is
and estimating distance from Sydney to Tokyo or vice versa are two
different things and require different sorts of knowledge. To
estimate the distance of Sydney from Tokyo it is necessary for the
subject to make a cognitive shift, to put himself in the place of
Tokyo and to relate to other places from there. The distances from
Tokyo to other places are much less cognitively relevant than the
distances of those places from the subject, and his skill at
estimating those distances may well be correspondingly less.
Another thing that may colour estimations made between two
places that are both remote from the subject is the extent to which
one or other of the two places is distant from him. As an
illustration of this, it may be that Stockholm students faced with
the task of estimating distances from London would have found it an
easier job than estimating distances from Calcutta, since the
cognitive shift of perspective required is not so great. They would
therefore be able to give better estimates; better in the sense that
the estimates would be expressed with more confidence, and less
resembling random number generation. On the other hand, it may have
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been that the subject's estimates of the distances from London were
unduly influenced by their ideas of the distances from Stockholm - a
sort of cognitive inertia in which a limited shift in perspective is
not sufficently violent to clear away the tendency to relate to one's
own position in space. Until this particular topic has been
investigated more thoroughly, the estimation of remote interdistances
must be viewed with some caution.
Mention must also be made of the way in which Lundberg asked his
subjects to estimate the distances involved: as a proportion of the
distance between the North Pole and the South Pole. One can
sympathise with the choice of this as standard, it being a convenient
(that is, convenient from the experimenter's point of view) way of
expressing half the great circle circumference of the earth, the
maximum possible distance from any place to any other place on the
surface of the globe. However, from the subject's point of view it
is more ambiguous. A subject not educated in the use of globes might
well be hazy about the properties of great circles and antipodes;
might even not realise that no distance can be greater than the
standard given. The distance from the North Pole to the South Pole
could be viewed as the distance between the poles on a map of
unspecified projection, or as the distance between then on a flat
photograph of a globe, in which the earth appears as a circle rather
than as a sphere. One would expect no necessary consistency among
the subjects either in interpretation or in skill in manipulating
this slightly unwieldy measuring stick. Nor is it necessary that a
subject would be consistent within his estimates (that a map-based
standard would automatically lead to planar results to the
experiment), for while trans-polar distances might be recognised as
such and estimated accordingly, a distance along the Greenwich
Meridian might invite planar thinking. As will be seen later, there
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is some evidence to support this view.
Another possibility is that a subject finding the
circumferential standard hard to visualise all at once might be
unconsciously steered into thinking in easier, Euclidean terms,
whereas if the measuring stick were smaller and therefore both easier
to visualise and more consistent from globe to map, it would be
easier for a subject to build up an image of the distances in
spherical terms. Half the trouble is, perhaps, that one is scraping
the surface of a very complicated, virtually untouched, and even as
yet ill-defined, problem.
(iv) Barriers.
The one remaining study to be discussed is the contribution of
David Stea who conducted an experiment at Clark University and again
at Seattle, using 22 and 37 students respectively as subjects (Stea,
1969a). Each group estimated distances and air travel time to eleven
other cities, though in the case of the Clark University students,
half were asked the distance from New York to the other cities
involved, while the other half were asked to estimate the distances
from the other cities to New York. (The latter group gave lower, but
not significantly lower, estimates.) Although the results have not
been published in full, they showed that distances objectively
greater than 4,000 miles tended to be underestimated while distances
less than that tended to be overestimated; this is consistent with a
logarithmic relationship between cognitive and geographical distance
(though this is not mentioned as such).
What is more important is that Stea develops for the first time
the idea of barriers affecting the perception of distance at a
geographical scale; this is consonant with the hypothesis of distance
being perceived in terms of things, or, at least, obstacles,
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contained therein. In this experiment he examined three sorts of
barriers, categorised as marine, political and linguistic divides.
The results did not appear to differentiate between these different
types, but there was a suggestion that they were responsible for
overestimation. However, since the longer a distance is, the more
barriers it is likely to contain, this trend runs directly counter to
the previous one mentioned in which underestimation rather than
overestimation increased with distance. As will be seen later,
careful structuring of experimental methodology can isolate these two
different trends and remove the confusion.
This comprises the total of the published literature on the
cognition of global distance to date. It will next be appropriate to
consider in detail the problems which a study of this sort presents
to the experimenter.
2) THE PROBLEMS OF EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
(i) Which Distance?
One of the great problems with regard to cognitive studies in
general, and studies of cognitive distance in particular, is that
very rarely is there any "right" answer. It is no simple thing to
say that "the distance from A to B is such-and-such"; when working at
a global level, though one can measure the great circle distance and
call it correct, it is also possible to measure the same distance on
a map, and call this distance, in its own way, correct, or at least,
objective. And, of course, map distances vary from projection to
projection. It is also possible to posit an experiential "travel
distance" consisting of the space actually traversed by boat,
railway, aeroplane or whatever, but since intercontinental travel is
not an everyday activity for most people, this is less important at
this particular scale.
This problem arises in two different ways. Firstly, the
experimenter will have to decide which sort of distance he will ask
his subjects to estimate - with the option of leaving it blank and
merely asking for distance unspecified. Great circle distances have
a certain advantage in that they are relatively unique, whereas map
and travel distances suffer from variation in projection and route.
However, to ask specifically for great circle estimations might be
regarded as "giving the game away" with respect to a subject who
might have been more naturally inclined towards thinking in terms of
a map; it could be seen as constraining the subject's freedom of
expression slightly. Whereas Stea did ask specifically for great
circle distances, the other experimenters mentioned seem to have left
the matter up to the subject.
The second consideration here is, having obtained distance
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estimations, should one compare them to sets derived from the globe
or from a map, and, if the latter, which map? Stea, since he asked
for great circle distances, naturally uses great circle distances as
the basis for comparison. Bratfisch mentions that he obtained
figures for actual great circle distances from the airline SAS
(Bratfisch, 1965); it is only Dornic, who, as mentioned before, used
map distances (projection unspecified) as a standard.
(ii) Estimation Technique
There are various different ways of asking people to estimate
distances, and these have various advantages and disadvantages. The
first and most obvious is to ask for estimates in straight mileages
(or kilometres if preferred). This has the advantage of simplicity,
but also a number of disadvantages, particularly at this scale.
Whereas most people are reasonably familiar with what a mile looks
like stretched out flat, visualising a thousand miles is a much
harder task. The author can acutely recollect an occasion, some
years ago, when, needing to estimate the distance to Australia in
miles, he found himself quite unable to decide even on the
approximate scale, whether in thousands or tens of thousands of
miles. On the other hand there is also the danger of misremembered
figures interfering with the process of pure estimation. A subject
might be plagued by a nagging suspicion that a particular distance
was "either 3,000 or 5,000" or somesuch. There is nothing "natural"
about miles as a measure of distance; a subject may may have a good
idea of the length of a particular distance in purely spatial terms
(he can visualise it easily on a globe or map) and yet have no basis
on which to translate this cognition into miles.
The alternatives are to use either multi-ratio scaling or single
ratio scaling. The former technique (used by Bratfisch and Ekman) is
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based on comparisons made in relative terms of pairs of distances in
every possible arrangement. These relative comparisons are turned by
mathematical manipulation into absolute numbers. While this method
avoids the problem of having to choose a single standard against
which estimations are to be made, it has the disadvantage of being
cumbersome in the extreme. The subject is called upon to make a very
large number of estimations.
Single ratio scaling involves nominating an initial distance to
be used as a standard. Estimates then have to be expressed in terms
of the ratio of the stimulus distance to the standard. Actually,
there is a similarity between this technique and that of simple
mileage estimation, since "one mile" is a standard distance. The
difference lies in the fact that a mile is a general term; it would
be different were one to ask for estimates with respect to "the
distance AB" where this standard distance AB was in fact one mile.
Estimates can be given either as numbers, or by marking off
proportional lengths on a line. The graphical method has the
advantage of providing a visual counterpart to the actual distances,
and also of tending less to yield estimates concentrated on round
numbers. Its disadvantage is that the length of the lines presented
to the subject on which the estimates are to be marked may affect his
judgement if he feels that all the space has got to be used - that
the longest distance will necessarily occupy the maximum amount of
line; or, of course, the lines may be too short for him. With
numerical estimates there is no apparent upper limit, and therefore
less sense of an implied scale of estimation.
There remains the problem of selecting the standard distance to
be used. This can be small, so that estimates must be expressed as
multiples, or large, so that estimates must be expressed as
fractions, or medial. But what is important is that the standard
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selected should be familiar and easily cognisable itself; preferably
something that will be perceived consistently by all the subjects.
In the studies mentioned above, mileage estimation was used by
Stanley and Stea (this is implicitly suggested in the reports, but
not explicitly stated), multidimensional scaling was used by
Bratfisch, Ekman and Dornic, and (presumably) Walmsley, while
Lundberg used single ratio scaling with a large standard distance.
(iii) Seale Problems
One of the drawbacks to this sort of study is that the results
obtained from a distance estimation experiment perforce express two
different things - firstly, how subjects estimate distance, and
secondly, how they estimate anything at all. As was discussed in
part I, cognition and estimation are different skills entirely, and,
given a hypothetical consistency of perception in a group of
subjects, variation in estimation skills could produce a wide variety
of experimental results.
Consider the hypothetical case of a subject involved in an
experiment on cognised length, in which he has been shown two lines,
one of which is one inch long, the other twelve inches. Let us
suppose that these have both been accurately perceived, and that the
subject is capable of envisaging both lines with perfect precision.
If the subject is now asked to express the ratio of the two lengths,
he will have to call into play mental skills of comparison and
estimation, and (since we have assumed perfect perception)
deficiencies in these will be responsible for any discrepancies in
the experimental results.
Two effects are possible. Firstly, the scale of estimation may
vary from subject to subject. A subject who calculated, in our inch
and foot example, that the longer line was ten times the length of
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the shorter, might be expected to estimate a two foot length as
twenty times as long, and so on. Another subject, though, might have
fitted the shorter line into the longer fifteen times, and would
correspondingly give an answer of thirty for the two foot length.
This is not to say that the two subjects perceive the lengths any
differently from one another; they merely tend to estimate things at
different scales. Thus if it is experimentally determined that when
subjective distance is plotted against actual distance for each
subject, a wide range of exponents is obtained, this is not
necessarily related to how the subjects cognise the distances, but
could be entirely produced by the matter of how they estimate their
cognitions. If the experimenter is concerned with true cognitions,
he is going to have to devise some way round this problem. The
constantly shifting standard in the multi-ratio scaling technique is
one way round; the author's own solution will be discussed at length
1ater.
The second effect is similar. We know very little about how
perceptions are evaluated numerically in the estimation process, and
we cannot assume that estimated distance is derived from perceived
distance in a linear relationship; it may bear a logarithmic
relationship. Therefore, if cognitive distance appears to be
logarithmically related to actual distance, this may be due to the
processes of estimation rather than those of perception. For
example, the ratios 2:1 and 3:1 can be distinguished from one another
with a relative degree of ease; the ratios 9:1 and 10:1 are more
blurred, and it would take some acuity to distinguish between 32:1
and 33:1. Therefore one can understand a tendency to round down
higher ratios more than lower ones, and this would produce a
generally curvilinear pattern of estimation. If this were to be the
case, one should observe the same logarithmic pattern in a mock
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distance estimation experiment where the subjects could observe the
distances on a wall map in front of them. This has not been tested
experimentally; The psychological aspect of the above is discussed in
section 5.
It will be recalled that in Stea's experiment it was found that
the vaguely logarithmic trend to the data appeared to mask the effect
of possible cognitive barriers. If this 1ogarithmicity is purely a
product of the estimation process, rather than being a component of
true cognition, then it would seem to be advantageous to eliminate
the logarithmic trend to the data if at all possible, in order to
remove the undesirable "noise".
(iv) Subjects
It may be worth mentioning the question of choice of subjects;
all the experiments previously discussed used university students as
subjects, and occasionally one hears this criticised as a weakness.
The complaint seems to be that such a specialised and restricted
group could be expected to yield different results from those of
"ordinary people".
Apart from the fact that this argument probably overestimates
the homogeneity of the student community, and underestimates the
extent to which students, too, are "ordinary people", there are
various defences of the use of students as subjects. Firstly, there
is the pragmatic approach: the experiments involved with this sort of
study tend to be both tedious and difficult to complete, especially
when more elaborate techniques like multi-ratio scaling are used.
Without a captive (or paid) audience, one might be very unlikely to
get any results at all. Secondly, one must allow that a cognitive
experiment must be relevant to those who participate in it. One can
ask a Scot to estimate distances around Scotland, but to ask a native
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of Bratislava the same questions would be fruitless. Similarly,
there is no point in asking questions about global distances unless
the respondents involved actually have valid cognitions of the places
involved. Students are one group whom one might reasonably expect to
be familiar with the places involved in a global study. To quote
•v
Dormc:
"There is probably a necessary lower limit of intelligence or
general education below which subjects can hardly participate in this
y/
type of scaling experiments (sic)." (Dornic, 1967, p. 2)
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3) THE DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT
(i) Absolute Scales
Since there is no real evidence to show whether global cognition
is primarily map-oriented or is actually derived from the world
envisaged as a sphere, it would seem unwise not to test for both.
Consequently two lists of distances were prepared as absolute
distances to which the subject's estimates could be compared. The
first of these consisted of great circle distances calculated
trigonometrical ly from the latitude and longitude figures in an atlas
(Philip,1969). The second list was of the same distances measured on
a large wall map of the world on Mercator's projection, in
millimetres. These two lists were then standardised by dividing
through by the distance from Edinburgh to London, so that this
distance had a value of one unit, and all the others were multiples
of it.
The choice of Mercator's projection rather than any other was
not to show that distance cognitions were related exactly to that
particular projection, but rather as a test case for general
"map-like tendencies". Also, Mercator's projection is, in some ways,
the archetype of all world maps; it is difficult to think of one
other projection that is as well-known. Similarly, one can think of
the great circle distances as being a test for "globe-like
tendencies" rather than an exclusive model. There is no reason why a
subject should not be inconsistent and relate some distances to globe
and some to map.
(ii) Estimation Technique
For reasons already discussed, it was felt that the procedure of
asking for estimates in miles was, at this scale of operations,
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fraught with too many problems to be considered seriously. The
complexity of the multi-ratio scaling technique ruled it out of court
for an experiment as large as that intended, so a single ratio
scaling technique was decided upon, in which subjects would compare
the distances to be estimated (the stimuli) to one standard distance.
In choosing the standard, the first problem was that of deciding
the length. Lundberg used the maximum possible distance; it has also
been suggested (source not discoverable) that a medial standard is
preferable, since reaction to differences is less standard at the
extreme ends of the magnitude scale. It is the author's personal
prejudice that in general it is easier to visualise multiples than
fractions, and that building up from a small standard is easier than
breaking down a large one. (See also sub-section (v) below.) But as
well as this, it was desirable that the chosen standard should be (a)
as familiar as possible (b) as free from barriers, especially marine
barriers, as possible. This rather dictated a short distance, and
since it was intended that all the distances involved should be from
Edinburgh (since, as has already been discussed, estimates of remote
interdistances may be less reliable than, or intrinsically different
from, estimations of distances from the subjects' actual location),
the choice of Edinburgh to London was rapidly settled upon.
The other thing to be decided was whether to obtain estimates
numerically or graphically. A short pilot test of both methods
showed that the numerical technique was easier to handle and
apparently preferable to the subjects, and so the graphical technique
was abandoned.
(iii) Choice of pi aces
Apart from Edinburgh and London, 24 other places were selected
for the questionnaire. Several considerations were important in
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choosing the places involved. Firstly, it was desired that as good a
spread as possible over the whole globe should be obtained - this
dictated the relatively large number of places chosen. Secondly, it
was essential that all the places should be reasonably well-known.
(Obviously no-one can estimate the distance to a place the location
of which they are ignorant.) In the pilot test it was found that two
subjects confused Hawaii with Haiti, and Vladivostok caused some
trouble as well. The selection was tidied up for the main
experiment, though even then, one subject confused Lagos with Laos
(and was therefore dropped).
The final list was as follows (in increasing great circle
distance from Edinburgh): Dublin, Paris, Oslo, Reykjavik, Warsaw,
Madrid, North Cape (Norway), Algiers, Moscow, Athens, North Pole,
Jerusalem, New York, Lagos, Bering Straits, Peking, Calcutta, San
Francisco, Saigon, Cape Town, Honolulu, Buenos Aires, South Pole and
Christchurch.
There were various reasons for selecting the places
individually; some were merely obvious representatives of the general
area (for example, Buenos Aires - Rio de Janiero would have done just
as well). Others were picked in almost equidistant pairs, as in the
case of Warsaw and Madrid, to see how far separated these became in
the actual estimates. Oslo is the nearest non-British city across
(mostly) sea, whereas Paris is the nearest across (mostly) land.
Algiers is the nearest city in another continent; the position of the
two poles is ambiguous on many maps, including the Mercator
projection; Bering Straits is a good example of a trans-polar
distance, and Christchurch is the nearest city to the Antipodes, thus
giving a convenient maximum distance.
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(iv) Subjects
Four groups of subjects viere used: (numbers following are sample
size in terms of number of subjects returning complete sets of
answers) Edinburgh University third year geography students (21);
ditto second year students (44); St Andrew's University first year
geography students (60); Queen's University Belfast third year
geography students (57).
With regard to the second two groups, the St Andrew's students
completed the same questionnaire as was given to the Edinburgh
students. At this scale it was felt that the small distance between
Edinburgh and St Andrew's would not make any difference; in any case,
if a significant difference in results were discovered it could be
noted as such.
The Belfast students were given a slightly different experiment,
estimating distances from Belfast rather than from Edinburgh, using
the distance from Belfast to Dublin as standard. It was decided to
use the two endpoints of the Scottish standard distance, Edinburgh
and London, as stimuli in this experiment. Dublin obviously could
not be used as a stimulus since it was part of the new standard, and
to keep the total number of stimuli the same for all sample groups,
Bering Straits was dropped for the Belfast group.
(v) Procedure
Each subject was presented with a questionnaire on which
appeared the 24 places in a random order. The order in which the
places appeared was different for every questionnaire. The first
task the subject was given was to re-arrange the places in order of
increasing distance from Edinburgh. This was intended to focus his
attention on the relative distances, and to make quite sure that he
would not give hurried estimates in which distance X might be given
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as longer than distance Y, whereas, were he forced to make that
specific comparison in isolation, he would realise clearly that Y was
actually longer than X. In some previous experiments of global
distance estimation, subjects have been asked to give quick,
impressionistic estimates. This, the author feels, does cognition
little justice. The implication is that if the subject thought hard
about the answer he would get it right, and that not allowing this is
the only way to approach the subject "cognitively". But if the
subject is capable of giving an accurate answer given due
consideration, this means that his cognition is accurate, and not
allowing him to express it by restricting his time is to study snap
estimation rather than cognition.
The second year students at Edinburgh were not asked to perform
this re-arrangement, to see what difference it would make. However,
they were still not limited in the amount of time they had for the
consideration of each estimate.
The re-arrangement complete, subjects were asked to estimate the
distance to each place as a ratio of the distance from Edinburgh to
London. Instead of specifically asking for great circle distances,
the phrase "shortest distance" was used, which implies great circle
distance but allows the subject some latitude. The advantage of
using a small standard, combined with the re-arrangement technique
will now be apparent. As each increasing estimation had to be made
(Xj, X2, ... Xn) the subject had the opportunity of asking himself
"how much further is Xp than Xp_^ (or Xn_^ or whatever)?" The subject
is enabled to use previous estimations as standards for further ones,
thus combining some of the advantages of multi- and single ratio
scaling in one technique.
Next, each subject was asked to express his confidence in each
of his estimations by assigning it a number from one to ten, given
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the scale of 10 = very certain this is accurate, down to 1 = just a
guess. This v/as intended to see if results that might have been
attributed to miscognition could be explained in terms of
self-admitted ignorance.
The subjects were also asked to put down the actual mileages to
any of the places if they really did know it, with instructions not
to estimate, but only to give figures they remembered and knew to be
accurate. The intention behind this was to check on whether
estimates were being based on the remembering, or misremembering, of
mileage figures. Very few answers to this section were obtained -
most of those that were referred to New York and occasionally San
Francisco; some were quite inaccurate, but most were reasonable.
These answers were not processed further. Similarly, the actual
(shortest) distance to London, if known, was requested: the figures
obtained were mostly of the order of 400 miles, which is in fact the
road distance and represents an overestimation of the great circle
distance, but, as will be seen, this does not make any difference.
Subjects were asked to indicate any places they had actually
visited, to check on whether this had any effects on their estimates,
but the number so indicated were too few to be processed.
Apart from the differences in places and standard mentioned
above, the Belfast experiment was conducted in the same way as the
Edinburgh/St Andrews experiments were.
4) ANALYSIS
(i) SPSS Frequency Analysis
From each subject's questionnaire, three columns of data were
taken - values for the estimated rank order of each place, the
estimated distance to each place, and the confidence expressed in
each distance estimate. The rank values were taken from the
re-arranged order, except in the case of the Edinburgh second year
students, where it was derived from the distance estimates - thus
allowing paired rankings. The distance estimates were all expressed
in standard figures (Edinburgh to London or Belfast to Dublin); the
confidence estimates were all integers from one to ten.
These data were then fed to an SPSS Frequencies programme, which
calculated for each place descriptive statistics for the total data
submitted. The three Edinburgh groups (i.e. including St Andrews)
were dealt with as separate populations-at first, and then combined
into one large population. Since the Frequencies programme is able
to handle missing values, unlike the other programmes that were used,
some of the subjects who had not totally completed the questionnaire
were able to be included. The final numbers for each population
were: Edinburgh third year (referred to henceforward as E3) 22,
Edinburgh second year (E2) 44, St Andrews first year (SA) 65, these
three combined (AL) 131, Belfast third year (B3) 67. (The numbers
were at one stage E3:23 and E2:45, but two subjects were dropped for
reasons mentioned below.)
The most interesting results of this analysis are presented as
tables 3.1 - 3.5. In table 3.1(a), the first two columns show the
the rank of each place ordered by increasing distance from Edinburgh
using distances measured on the globe and on a Mercator projection




Place Gt.C.Rank Map Rank E3 E2 SA
Dublin 1 1 1.30 1.11 1.34
Pari s 2 2 2.83 2.78 2.91
Osl o 3 3 • 2.39 2.71 2.27
Reykjavik 4 5 6.17 4.71 6.41
Warsaw 5 6 6.44 6.89 7.55
Madrid 6 4 5.22 5.20 5.69
N.Cape 7 10 7.35 5.80 5.64
A1giers 8 7 9.00 8.11 9.30
Moscow 9 9 9.30 10.16 9.72
Athens 10 8 8.04 8.04 8.48
N.Pole 11 14 12.22 10.62 11.64
Jerusal em 12 11 10.91 10.96 11.58
New York 13 13 12.96 12.27 13.22
Lagos 14 12 14.13 13.11 14.11
Bering Sts. 15 22 15.57 16.58 16.05
Peking 16 15 20.57 20.24 20.09
Calcutta 17 19 15.70 16.18 16.20
San Francisco 18 18 17.83 17.24 17.36
Saigon 19 20 18.74 18.84 19.06
Cape Town 20 16 17.96 16.29 17.41
Honolulu 21 21 20.44 20.20 20.03
Buenos Aires 22 17 18.22 16.58 17.83
S.Pole 23 23 23.05 21.89 22.65
Christchurch 24 24 23.44 22.96 22.97
E3 = Edinburgh 3rd year students
E2 = Edinburgh 2nd year students




































































































































Place Gt.C,. Distance Map Distance E3 E2 SA
Dublin .66 .68 .74 .77 .83Paris 1.63 ' 1.60 1.48 1.57 1.51
Osl o 1.74 1.92 1.46 1.51 1.45
Reykjavik 2.57 3.00 2.97 2.48 3.03
Warsaw 3.03 3.24 2.53 3.02 3.55
Madrid 3.23 2.84 2.56 2.89 3.02
N.Cape 4.06 5.48 3.25 3.02 2.97
Algiers 4.09 3.48 4.13 4.02 4.78
Moscow 4.68 4.80 4.56 5.04 5.01
Athens 5.28 4.56 3.75 4.07 4.98
N.Pole 7.07 10.48 5.88 5.94 6.45
Jerusalem 7.46 6.20 5.06 5.58 6.02
New York 9.79 9.00 6.47 7.50 7.63
Lagos 10.34 7.52 7.83 7.75 8.48
Bering Sts. 11.97 20.12 9.94 13.17 10.53
Peking 14.83 12.28 14.83 16.83 16.07
Calcutta 15.01 14.72 8.94 11.90 12.00
San Francisco 15.21 14.72 12.00 12.20 12.10
Saigon 19.03 14.92 14.92 14.90 15.96
Cape Town 19.05 12.84 11.09 11.13 14.06
Honolulu 20.72 19.52 14.75 16.88 17.00
Buenos Aires 21.15 14.32 12.00 11.88 13.63
S.Pole 30.30 20.72 17.83 19.67 23.25




Dublin 6.44 6.18 6.80
Pari s 6.35 6.38 6.72
Oslo 6.04 5.40 6.22
Reykjavik 4.70 4.71 4.58
Warsaw 4.09 3.67 4.34
Madrid 4.96 5.16 5.44
N.Cape 3.91 3.69 4.19
A1giers 4.27 4.13 4.19
Moscow 3.96 4.33 4.14
Athens 4.17 3.96 4.76
N.Pole 3.22 3.36 3.63
Jerusalem 3.65 3.58 3.95
New York 4.65 5.11 5.06
Lagos 3.39 3.11 3.06
Bering Sts. 2.65 2.60 3.03
Peking 2.22 2.27 3.03
Calcutta 2.78 2.58 3.33
San Francisco 3.91 4.02 4.25
Saigon 3.00 2.24 2.81
Cape Town 3.04 2.91 3.64
Honol ul u 2.70 2.42 2.84
Buenos Aires 2.83 3.04 3.25
S.Pole 3.05 2.33 2.83




Place Gt.C. Rank Map Rank Mean Estimated
Edinburgh 1 1 1.03
London 2 2 1.99
Pari s 3 3 3.19
Osl o 4 4 4.55
Reykj avik 5 6 7.08
Madrid 6 5 5.81
Warsaw 7 8 8.09
A1giers 8 7 9.96
N.Cape 9 11 8.62
Moscow 10 10 11.73
Athens 11 9 9.36
N.Pole 12 15 13.80
Jerusalem 13 12 12.24
New York 14 14 14.02
Lagos 15 13 15.13
San Francisco 16 19 17.70
Peking 17 20 19.65
Calcutta 18 16 17.02
Cape Town 19 17 16.72
Saigon 20 21 19.49
Buenos Aires 21 18 17.15
Honolulu 22 22 20.39
S.Pole 23 23 22.21








































































































































Place Gt.C. Rank Map Rank Mean Estimated Rank
Dublin 01 01 01.25
Paris 02 02 02.85
Osl o 03 03 02.44
Reykjavik 04 05 05.75
Warsaw 05 06 07.12
Madrid 06 04 05.47
N.Cape 07 10 05.99
A1giers 08 07 08.87
Moscow 09 09 09.79
Athens 10 08 08.30
N.Pole 11 14 11.36
Jerusalem 12 11 11.29
New York 13 13 12.84
Lagos 14 12 13.73
Bering Sts. 15 22 16.16
Peking 16 15 20.27
Calcutta 17 19 16.13
San Francisco 18 18 17.39
Saigon 19 20 18.92
Cape Town 20 16 17.15
Honolul u 21 21 20.24
Buenos Aires 22 17 17.45
S.Pole 23 23 22.44
Christchurch 24 24 23.05
Gt.C. Order Map Order Estimated Order
Dublin Dublin Dubl i n
Pari s Pari s Osl o
Osl o Osl o Paris
Reykjavik Madrid Madrid
Warsaw Reykj avik Reykjavik
Madrid Warsaw N.Cape
N.Cape A1 giers Warsaw
A1giers Athens Athens
Moscow Moscow A1 giers
Athens N. Cape Moscow
N.Pole Jerusalem Jerusalem
Jerusalem Lagos N.Pole
New York New York New York
Lagos N.Pole Lagos
Bering Sts. Peking Calcutta
Peking Cape Town Bering Sts.
Calcutta Buenos Aires Cape Town
San Francisco San Francisco San Francisco
Saigon Calcutta Buenos Aires
Cape Town Saigon Saigon
Honol ul u Honolulu Honolulu











































































































































ranks across each population. These distributions are not normal;
obviously those places at the near end of the scale show
distributions of rank estimates with positive skew, those at the far
end, negative skew. This is just a product of geometry. Table 3.1(b)
shows rank orders for each population, constructed on the basis of
increasing mean rank estimates, compared to the rank orders of places
for the globe and the map. a3.4(b) and 3.5(b) show the same thing for
the Belfast and combined Edinburgh groups.
When it came to dealing with the distance figures, it became
necessary to use medians instead of means. When estimating rank and
confidence, subjects were restricted to the numbers 1-24 and 1-10
respectively; thus everyone's figures were on approximately the same
scale of magnitude. But when it came to distance estimates there was
no upper limit, and therefore no limit to the scale of magnitude
employed by each subject in his estimations. As discussed earlier,
each subject may have his own scale of estimation which will be quite
valid for him; but this makes compiling group data in this way
difficult and unreliable. For example, if the majority give their
results in tens while one subject gives his in thousands, the
estimations of the latter will have an undue effect on the means of
the population as a whole. This was clearly illustrated by the E2
results; when the statistics were calculated for 45 subjects, the
mean distance estimate for the South Pole was 26.16 . When one
subject was dropped and the same mean calculated for the other 44
subjects, the figure was only 19.93 . The relevant standard deviation
dropped from 44.22 to 6.37 at the same time. The B3 analysis showed
for the distance estimations that the mean population skew for each
place was +3.66, the lowest figure being +0.95 for Christchurch.
With regard to the confidence figures, it can be clearly seen that
the mean confidence estimate decreases with distance, which should
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occasion no great surprise. Again as a product of geometry, this
distribution tends to be negatively skewed for near places and
positively skewed for distant ones. It is interesting to note that
the greatest uncertainty was expressed with regard to Saigon in three
out of the four groups, thisdespite all the attention the city has
received in past years.
Rank information has one great advantage in dealing with
problems like the one in hand - being ordinal it does not suffer the
scalar and logarithmic problems that beset cardinal estimates as
previously discussed. However, there is also a great disadvantage in
that rank data suffer from a lack of independence. If we ascertain
that in objective canon X is closer than Y, and find that in
cognitive analyses that Y is considered the closer, it is not
possible to determine if this is because the distance to Y has been
underestimated or because the distance to X has been overestimated.
In comparing the rank orders constructed from the mean rank
estimates, a number of points can be made. Firstly, the three groups
estimating distances from Edinburgh give basically similar patterns,
although it would be difficult to calculate the significance of the
divergences that can be discerned. This is due to the very strong
natural trend in the data; one expects subjects to have no trouble
distinguishing between places that are near, intermediate and distant
(no-one is really going to estimate, say, New York as being more
distant than the South Pole); it is only at the finer level of
disaggregation that disagreements are likely to crop up. This
disagreement in fact occurs in three areas of the scale, around 4th,
5th, 6th and 7th place, 11th and 12th place, and 15th to 19th place.
These are areas where the actual differences in distance separating
the places are naturally small, so this is not too surprising. What
is interesting is that though one might have expected St Andrews to
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show the most differences, it shows striking agreement with the E3
scale, leaving E2 as the most divergent. And if it were thought that
this was owing to the less attention paid to ranks by the E2
subjects, the E2 rank order is generally the more accurate! As
further results will show, this is probably purely fortuitous. The
difference most likely results from the fact that tied rankings were
permitted in the E2 analysis; this would tend to blur the pattern
siightly.
Of interest is the consistently low placing of Peking in all
scales - it falls 22nd in all the Edinburgh based scales, as against
its correct position of 16th, and is 21st on the Belfast list. The
positions of Oslo and Paris are consistently reversed except for the
B3 list. In this case, looking ahead to the distance estimate data,
it would appear that underestimation of the distance to Oslo rather
than overestimation of the distance to Paris is responsible. Other
minor reversals occur as was expected - the correct order of Warsaw
and Madrid is consistently inverted, as is that of Algiers and
Athens. Interestingly, neither New York nor Honolulu are ever
displaced from their correct positions. In the former case this
suggests an accurate perception of the width of the Atlantic relative
to the spatial extent of the Old World, but there is no obvious
explanation of the latter.
Looking at the median distance estimates it can be seen that
while estimated distance starts off by more or less keeping pace with
actual distance, it levels off giving a logarithmic pattern to the
whole. Since these median data are so awkward statistically, the
task of determining exponents has been left until later when it can
be tackled more appropriately.
There is not a great deal more to be said about this particular
analysis. Its weakness lies in the fact that it attempts to combine
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all the data into a group image and then look for significant
features. This is really putting the cart before the horse, and it
is much more appropriate to examine the characteristics of the
individual images and then see if these can be combined into a group
image with any degree of sighificance. We shall therefore proceed to
view the material in this way.
(ii) Accuracy Statistics
The difficulty of using rank order when studying individual
places has already been mentioned; however, when we come to the
matter of dealing with whole lists of places at a time, thanks to the
elimination of scale problems, rank order analysis provides a useful
means of comparing one set of estimates as a whole with a particular
standard list. In particular it was desired to determine whether the
rank order each subject gave more closely resembled the rank order
obtained from great circle or map distances, and also to provide some
comparative estimate of how accurately the correct rank order is
represented. Accordingly a special statistic was devised, based
loosely on Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficent, and which we have
christened the Accuracy Statistic and represented as AS. It is
calculated on the basis of the squares of rank order differences
according to the following formula:
where Rn is the estimated rank order for place n, and R<^n is the
standard rank order for the same place, where n is a number from 1 to
24. This statistic is, of course, specially tailored to this
particular experiment, and would employ a different constant for
lists of length other than 24. The formula is designed in such a way
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that the most accurate possible list, with all 24 places in the
correct order, would score zero, while the worst possible list, in
which the places were listed in inverse order, would yield a value of
100 . (This is the effect of the constant 1.474 ). A list in a
random order will tend to give a value of 50 . For each subject, two
versions of AS were calculated: AS with respect to the great circle
distance rank order (this was labelled ASGC) and with respect to the
rank order from map distances (this became ASMM). The calculations
were computed by part of a large data analysis computer programme
specially written for this experiment by Jurek Kirakowski and edited
by the author; this programme also carried out most of the regression
analysis discussed below. The values of ASGC and ASMM were then
compared for each subject; the lower value indicated which standard
the estimations more closely resembled. The next stage in the
proceedings was to count up the number of subjects in each group with
lower values of ASGC, and compare it with the number having lower
values for ASMM. The significance of the majority so obtained was
assessed by recourse to binomial probability theory. (Given a null
hypothesis of no significant group image, it follows that the chances
of a subject giving a lower value of one statistic or the other are
equal; from there it is a simple matter to calculate the chances of r
subjects out of n total all having lower values of ASGC or ASMM given
equal probability of either occuring, i.e. a random distribution. If
this chance is very small, we can express the confidence with which
we can discard the null hypothesis as a percentage. This technique
is effectively the same as the more common standard error technique,
but in this particular context was felt to be more appropriate.)
The results of this analysis are presented as table 3.6(a). The
figures for E3 and E2 are not really significant as they stand, but




GLOBE COMPARED TO MAP
Subject CIoser to CIoser











Tied results: E2, 1 subject; B3, 1 subject.
(All figures are number of subjects in each sample whose rank orders
conformed most closely with that rank order.)
E3 = Edinburgh 3rd year students
E2 = Edinburgh 2nd year students
SA = St.Andrews's 1st year students
AL = Combined Edinburgh and St.Andrew's results




Subject Standard Mi nimum Maximum
Group Mean Error Median Val ue Val ue
E3 19.37 .94 19.78 11.61 28.88
E2 21.72 .89 21.03 7.94 34.98
SA 21.18 .85 19.99 11.42 44.90
AL 21.06 .54 20.11 7.94 44.90
B3 18.17 1.14 15.60 7.80 47.26
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remains approximately similar. However, this proportion is only
significant (unlikely to occur by chance) when the sample is of
sufficent size, as the numerical difference between the opposing
A
camps is a determining factor in the assessment of significance
level. When the sample is as large as the SA sample, the same
relative proportion becomes significant in absolute terms. What is
unusual is that in the case of B3, although this relative proportion
of majority/minority is numerically similar, the direction is
switched; whereas ASGC gave better results in the Edinburgh groups,
ASMM is favoured by the majority in the Belfast sample. This
difference is quite possibly due to differences in the experiment.
The differences between the two standard rank orders in the Edinburgh
lists is more pronounced than in the Belfast list, partly because the
shift of centre removes some of the anomalies in the Edinburgh lists,
and partly due to the absence of the Bering Straits from the Belfast
list. This place has a considerable effect, in that there is a wide
gap between its relative position on the global list (where it
appears in a medial position thanks to the transpolar distance) and
its ranking on the map list (where it is placed far down owing to its
peripheral position on the map). When a subject correctly perceived
the distance as being transpolar, the large gap between the estimated
rank of the Bering Straits and the map rank produced a large
component of ASMM, giving ASGC an advantage. Of course, with the
Belfast subjects this no longer occured with the Bering Straits off
the list, replaced by a close city presenting no disparity between
its two rank positions. This does suggest a limitation in this
experimental technique, since the results seem to depend in too high
a degree on the initial selection of places. However, this is no
great loss, since other comparisons of map and globe are still to
come.
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The next stage was to derive descriptive statistics of the
values of ASGC and ASMM, to see how accurate overall the subject
groups were. The distributions for SA, AL and B3 were positively
skewed by a significant amount, and so medians are included as well
as means on table 3.6(b), which shows the results. The figures for
E3, E2, SA and AL all refer to values of ASGC; those for B3 refer to
ASMM. The calculations were performed by the SPSS Frequencies
programme. Looking at the means, one can see the results to be
fairly uniform, averaging close to 20 (a figure of 25 would be
effectively "half-random"). However when the medians are considered,
it becomes clearer that the E2 subjects are on the whole the least
accurate, as might be expected from the variation in experimental
procedure. That the group image for E2 was apparently more accurate
than the others is now shown to be another example of mean data
leading one astray. When the subjects are considered individually,
they are found to be less accurate. The apparent accuracy of the
group image might simply be a case of "theory of errors" - that
non-cumulative errors tend to cancel themselves out. Table 3.6(b)
presents mean description of individual data rather than individual
description of mean data and is therefore more reliable. However,
the margin of difference is not great and it would be unwise to put
too much significance on this. As can be seen, the SA and B3 groups
both contained subjects who were worse than any in the E2 group. The
overall performance of the B3 group does seem to be notably better
than the others. The E2 median is only 1.04 points behind SA,
whereas the B3 median leads by 4.18 from E3. This is particularly
interesting considering the tendency of the B3 results to approximate
to map rather than to global rankings, but once again, it may be the
experimental differences that are responsible. When the list of
places was selected (with Edinburgh in mind as centre) a number of
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cognitive traps were laid (such as the Warsaw-Madrid one already
mentioned). When the focus was shifted to Belfast, some of these
traps were "defused", and the Belfast subjects therefore had an
easier task before them.
(iii) Regression Analysis
Though the analysis of rank orders gives information about the
ordinal cognition of distance, it tells us very little about the
scale involved. More detail can therefore be obtained about the
relationship between cognitive distances and great circle or map
distances from a consideration of the Pearson correlation coefficents
of the data. Whereas we were reluctant to use this means of analysis
on the mean or median data, once we come down to an individual level
it becomes much safer. For each subject estimated distance was
correlated with and regressed against both actual great circle
distance (abbreviated to AGCD) and actual Mercator map distance
(AMMD). This provided two correlation coefficents (R) for each
subject, measures of the strength of the correspondence between the
patterns of estimated and standard distance; and values for the
regression gradient (b), which shows the rate of change in the
magnitude of estimated distance with increasing actual distance.
This latter we might expect to vary from subject to subject as the
scale of estimation involved may vary with subject as already
discussed.
By comparing the two correlation coefficents obtained from AGCD
and AMMD we can determine whether, as a whole, each subject's
estimates bear a stronger relationship to global or map-based
distance. In fact, for each subject four, rather than two,
regressions were calculated for each subject. In order to take into
consideration the expected 1ogarithmicity of the data, as well as the
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regressions of estimated distance (D) upon AGCD and AMMD, the
regressions of log D upon log AGCD and log AMMD were also calculated.
For each subject the regression giving the highest correlation
coefficent was selected, then for each group the scores were counted
up and the number of subjects giving their highest values of R for
each particular regression totalled. However, given the four-way
split to the results the significance figures were assessed for two
different pairings of categories, effectively great circle/map
(irrespective of 1ogarithmicity) and linear/logarithmic (irrespective
of standard). These figures are presented as table 3.7 .
They provide a contrast to table 3.6(a) in that here there is a
much greater degree of unanimity, the correlation with log AGCD being
by far the most favoured by each group of subjects, including B3,
which formerly appeared in the map-based camp. Even more impressive
is the clarity with which the 1ogarithmicity of the data is shown,
thus confirming Bratfisch's results in this respect. This
consistency is especially convenient with regard to the next major
stage in the data analysis, to be dealt with in subsection (iv). Two
conclusions can therefore be drawn from table 3.7: that the distance
estimations gathered are significantly more logarithmic than they are
linear in their relationship with real distance; and that of the
attempted representations of the data, the logarithms of great circle
distance provide a consistently better fit. This therefore suggests
that the subjects were able to think about distances in terms of a
round globe, and were not constrained to flat images.
The next step was to examine the regression gradients for each
subject to see how much variety there was. We expected high
variations between individual subjects on account of the likely
variation in scale of estimation; also, from Bratfisch's evidence









E2 4 3 28 9
SA 6 3 40 11
AL 12 8 80 25
B3 1 2 33 21
Any Gt.C. Any Map Significance
E3 14 7 90%
E2 32 12 99%
SA 46 14 99.99%
AL 92 33 99.99%
B3 34 23 90%
Any log. Any non-log. Significance
E3 17 4 99.5%
E2 37 7 99.99%
SA 51 9 99.99%
AL 105 20 99.99%
B3 54 3 99.99%
AGCD = Actual great circle distance




Subject Mean b Standard Minimum Maximum Standard
Group Val ue Error Val ue Val ue Deviation
E3 .88 .05 ■ .57 1.38 .21
E2 .84 .02 .56 1.06 .15
SA .87 .02 .44 1.24 .17
AL .86 .02 .44 1.38 .17
B3 .88 .03 .43 1.54 .22
consistency of the results just described, it was decided to use just
one regression gradient for each subject (log D on log AGCD) to
facilitate comparisons. These were processed in the same manner as
the AS results, by the SPSS Frequencies programme. The results,
shown in table 3.8, are very interesting. The variation by subject
is there as expected, with a total range in values of 1.11, but the
consistency of the results from group to group is very striking, and
bears no relationship to Bratfisch's results. In particular, it was
hypothesised that the Belfast group, using a different standard only
a quarter of the length of the Edinburgh/London distance, would show
a different exponent of the subjective/actual distance relationship.
This is not at all discernable. With regard to the skew of the
distributions, that of B3 is negligible and that of AL virtually
zero. This suggests that variation about the mean tends to be purely
random, which seems entirely reasonable; there is no reason why this
should not be so if we hypothesise that the variation in exponent is
the result of fortuitous individual variations in estimating skills,
which, like IQ, are likely to follow a normal distribution about the
mean.
Since Bratfisch appears to have used a different method by which
to arrive at his final exponent values, to wit, regressing all the
data from all the subjects in each group simultaneously, it was
decided that this method should be tried to see if it made any
difference. It didn't. The answers were identical to those
previously obtained, except for E3, which came out at 0.87 instead of
0.88, even closer to the overall mean.
We therefore come to the conclusion that though the exponents of
distance estimation vary considerably from individual to individual,
they were seen to be constant in pattern from group to group, even
when focus and standard were changed. The mean about which the
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individual values fluctuated was stable at slightly under 0.87 . This
may genuinely represent some element of the cognitive process, or it
may just be due to basic estimation ratios not strictly linked to the
actual perception of distance, but rather to its recall. It would
take specific psychological studies to determine which.
One final point lies in the possibility that the consistency of
the mean exponent value is a result of the scale of each experiment,
not in terms of size of standard but in terms of range of distances,
being kept constant. In each case the scatter of places covered the
whole globe, from near at hand to the antipodes. Walmsley (1972) has
suggested that differences in the range of distances may have caused
the variation in exponents of emotional involvement to subjective
distance in his own experiments, and between those of Gordon Stanley
and the Stockholm investigators. It is possible that the constancy
of range employed above may have had a similar effect in maintaining
constancy of exponent, whereas a more limited range of distances
might have produced a different exponent, but this seems less likely
when we consider that Walmsley produces this hypothesis in order to
criticise Bratfisch for constancy of scale, not inconstancy! So it
does not look as though variation in range of distances explains
Bratfisch1s more varied results.
(iv) The Problem of Places
So far we have been looking chiefly at general images referring
to the estimates made by each subject of the whole range of
distances. By looking at the pattern presented by all the
estimations of each subject we have tried to reach conclusions about
the general way in which the world has been perceived by the
subjects. However, this is only half the story, and we must now turn
our attention to the crucial topic of the cognition of individual
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places. This is vital to our understanding of cognition as a
geographical problem. It is not enough to study people as those who
cognise the world; it is necessary to study places as objects of
cognition.
Approaching the problem turns out to be quite tricky. Little
can be deduced from a re-examination of table 3.2, place by place.
If we take as a definition of overestimation at least one mean
distance estimate exceeding either of the two correct distances, we
can list the places that are ever overestimated. These are Dublin,
Reykjavik, Warsaw, Madrid, Algiers, Moscow, Lagos, Bering Straits,
Peking, Saigon and Cape Town; just under half the total. These are a
mixed bag in that some of them are only overestimated with respect to
map distances in cases where the map distance is much lower than the
great circle distance, for example, Cape Town. If we take only AGCD
as standard, the list drops to Dublin, Reykjavik, Warsaw, Algiers,
Moscow, Bering Straits and Peking. All the distances beyond Peking
are underestimated - comparable to the underestimation Stea found
after the 4,000 mile mark. We are still faced with three problems.
Firstly, what is to be done about places which are overestimated with
respect to one standard and underestimated with respect to the other,
or overestimated by only some of the groups; secondly, how can we
judge the significance of the over- or underestimation, and lastly
(but certainly not least), how much of the pattern of misestimation
is a result of the already accepted logarithmic trend to the data?
The third of these problems gives the key to the solution of the
other two. The superficial approach of scanning table 3.2 is just
not sufficient. The median estimates are aggregates of widely varying
data, and a more sensitive and discriminating approach is necessary.
Again, it is important to assess the individuals and then generalise
rather than to generalise the individuals and assess.
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Take the case of a hypothetical subject whose estimates yield a
cognitive/physical exponent of 0.5 . Quite clearly, most of his
estimates are going to fall below the standard values; are we going
to categorise him as having underestimated all the distances? In
absolute terms, we could do so, of course; the statement, taken
literally, is true. But we can also regard his data as exhibiting an
exponent of 0.5, which is quite a different thing. If we say that he
has underestimated all the distances, there is an implication that he
could have overestimated instead, if perhaps, he had been given
different places. There is a implicit suggestion that the distances
themselves are in some way responsible, since there is no implication
that the subject is to blame, or that he would have underestimated
any distances. But if we say that the subject's estimates show an
exponent of 0.5, the emphasis shifts to the subject. We are now
saying that owing to the way this subject happens to make estimates,
any distances given him will tend to be underestimated relative to
absolute values. This does not involve the places as such at all; we
can then go on to consider them separately. To clarify this
argument, an illustration (figure 3.9) is provided.
This shows the plotting of the data from a hypothetical subject
(fijttw Cal)
on a graph of , D against AGCD. If we were to consider the
subject's estmates in absolute terms, we would find
^ twelve ^
overestimations - the points occuring above the line defined by
D=AGCD - : • , • - - ; all
the other points fall below the line and would appear as
underestimations. As the data ^piotted on a graph with ordinary
But
linear scales, the pattern of points is a curve. 0 the
1ogarithmicity of the data is shown by the fact that when
logarithmically plotted, the data conform to a straight line, as
in -figure ih)







0 )( log AGCD
iyure 3.9 (b)
Use ol regression analysis
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pattern is a feature of the subject, not of the places. Either he
perceives the world in a logarithmic fashion or he estimates in a
logarithmic fashion; which of these alternatives is not actually
important here - either way the pattern is characteristic of the
subject and independent of the places. Therefore the use of a
logarithmic graph loses no information about the individual distances
themselves.
We now have to compare the points on the graph to the line y=x,
that is, log D=log AGCD. We find that the log values for each place
are consistently lower than the log standard distances. All the
points are below the line. Having compensated for the 1ogarithmicity
of the data, we now find that all 24 distances appear to be
underestimated.
The problem may appear to have been compounded, but this is only
because the solution is not yet complete. If we take the regression
of log D on log AGCD, we find that the best-fit regression line to
the data is
1og D = 0.5 log AGCD
and it is about this line that the points are clustered. The
gradient of this line is the exponent of estimated distance that was
discussed previously. (The use of the term exponent to signify the
regression gradient stems from the alternative form of the equation
whereby it is expressed as
D = AGCD b
- this form of expression is favoured by Bratfisch). This exponent is
directly comparable to the 1ogarithmicity that we have just adjusted
for; it is a characteristic of the subject and not of the individual
distances. For this particular subject, the exponent value of 0.5 is
an independent constant, and can be treated as such. Once again, the
derivation of this constant, whether cognitive or otherwise, is not
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relevant. It is applicable to the entire list, and therefore does
not affect the relative placings of the various distance estimations.
We can therefore compensate for exponent in the same way as we did
for 1ogarithmicity, by changing the baseline. Instead of making
comparisons with the standard values predicted by the line D = AGCD
or the line log D = log AGCD, we now use the figures predicted by the
regression line, which is log D = 0.5 log AGCD for this particular
subject. In effect we are now saying that, given the way this
subject estimates distances in general, that is, as a certain
logarithmic ratio of the true distance, we would expect him to
estimate the distance X (see figure 3.9) as Y^, a figure derived from
projecting the actual distance X onto the best-fit regression line.
For example, consider the point C in figure 3.9 . Its component
representing the actual distance is given by the value X, and the
line CX intersects the regression line at Z. Therefore, given the
pattern of estimations made by the subject as best represented by the
line log D = 0.5 log AGCD, we should expect that a place of actual
log distance X ought to be estimated as being of log distance Y^.
(This can be translated into antilogarithms to obtain an actual
predicted estimate.) Therefore the place should be represented on the
graph by point Z of co-ordinates (X,Y^); in fact it isn't, since C
exceeds the predicted value by CZ. Although the point C appears to
represent an underestimation when compared to actual distance and log
actual distance, when compared to the way the subject actually
estimates distance, it represents an overestimation. The point D in
the diagram is a point which indicates a distance underestimated in
comparison with its predicted value.
If we now take the cas'e of a different hypothetical subject
whose figures yielded an exponent of 1.5, though his estimates might
at first seem all to be overestimations, and far higher than those of
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the first subject, by applying the same process we can reduce the
scale of his estimations so that the actual pattern of genuine
overestimation and underestimation can be compared directly with that
produced by the first subject. Having removed all the variations in
estimates stemming from the various subjects themselves, we have at
last isolated the pattern that is directly contributed by the
individual places. It will also be noted that the consistency of the
logarithmic pattern previously revealed greatly facilitates this
analysis, in that it becomes valid to hypothesise that those graphs
which gave higher correlation coefficents for simple linear
regressions were chance aberrations, and that it is possible to
regard all the data as inherently logarithmic and therefore to treat
it all in the same fashion.
So, we have proposed that the pattern of regression residuals is
equivalent to the pattern of true underestimation and overestimation.
This, it is suggested, is caused by the individual cognition of
individual distances. But let us suppose for a moment a null
hypothesis - that places have no especial effect on cognition at all.
What then of the residuals' pattern? In the case of a hypothetical
ideal subject, the points on the graph would then all lie along the
regression line - there would be no residuals at all. However, the
ideal subject exists more in imagination than in reality; there will
still be residuals, only they will be the product of pure chance,
sometimes falling under, sometimes over the line, the direction
depending on mere accident. How then, do we distinguish the residual
that represents a real cognitive misestimation and the residual that
is there only because it has to be somewhere?
The answer if fairly simple. Given only one subject, one image,
nothing significant can be determined. Given a large number of
subjects, by comparing the patterns produced by each we can determine
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whether a valid general image can be construed for any particular
distance by looking for consistency in the direction of residuals.
If the direction of residuals (positive or negative) is produced by
pure chance, the probability of one person overestimating the
distance to X is 0.5 . The probability of r people out of n all
overestimating the difference to X by mere coincidence can be
calculated by the binomial theorem as before, and significance
figures derived. If the chance of a discovered agreement turns out
to be very small, say less than 0.01, then we can say with 99%
certainty that the consistency of direction represents a genuine
cognition of that place being too close or too far away.
This has dealt with all the problems except for one: what should
be done about the two different distance standards, the great circle
and the map distances? Supposing an estimation represents an
overestimation with regard to one and an underestimation with regard
to the other? It would be possible to regard the map scale as having
been overruled by the support given to the great circle scale, and
ignore map distances altogether, but to do so at this stage would be
unjust. The distinction between great circle scale and map scale is
different from the logarithmic/linear problem just dealt with, for
whereas the logarithmic pattern of any subject is a constant
throughout, map perception may be something that is localised to
particular distances, so that though the subject's overall pattern
conforms more closely to global standards, it is possible to identify
particular places that have been thought of in map-like terms.
The problem was tackled in this way. For each subject, two
regressions were obtained, that of log D on log AGCD and log D on log
AMMD. Residuals from both these regressions were tabulated in a
2n x 24 matrix (where n = no. of subjects). Then for each place, the
residual with the lowest absolute value was selected from the two
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produced by each subject. This produced a matrix n x 24 of residuals
some of which referred to the AGCD regression and some of which were
derived from the AMMD regression. Which residual came from which
regression was recorded on another matrix. We have christened this
technique of combining two regression analyses "parallel regression".
The advantages are twofold: firstly, it permits of two possible
r
interpetations of any particular distance estimation, in the context
of globe or of map; secondly, by minimising the possible size of the
residual and the distance of the point from the line, the technique
constrains the data in the direction of the null hypothesis as much
as possible, which will lend greater weight to any positive results
which would appear to contradict the null hypothesis.
Having obtained the composite matrix of residuals, each place
was assessed on the number of times it appeared as a positive
residual and the number of times it appeared as a negative residual,
and the significance of the result was assessed on the basis of
binomial calculations. These figures are entered as table 3.10.
The results are quite impressive. The first thing to note is
the consistency of the figures with regard to each place. If one
group shows a positive figure for a particular place (representing
overestimation of that distance significant at the given percentage
level), no group will show a negative figure for the same place. In
other words, each distance is either significantly overestimated by
some or none of the groups or significantly underestimated by some or
none, but never significantly overestimated and underestimated by
different groups. Each place engenders an image that may vary from
group to group with regard to strength but never with regard to
direction. And of course, some places are perceived correctly, or at






PI ace E3 E2 SA AL B3
Dublin +90%' +90% +95% npPari s -95%
Osl o -99.5% -95% -99.9% -99.9% -99.9%
Reykjavik
Warsaw +90% +90% +95%
Madrid -90%
N.Cape -99.9% -99.9% -99.9% -99.9%
A1giers +99.9% +95% +99.9% +99.9% +99%
Moscow +99.9% +95% +99.9%
Athens 1 LO O -95%
N.Pole -99% -90% -99.9%
Jerusalem
New York -95% -99%
Lagos +90% +90% +90%
Bering Sts. -90% -95% -95% -99.9% npPeking +99.9% +99.9% +99.9% +99.9% +99.9%
Calcutta -95% -90% -90%
San Francisco +95% +95% +99.9% +99%
Saigon +95% +90% +99.9% +99.9%
Cape Town -95%
Honol ul u +95% +95% +99%
Buenos Aires -95% -95% -99%
S.Pole +90% +90%




Percentage figures show significance
(values >99.9% are treated as 99.9%)
np = not placed in Belfast questionnaire
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This means that of the first four columns of table 3.10, the
fourth is the most important, being the amalgamation of the preceding
three and therefore the largest sample size. Since the previous
three are not usefully different, there seems no advantage in not
representing them chiefly by the AL column. Before we do this,
though, it is interesting to make a comparison of the strengths of
images by seeing which places are significantly placed in all
columns. As can be seen, Oslo is invariably underestimated by all
groups, but Reykjavik is never significant. The Bering Straits
distance is heavily underestimated (except, of course, by the Belfast
group since it was omitted from the Belfast list). Algiers and
Peking are overestimated right across the board; the distance to
Jerusalem is approximately correct (this exactitude with regard to
Jerusalem was a notable feature of the pilot experiment also). Both
Cape Town and Madrid only appear significant in the Belfast column,
and then relatively weakly.
The next thing to notice is that we have lost the trend towards
increasing underestimation with increasing distance. The most
underestimated distance is only the third shortest, and
underestimations and overestimations are equally spaced out down the
list. Since we have shaken off the problems of 1ogarithmicity and
scale, and isolated the estimations of individual distances, we can
now look more closely at the question of barriers. However, this we
shall leave until sub-section (v).
It was decided to attempt to back-up the significance figures in
table 3.10 by examing the size of the residuals. Given that the
distribution of residuals for any particular place is not necessarily
normal, there is no reason why a case like figure 3.11 should not
occur, where, although all residuals are greater than zero, thus







overestimation is not very great. By contrast, figure 3.12
represents a distribution which would give a lower significance
figure on frequency of overestimation, but a higher mean residual.
The following procedure was adopted. The mean residual for each
place in each group was calculated, and if it was more or less than
zero by two standard errors or greater, a plus or minus was
accordingly noted. The use of two standard errors as a measuring
stick was semi-arbitrary. In a normal distribution this would
represent the bounds within which the true population mean (as
opposed to the sample mean) would be likely to lie 95% of the time.
The figure of 95% does not necessarily hold for non-normal
distributions, but the standard is a useful one, since it will
certainly eliminate cases resembling figure 3.11, which is all it is
intended to do. The results of all this are presented as table
3.13 . Comparison of this with table 3.10 shows that the results are
fairly consistent. Dublin is undermined in the significance of its
results (not entirely surprisingly, since the estimates are
necessarily small anyway); so is San Francisco, Saigon and Honolulu.
The significance of the South Pole figures is backed up slightly
more, as is the case with Paris and Moscow - otherwise the figures
are much the same. The next step was to analyse how frequently the
lowest modulus residual came from the AGCD regression and how often
from the AMMD regression. This was calculated for each subject, and
the significance of the consistency assessed as before, by reference
to binomial probabilities. The total number of subjects with
significantly consistent lists of residuals (at the 90% level or
greater) was a mere 32 out of 182 . Twenty-six of these approximated
consistently to great circle distances. This is quite interesting in
that it somewhat undermines the earlier results on general images; it










Warsaw + + +
Madrid
N.Cape
Algiers + + + + +













Buenos Aires - -
S.Pole + + +
Christchurch -
KEY
- = significant underestimation
+ = significant overestimation
np = not placed on Belfast questionnaire
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each subject, by and large, one image will not be a more significant
representation than the other, but for a group of subjects, one
standard will yield significantly better results. Great circle
distances may come out on top for a significant majority of the
subjects, but for each of them the margin by which it supercedes map
distances is not significantly great. This lack of consistency
within each individual directly suggests that the individual places
have a strong bearing here; certain distances may lend themselves to
map perception whilst others are conceived of in global terms by the
same subject. In this case our earlier "general images" are somewhat
of a necessary evil - a stage in the analytical process more than a
reflection of the results. Rather than it necessarily being an
intrinsic property of each subject that he should be a
"map-perceiver" or a "globe-perceiver", it seems that the emphasis is
more on place than person, that there are distances easier to cognise
in map terms or in globe terms. The general image that an experiment
unearths may therefore necessarily be a product of the selection of
places that one makes. This throws interesting light on the earlier
discussion of the difference between the Edinburgh and Belfast rank
orders, and may explain the disparity a little more clearly.
Obviously the next question to ask is which places were
consistently associated with one or other regressions? This is not
something that can really be adequately determined. The disadvantage
of the parallel regression technique is that although it does allow
for two different ways of interpreting the distance estimates, by
reference to globe or map standards, it does not necessarily follow
that if a place is assigned to one regression by dint of lower
residual, one can invariably assume that the subject had that
particular distance scale in mind. Of course, in most cases it is
probably true to say that if a significantly lower residual occurs on
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a map regression then that represents a reference to map distance.
But it is theoretically possible for a distance estimation, which, in
isolation appears to relate to one sort of distance standard, to be
represented by a lower modulus residual in the opposite regression if
it corresponds more closely to the general trend of that regression.
This is most likely to occur in extreme cases where there is already
a very strong trend to one or other distance standard, which will
tend to swamp minor divergences. Since the technique has been
constructed on a fail-safe basis, that is, minimising the
significance of results, this is not seen as a major weakness. There
is a further difficulty in examining preferred projection in that, if
an estimate is grossly in excess of both actual distances, it will
naturally tend to give a lower residual with respect to the larger of
the two. It would be unwise to attribute this consistency to the
projection as such, but rather to the relative size of the two
standard distances. If the difference between these is considerable,
then it may be true to say that the discrimination between map and
globe is a valid one.
Bearing these limitations in mind, one can examine table 3.14,
which indicates the places for which the selection of residuals was
consistent. It can be seen that the images for each place tend to be
consistent, the most notable exception being Peking, and the only
other ones the slightly significant Cape Town and Jerusalem. In the
face of the other results it may be possible to regard this exception
as a chance aberration of limited interest. Detailed interpretation
is not easy. Perhaps the most notable thing is the tendency to map
distances round the periphery: Honolulu, San Francisco, Buenos Aires,
Cape Town and Christchurch. While subjects might be aware that the
distance to Bering Straits is trans-polar, it is more difficult to
realise the effect the girth of the globe has in lengthening the
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Table 3.14
CONSISTENCY OF IMAGE WITH PLACE
PI ace E3 E2 SA AL B3
Dublin np
Paris M90X
Osl o G95% G95% G99.9X G99.9X G99.9%
Reykjavik G95%
Warsaw M90% M99X M99X
Madrid M95%
N.Cape G95% G99.9% G99.9X G99.9X G99.9%
A1giers G95% G99.9X G99.9X G99.9X G99.9X
Moscow M99% M99X M99X
Athens M90%
N.Pole G99.9% G99.9X 99.9% G99%




Peking G99.9% G99.9X G99.9% G99.9% M99.9X
Calcutta G99.9% G99X G99%
San Francisco M90% M90X M95X M99% M95%
Saigon G95X G95X G99% G99.9X
Cape Town G90% M95% M95%
Honol ul u M95X M95% M99%
Buenos Aires M95X M99%
S.Pole G95X G90%




M = tendency to map image
G = tendency to globe image
Percentage figures indicate significance levels
np = not placed on Belfast questionnaire
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distance to somewhere like Buenos Aires, especially when this
distance is not obviously distorted on most maps, as is the distance
to the South Pole on Mercator's projection. At an earlier stage in
the analysis, when residuals had been compiled for only one
regression (the one with log AGCD), one of the most spectacular
features of the data was the massive underestimation of the distance
to Buenos Aires. Once the parallel regression technique was
introduced, this was dramatically reduced. Measuring such a distance
with a tape measure on a large globe can be a very educational
experience as one sees just how the bulge of the Earth at the equator
affects distances to the southern hemisphere.
Perhaps the most important conclusion from table 3.14 is that it
does seem to show that consistency of image by place exceeds
consistency of image by subject, as previously suggested.
Before going on to consider the interpretation of the individual
estimation results in terms of geographical factors, it will be
appropriate to turn back to the figures collected for the confidence
expressed in each estimation. It was regarded as a possible
hypothesis that the variations in accuracy shown as greater or
smaller residuals were occasioned by variations in awareness about
which the subject was under no illusions. Under this hypothesis, for
each subject, the modulus residuals and confidence figures should
have a high covariance, and this was tested for by regression
analysis.
The results showed that very occasionally this might be true for
isolated subjects (one subject had as much as 39% of the variation in
his residual figures explained by his confidence estimates) but in
general the mean explanation provided by confidence estimates was 1%
or less. Furthermore, almost as many subjects gave inverted
correlations as gave predicted ones; in general terms the
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significance of confidence in explaining misestimation as measured
was nil. Figures were also obtained for the correlation of
confidence with percentage error, derived as estimated distance
divided by AGCD or AMMD and multiplied by 100 . These are not
significantly better.
The final topic to be covered is the attempt to explain the
obtained estimations in terms of the places themselves and the nature
of the distances that separate them.
(v) Barriers
Once we start looking at the pattern of estimations in terms of
barriers, then we are beginning to look at the subject with a truly
geographical perspective. We are looking for evidence of the
perception of distance being guided by the geography of that
distance, either in terms of the attributes of the place itself, or
of the attributes of the distance to that place; attributes that may
be physical in terms of seas or land masses, or may be human as with
political boundaries or language divides. Also, we are beginning to
hypothesise that subjects estimating distance may be subconsciously
asking themselves "what lies between here and X?" in terms of
perceptual events; that it is necessary to cross into another
continent, or cross the Iron Curtain, or whatever. In other words,
the concept that Stea introduces into this field under the heading of
"barriers" is the start of the hypothesis that geographical space may
be perceived or measured by the things it contains - a tacit
association of space and matter.
Returning to table 3.10 once more, let us consider in the light
of it the three sorts of barriers that Stea investigated. The first
of these was marine barriers - separation of the various places by
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bodies of ocean or sea. The first test of this was the comparison of
Oslo and Paris - the first of these distances is chiefly across sea,
the second mostly across land. Accordingly, one might expect the
distance to Oslo to be overestimated relative to Paris. Of course,
as the results show, the reverse is true. New York, an important
inclusion in the list as one of the closest cities of the New World,
separated from Britain by the Atlantic Ocean, is again underestimated
rather than overestimated. On the other hand, a predominantly
overland distance like that to Saigon, is overestimated. The general
impression given by the results is that marine barriers do not exist
in the expected sense; rather that land barriers are more probable
phenomena. One could, however, think of seas as a sort of "negative
barrier", causing underestimaton, if one wished.
There are two ways of regarding this. The first is to account
for it culturally, and hypothesise that while British subjects might
give such a result thanks to a long naval tradition which might still
gear people to thinking of foreign places as "overseas", and of
seeing little obstacle in a sea journey, it might be that American
subjects, given that the dominant American cultural tradition is of
an overland, pioneer outlook, might regard the ocean as much more of
a separating barrier. The sea is an ambiguous agent; it can divide
but it can also unite. The other approach is to look at this effect
in more philosophical terms. The basis of "barrier thinking", as has
already been discussed, is the concept of space viewed in terms of
its contents. The contents of x miles of land are both varied and
variable - there are rivers and mountains to cross, cities to pass
by, countries to pass through. The contents of x miles of sea are
uniform and unchanging - a large amount of water, showing blue and
unfigured on the map. Measuring by events, a land distance ought to
be perceived as more distant, for it contains more perceptual events
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to be crammed into the same space. The sea contains but one event -
itself. Of course, it is also true to remark that monotonous
distances often seem boring and therefore longer, but that is an
experiential approach, and at this level we are dealing chiefly with
non-experiential cognitions.
With regard to political barriers, one must be a little more
selective, since all the distances, unlike those in Stea's
experiment, cross at least one political boundary, and to count all
those crossed is obviously not appropriate. Whether the great circle
route to Cape Town intersects the boundaries of Botswana or not, in
addition to all the other frontiers it crosses, is highly unlikely to
have any effect on cognition. On the other hand, there are other
political boundaries of note besides state borders, to wit, the
"ideological" frontiers of the Iron and Bamboo curtains, and these do
look as though they might be associated with overestimation.
Finally, we have Stea's lingual barriers. It is difficult to
discern any pattern, positive or negative, with regard to these in
table 3.10 . However, once again, we would expect only one barrier
would be effective in affecting any distance estimaton. It seems
unlikely that all the different intervening lingual areas lying along
a route would be comprehensively cognised, but it would be easily
noted that a different language was spoken at the end point of the
distance.
Having looked at these superficially, it was next decided to try
and synthesise the barrier concept in a single barrier score for each
place. This was calculated as follows:
(a) Lingual barrier. If English was not a major language in the
object place, one point was awarded. Cities like Cape Town and
Calcutta were therefore not given the point, even though the chief
languages of these cities is other than English. Places in polar
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latitudes where no language is spoken much were not given the point.
(b) Ideological barrier. If the place had a communist
government it was given one point. Saigon was not given the point
since it was felt that the government there was too recently
established to have been coghitively registered. The author hastens
to point out that this discrimination against communist countries
rather than, say, fascist countries, is no political bias, but purely
due to the fact that left-wing governments are more prone to making
it difficult if not impossible for the foreigner (or native, for that
matter) to cross the country's borders. It can also be justified on
the grounds that the American division of the world into "free
countries" and "communist bloc" has an effect on colouring
geopolitical thinking in this country.
(c) Land barrier. One point was awarded for each continent
traversed in substantial amount by the distance in question. This
was considered as justifiably cumulative unlike the lingual and
political barriers owing to the fact that land barriers, larger and
more indisputable, are self-evident on any map. In addition, a bonus
point was awarded for each continental boundary crossed (e.g.
Europe/Asia, Europe/Africa), provided this was not an ocean. It was
felt that, for example, Algiers might be cognised as being too far
away owing to its being outside Europe, whereas New York would not
show the same effect since the Europe/America boundary might be
considered as cancelled out by the negative effect of the ocean. The
judgements on the total score awarded were occasionally a little
subjective: Honolulu totalled one for the North American continent
crossed; Christchurch received one for Europe, one for Australasia
and one for rather tangentially intersecting Asia, making three in
all; Moscow was awarded a point for the amount of Europe crossed to
reach it, whereas Warsaw was not. These figures were usually based
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on map routes rather than great circle routes.
(d) Cultural association. This was added in a rather negative
sort of way, in that places formerly under British administration had
one point deducted from their score. The same effect could be
achieved by adding one point to the score of all the other places on
the basis of a cultural barrier, so the negative aspect need not
worry us with implications; it was simply felt to be a more direct
way of achieving the same ends. New York had a point deducted whilst
San Francisco did not (1776 and all that). The point was not
deducted from Jerusalem, though it might well have been, considering
the former British involvement with Palestine.
The final figures were therefore as follows: Dublin -1, Paris
+1, Oslo +1, Reykjavik +1, Warsaw +2, Madrid +1, N. Cape 0, Algiers
-i-3, Moscow +3, Athens +2, N. Pole 0, Jerusalem +2, New York -1, Lagos
+2, Bering Straits 0, Peking +5, Calcutta +2, San Francisco +1,
Saigon +4, Cape Town +2, Honolulu +1, Buenos Aires +1, S. Pole +3,
Christchurch +2. This list was regressed against the median residual
for each place, acquired from the calculations of the AL group. The
resulting relationship was the equation
y = 0.06x - 0.08
for which the value or R was 0.66, a value significant at the 5%
level. This is equivalent to over 43% of the general residual
pattern being explained by this admittedly crude measure of barriers,
which, as can be seen, tends to the hypothetical and subjective.
Certainly this is a much better result than that obtained from using
confidence estimates as an explanatory variable (discussed earlier).
The reason why medians were processed for the AL subjects as a whole,
rather than treating each subject individually was chiefly that,
given the blunt nature of the hypothesised barrier scores, it would
be inappropriate to attempt to use too fine a level of disaggregation
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in the analysis. The B3 data were not processed separately, since
they resemble the AL data sufficently closely for us to regard this
as superfluous.
There is, of course, room for manipulation. Having seen little
evidence for lingual barriers in table 3.10, we re-did the
calculation without the lingual component. The result was a lower
value of R (0.56), thus suggesting that lingual barriers do have at
least some effect.
In conclusion, it should be said that for such a vague
construction to yield such a good result is most promising. It
suggests that there is potential here for further research,
especially into the detailed cognition of barriers at a global level,
and a determining of the relative parts that different sorts of
barriers play. It certainly seems that barriers or perceptual events
play an important part in the cognition of global distance.
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5) PSYCHOPHYSICS
In the course of the preceding text, we have occasionally
touched on matters relating to a particular branch of the discipline
of psychology without giving- much consideration to the psychologist's
point of view. In the following section the author hopes to remedy
this by giving a brief account of the relationships between some of
the preceding arguments and the study of psychophysics. It has been
thought advisable to keep this discussion separate from the rest of
the text since, to most geographers, the field of psychophysics is a
trifle obscure; it is thus easier to follow the whole of the
discussion, or to skip it.
Psychophysics was originally conceived of as the science of
relations between mind and body; but since this gives it rather a
philosophical scope, it is perhaps easier to describe it as the study
of the relationships between psychological and physical phenomena,
mental entities and the stimuli that produce them. It has also been
described as the science of relations between psychological
dimensions and physical dimensions, thus emphasising the
psychophysicist1 s essentially metric viewpoint. The search is always
for laws dealing with numerical transformations between a physical
dimension and some form of psychological dimension.
In particular, we are concerned with perceptual psychophysics,
which is concerned with the relationships that dimensions of physical
stimuli bear to the dimensions of sensation of those stimuli, for
example, the relation of perceived brightness of light to the actual
intensity of light waves, or the sensation of salinity to the actual
concentration of salt solution. And, of course, the relationship
between perceived length and actual physical length.
In historical perspective, psychophysics can be divided into the
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"old" psychophysics of which Fechner was the chief exponent, and the
"new" psychophysics established by S.S. Stevens. In recent times,
C.W. Savage has attempted to demolish both these positions in favour
of a "radical" psychophysics, about which more will be said later.
Fechnerian psychophysics revolves largely around the concept of the
"jnd", or just noticeable difference. This more or less
self-explanatory term is simply the least amount of change necessary
in a stimulus for an observer to be able to perceive that a change of
a very small nature has, in fact, taken place. According to Weber's
law, which is in many ways the foundation of the Fechnerian edifice,
all just noticeable differences are equal, and are equal to a
constant proportion of the stimulus in question. To a certain
extent, this is obviously observable. In a room lit by one candle,
the addition of a further candle occasions an easily appreciable
difference in "illumination. However, in a room lit by a hundred
candles, one more candle will not make a sufficent relative increase
in brightness to be noticeable.
Similarly, in section 2 subsection (iii) (q.v.) we argued that
certain ratios were more easily distinguished from others in the
search for an explanation of the 1ogarithmicity of estimation. We
were, in fact adducing from Weber's law, or at least, the part of it
that works. The illustration given by the example of the candles
does indicate that the jnd is relative to the stimulus magnitude and
not constant in terms of absolute units, but it does not show that
the jnd is a constant fraction at any scale of magnitude. Suppose we
find that adding a 54th candle to 53 is just noticeable and no more.
Will the same hold for adding the 54th 100 candles to 5300? Not only
has this never been proved, many would say that it does, in fact, not
hold at all; that just noticeable differences are not equal at all
scales of magnitude.
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Nevertheless, Fechner proposed a system by which the jnd could
be used as a basis for the measurement of sensation; at that time,
this was a notable advance since it had previously been held that
sensation was not susceptible to measurement at all. He also
propounded Fechner1s law, which, (slightly paraphrased) states that:
(sensation) = k 1og(stimulus)
where k is a constant, the value of which depends on the sort of
sensation in question. This law is developed mathematically from
Weber's law.
There are many objections to Fechner's position, and a wholesale
critique is not relevant here. Two examples will suffice. Firstly,
if one uses jnds as a basis for measurment, one cannot then use one's
measurements to prove that jnds are equal without being guilty of
circularity; therefore, given no other method of measuring sensation,
one cannot vindicate the basis of the whole system, namely that as
jnds are equal, they can be used as the basis of a system of
measurement. Secondly, there is a tacit assumption that in a
particular experiment a jnd can be accurately determined. In fact,
there is probably a zone of uncertainty, and an observer may think he
notices a difference on some occasions, and on other occasions be
less sure, given exactly the same experimental conditions on each
occasion (Savage, 1970).
The theories Fechner laid down were subjected to intensive
debate for many years, but it was only until the work of S.S. Stevens
on ratio scaling that there arose a comparable body of theory to
replace the Fechnerian doctrines. Stevens devised many techniques
for investigating reaction to stimuli using ratio estimations, and
the results of these experiments led him to believe that, rather than
reaction following a logarithmic pattern as proposed by Fechner's
logarithmic law, it showed a pattern that suggested a power law. We
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therefore have the relationship variously described as "Stevens' power
law" and "the psychophysical law":
(sensation) = (stiinul us)n
where n (the exponent) is equivalent to the constant k in Fechner's
law. It should be noted1 in both these laws that we have taken a
slight liberty in representing the two components as "sensation" and
"stimulus". Strictly speaking, one should read "a psychological
dimension in units of psychological measurement" for "sensation" and
"
a physical dimension expressed in units of physical measurement"
for "stimulus".
It should also be noted that the relationship between perceived
distance and actual distance already discussed is effectively another
instance of Stevens' power law. The forms
1og D = b 1og AGCD
and
D = AGCD b
are synonymous. We have preferred to use logarithms since the
equation was derived primarily from a graphical portrayal of the
data, which were processed by regression analysis to obtain the
appropriate formula. Stevens, on the other hand, probably wanted to
avoid confusion with Fechner's "logarithmic" law (but which has
logarithms on one side of the equation only); furthermore, he also
derives the law as it stands from mathematical reasoning, using as
basis a variant on Weber's law. He does indicate both forms of the
equation (Stevens, 1957).
Since the Swedish investigators previously discussed in
section 1 are all psychophysicists of the Stevens school, the above
sheds some light on their approach to the subject, as follows:
(i) (A trivial point.) It explains the different renderings
of the subjective/physical distance equation used by Bratfisch and
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the author. Bratfisch sees it in the lineage of Stevens' law,
whereas the author prefers to express it in terms of a straight line
on a logarithmic graph.
(ii) It perhaps explains the apparent lack of interest shown
by Bratfisch et al. in determining the independent variable in the
subjective distance/emotional involvement equation. It may be that
having confirmed the psychophysical law once again by discovering a
power function, they regard this as the conclusion of the matter.
(iii) It illustrates more clearly Lundberg's criticism of
Stanley. Since the psychophysicist is concerned with the measurement
of sensation, it is the "sensation" of distance that is important to
him, not the extent of information upon it. If the subject can say
that Paris "feels" that much further from London, well and good; the
experimenter is satisfied that he is dealing with a psychological
dimension. If, on the other hand, the subject knows that Paris is
that much further from London, the "psychological dimension" is
spurious in so far as it is just an extension of the physical
dimension of distance. Of course, as previously argued, the extent
to which the psychological and the physical can be divorced by the
subject is an unknown variable. Since we have shown that there seems
i
to be an important geographical component to cognitve distance, it
may be that the psychophysicist must proceed with care when venturing
into geographical waters.
However, we now have to deal with one of the thornier problems
in psychophysics, one which has significant reference to some of the
preceding arguments relating to data analysis and experiment design.
The question is fundamental: can sensation really be measured? Since
Stevens has by and large disposed of the Fechnerian principles of
sensation measurement, it remains to deal with Stevens' own
techniques - the ratio scaling approach. In this technique the
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experimental procedure is very roughly as follows: the subject is
shown two stimuli and is asked to estimate the ratio of the two
magnitudes as he perceives it. This may be the length of two rods,
brightness of two lamps, or whatever, as the case may be. The phrase
"as he perceives it" is really dispensible, since the subject can
scarcely produce a sensible estimate of the ratio as he doesn't
perceive it. The basic premiss is that the stimulus produces a
sensation, the subject estimates the sensation, reports this to the
experimenter, who can then say he has measured the sensation.
However, as Savage argues in his broadside against conventional
psychophysics (Savage, 1970) this is not so, since the experimenter
has no way of independently assessing the subject's accuracy of
estimation relative to the sensations produced by the stimuli. He
can compare the ratio estimates with stimuli, but not with
sensations, and since he cannot check the accuracy vis a vis the
sensation he cannot say he has measured (i.e. measured accurately)
sensation.
According to Savage, there are two possible interpretations of
the ratio scaling technique, the introspectionist and the
behaviourist, and he criticises both of these. The introspectionist
position states that there do exist private "sensations",
psychological phenomena, and that the subject can estimate the size
of these psychological phenomena apart from estimation of the
physical stimuli. Savage attacks this position from two directions.
Firstly, he argues, these internal psychological phenomona do not
really exist, and that to ask a subject to estimate the length of the
visual sensation produced by rod A without estimating the length of
rod A is ridiculous. Secondly, even if they did exist, we could not
measure them, owing to the difficulties detailed in the preceding
paragraph.
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The behaviourist approach is to take the attitude that
"measurement" is basically a process of simply assigning numerals to
phenomena, and this is being done. Whether the estimates given refer
to inner mental entities is not relevant; what is important is that
the subject has chosen to give those particular numbers to those
e
particular stimuli; the ratio estimates can therfore be investigated
in their own right. Unlike the introspectionist position, this
approach is logically quite sound. However, it does have
implications. If the "mental entities", the psychological phenomena,
are not integral to the ratio scaling proceedure, they, and by and
large sensation as well, are irrelevant altogether. Under the
behaviourist approach it is unneccessary to posit any psychological
phenomena at all - one is really subjecting the subject to physical
stimuli (expressable in physical units) and receiving from him
"physical estimates" (also expressable in physical units). Far from
measuring sensation, the power-law experiments would seem to measure
what Savage calls "perceptual abilities" - and this term is by and
large synonymous with "process of estimation".
The adherents of Stevens seem to take the attitude that a
subject presented with two stimuli perceives the ratio between them
in an inaccurate fashion (i.e. other than the objective physical
ratio) and then estimates this perceived ratio with complete
accuracy. To this non-psychologist at any rate, it would appear that
the contrary is far more plausible: that the subject perceives the
stimuli quite accurately, but (as previously argued) estimates them
inaccurately. The hypothetical experiment previously suggested, in
which subjects completed a distance estimation questionnaire while
looking at a map was regarded by the author as an investigation of
how people made estimates - the psychophysicist of the Stevens school
would regard it rather as an experiment into perceived length.
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There seems no way of experimentally distinguishing between the
two possibilities, and of course the third possibility, that subjects
are inaccurate in both perception and estimation, lurks somewhere in
the background.
However, one thing is clear. All the mass of ratio estimations
gathered by the new psychophysicists does show that when subjects are
presented with physical stimuli from which to make ratio estimations
of magnitude, be it length, distance, brightness, loudness, weight or
whatever, the ratio estimates they make always fit the physical
dimensions of the stimuli by a power function rather than indicating
a linear relationship. The author suspects his hypothesis of
distinguishable ratios elaborated in section 2 is akin to the
mathematical arguments that Stevens uses to explain his power law
(with the difference that it has "estimation" rather than "sensation"
as the dependent variable). But whatever the cause, the implication
is that when subjects are asked to estimate distance one should
expect a power relationship between estimated distance and actual
distance irrespective of cognition. The following maxim seems
advisable: the relationship between estimated and physical distance






1) REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
(i) Urban Cognition
As previously mentioned, very little work has been done to study
cognitive distance at a regional or national scale. However, there
is a large body of literature dealing with cognition of distance at
an urban, that is, intra-city rather than inter-city, scale. It
therefore seems useful that we should briefly consider this work
before proceeding further, to see if the results obtained by workers
dealing with this particular scale of cognition might be helpful in
formulating hypotheses at a higher scale of study.
Perhaps the easiest way of discussing the mass of different
experiments is to take a thematic approach. Several hypotheses are
common to more than one experimenter, and not all have produced
confirmatory results. The first point to consider is a
methodological one. Arguments in favour of different ways of
collecting distance estimates have already been discussed;
experimenters working at the urban scale have differed in the
appoaches they have adopted. A graphical ratio scaling technique was
employed by Lowrey (1970) and Ericksen (1975), whereas direct mileage
estimates were sought by Lee (1970), Pocock (1972b) and Canter
(1975). Zeller and Rivizzigno (1974) asked subjects to estimate the
relative distance of all possible pairs in a matrix of locations on
an arbitrary scale of zero to nine, an unusual procedure. McKay,
Olshavsky and Sentell (1975) collected only ordinal data on the
relative distances of supermarkets in Bloomington, Alabama. Some
experimenters gathered data using more than one technique, including
Briggs (1973a) and Golledge and Zannaras (1973). Notable is a study
by Day (1975), in which he tested four different techniques in two
153
Sydney suburbs. The techniques were: measuring distance on a map
drawn by the subject; verbal estimation; marking distances on a scale
graduated in miles; and a ratio scaling technique using one scale
base. The different techniques produced different results, which Day
plotted graphically (Day, 1975, p.197).
Once again, the thorny problem of cognition and estimation rears
its head. These four techniques may have yielded different results,
but, though it is possible to determine which set of results most
closely corresponds with the actual distances, it is not possible to
tell which results most accurately reflect the subject's own
cognitive distances. The situation is something as follows: it is
impossible to tell which is the most accurate estimation technique
until we have absolute figures for cognitive distances; but we cannot
obtain absolute figures for cognitive distances unil we possess a
perfect estimation technique. The only realistic solution would seem
to be to take the most expedient way out of the dilemma according to
individual circumstances. The more complicated techniques are only
possible given a captive community of subjects, i.e. students. In
dealing with "ordinary people" it is probably more appropriate to use
a more familiar process such as mileage estimation (Canter and Tagg,
1975). Since subjects are more familiar with concepts of the order
of five miles than they are with 5,000 miles, the objections to
working with mileage estimates at a global scale are much less
relevant here. As Canter points out (Canter, 1975, p7), distance
estimation is a tiresome business for the ordinary subject, and as
boredom increases, the care taken over each estimation decreases,
something found even with Zeller and Rivizzigno's "captive" students.
(Zeller and Rivizzigno, 1974). Keeping questionnaires simple would
therefore seem advantageous in securing reasonably valid estimations.
Some of the work that has been done involving estimation of
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urban distance has been more concerned with using this as a tool in
the investigation of the cognition of urban structure rather than the
study of cognitive distance per se, and obviously this sort of study
(including Pocock, Golledge and Zannaras among others) is less
relevant to this thesis. Often the distance estimates obtained are
processed by multi-dimensional scaling programmes in order to produce
a distance-derived mental map of the city (the debt to Lynch, 1960)
is acknowledged). There is obviously little to be gained here from
discussing the results of these studies at any length. The results
tend to be in terms of the overall measure of location error or
"stress", which Zeller and Rivizzigno attempted to relate to length
of residence, amd McKay, Olshavsky and Sentell attempted to relate to
a variety of socio-economic factors.
Turning to two themes already discussed in part III, we find
confirmation of the hypothesis that the relationship between
estimated and actual distance is a non-linear one. This is found by
both Ericksen and Briggs, although Lowrey produced results in which
subjects' estimates most closely reflected Euclidean straight-line
distances. Canter and Tagg found that a logarithmic regression
tended to account for more variation than a linear one, but this was
not consistent from subject group to subject group.
The distribution of distance estimations (as was seen in part
III) can exhibit not only considerable spread, but considerable skew
as well. Day makes the important point that
"the previously standard use of mean values is misleading as
it gives a false impression of the extent to which a sample
population holds the same image in common." (Day, 1976, p.198)
As Zeller and Rivizzigno found, mean figures tend to be more
accurate than any of the individual subjects' figures. Canter also
mentions the wide variation in individual responses (Canter, 1975,
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p. 8).
Another problem that arises is the question of whether subjects
should be asked to estimate "crow-flight" distances or walking
distances, and though this matter has aroused some dispute, with
different experimenters adopting different approaches, no conclusion
seems to have been reached. It is possible that if one specifies
direct distances are to be estimated, the complexity of route
distance may still influence the results by causing overestimation in
certain cases. It is equally possible that if one asks for travel
distances to be estimated, straight-line proximity might influence
the results in the opposite manner, by causing occasional
underestimation of distance. And, once again, we are confronted by a
variation of the black box problem; we cannot really tell which sort
of distance is most appropriate to the subjects' own cognitions.
The themes most frequently covered in the literature with
respect to interpreting variations in cognitive distance are those of
direction (towards or away from the city centre) and straightness or
crookedness of route; familiarity is also mentioned by several
writers.
Turning to direction first, the issue lies between those
researchers who found that subjects are relatively more prone to
overestimating distances away from the city centre, and those who
found the reverse to be true. Of the former, Lee explained his
results in Dundee as perhaps due to the more attractive nature of the
city centre to the respondents (Lee, 1970). However, American
researchers, for example Briggs in Columbus, Ohio, found
overestimation towards the city centre (Briggs, 1973a). The
discrepancy is explained on the basis that, firstly, American city
centres are less attractive than Dundee, and secondly, that the
overestimation towards the centre is the result of the denser packing
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of perceptual events, i.e. that distance is being perceived in terms
of events or matter.
Further light has been shed on the subject by Canter, who
discovered, in a London-based experiment, that the direction of
overestimation relative to the city centre appeared to be a function
of the distance from the city centre of the respondent. The
direction of overestimation was outwards for those living less than
six miles from the centre; but inwards for those living further away.
(Canter, 1975, p.188)
An attempted hypothesis also connected with space perceived in
terms of events is that distances involving.straight routes should be
perceived as shorter than those involving corners. According to Lee,
this has been shown to hold in the estimation of lines presented to
the subject (Lee,1969). Briggs suggests that in the case of actual
distances, the matter is complicated by the influence of crow-flight
distance between the two points connected by a crooked route. Pocock
produced a small experiment in Dundee, which, while not conclusive,
did suggest the hypothesis to be worthy of further attention (Pocock,
1972a).
Another experiment worthy of mention was conducted by Brown, and
was one of those mentioned in which the aim was to construct a "map"
of a city from estimated interdistances. In the results it was found
that the distance between two particularly remote points was
consistently and dramatically underestimated, and it was suggested
that the cause of this was that the subjects were insufficently aware
of what lay between the two points (Brown, 1974).
The concept of "valence", stemming ultimately from Lewin
(e.g. Stea, 1973a, Canter, 1975) has been drawn on by several workers
as something to which distance estimation might be related. The idea
is roughly that each individual has "life space" made up of places
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with which he is involved in various ways, either by interaction or
by attitude. From this, familiarity with a place and attractiveness
or unattractiveness are taken to be possible variations affecting the
cognition of distance. We have already seen attractiveness drawn
upon by Lee as a possible explanation of the relative underestimation
of distances towards the centre of Dundee. A paper by Watson (1972)
on mental distances in Hamilton, Ontario, takes the approach (on
introspective grounds) that the social status of an area is
fundamental to the way in which distances to places in that area will
be perceived. The frequency of social trips is seen as an important
variable in determining the "social distances" separating places, and
this idea can be related to Lewin's "life space". Areas of similar
social standing that were much visited could be characterised as more
attractive and more familiar relative to unvisited and poorer
districts.
David Canter devised a specific test of both elements of the
hypothesis which he carried out in London; he regarded the results as
a strong refutation of the valence hypothesis in both its forms -
neither familiarity nor attractiveness had any discernable
significance.
However, Day concluded that familiarity did have some effect at
the urban scale, since he found that familiarity with a location
tended to produce greater accuracy of estimation, while unfamiliarity
led to overestimation. Ericksen, on the other hand, working in
Kingston, Ontario, found that familiarity had no effect on the degree
of misestimation, whereas attractiveness did - only more attractive
places were seen as relatively more distant! Golledge and Zannaras,
though, support Day's conclusions that unfamiliar places are seen as
relatively further away than familiar ones.
A study by Gunter Meyer (1977) on the estimation of the length
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of shopping streets in the CBD concluded that familiarity was very
much responsible for underestimation, and that attractiveness also
tended to be associated with underestimation. By contrast, such
factors as subjects' age, education and social class had rio effect on
distance cognition.
Canter, in what one must acknowledge to be the most thorough
investigation of cognitive distance at any scale to date, also made
some more tests worthy of mention. An experiment based on the
estimation of travel time and distance along the London Underground,
taking advantage of the fact that travel time along such a route is
far more constant (and therefore objective) than ordinary motor
routes, produced figures which demonstrated that distance estimates
were not being based on time. This is the best evidence we have so
far on the relationship between time and distance in the evolution of
cognitive distance. Canter suggests that time estimations are
derived from distance estimations rather than vice versa. (Canter,
1975, p. 11)
A test to see if the Thames acted as a barrier found that
distances parallel to the river on the North side were estimated more
accurately than those across the river - but distances on the South
side of the river were not estimated significantly differently from
either. In Canter and Tagg we find the suggestion that, at the scale
of cities, roads, railways and rivers, rather than acting as
barriers, may serve as conceptual links.
Investigation of transport modes showed that those who used
buses produced consistently more overestimation of distances than
those who travelled mainly by underground railway. The suggestion
behind this would appear to be that the greater number of perceptual
events experienced by the bus passenger is causing the relative
overestimation. Further results from a study involving distance
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estimation within London by people living near Guildford supported
this hypothesis that more detailed experiences make places seem
1arger.
The studies of cognitive distance at a regional scale are few:
an unpublished experiment by' Irene Buckman, one by Hansen, also
unpublished, and a paper by Martin Cadwallader (1973). (Buckman and
Hansen are both cited in Stea 1969a.) The first of these involved
students in Providence, Rhode Island, estimating the distances of all
possible pairings of six New England cities, plus New York, after
having arranged them in order of increasing attractiveness.
Information on familiarity was also obtained. The results were that
59% of the "trips" between two cities yielded shorter distance
estimates in the direction of the preferred city. The significance
of this figure was not tested but does not appear to be sufficent to
count as a positive result. The effect of familiarity was apparently
one of increasing accuracy with increasing familiarity, in line with
at least half of Day's findings.
Hansen's study was carried out in San Cristobal la Casas
(Mexico); students were asked to estimate the distance to Tuxtla
Gutierrez and Comitan. The two distances are in fact identical in
length, but the former city is separated from San Cristobal by a
tortuous mountain road, while the route to Comitan is straighter and
flatter. It was therefore hypothesised that the more tortuous
distance would appear to be the longer of the two. The reverse
effect occured; two-thirds of the 66 students estimated the
straighter distance as the longer one. Stea (1969a) suggests that
the distance to Comitan is perhaps more boring to bus passengers (the
majority of the subjects travelled by bus) and therefore seems longer
for that reason. Bus drivers, who actually had to negotiate the
difficult road, might have given different answers.
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Cadwallader completed his experiment on the Western American
seaboard, in the vicinity of Los Angeles. Data were collected from
ordinary households, subjects being asked to estimate distances to 30
cities in the Los Angeles basin. (However, the maximum distance was
only 65 miles.) Estimates we're collected using both mileage estimates
and ratio scaling techniques. As with Day's findings, these two
techniques yielded differing results, without it being possible to
conclude that one technique was actually better than the other. And
also as with Day, aggregate figures (i.e. means) were found to be
misleading in suggesting a stronger relationship between cognised and
actual distance than could be found at an individual level.
Amongst Cadwallader's further findings was the conclusion that
distributions of distance estimations for particular cities tended to
be positively skewed. This is in accordance with the author's
findings; it seems logical that there should be wider scope for
overestimatiori than for underestimation, since the range for
underestimation is bounded by the area around the subject with which
he is most familiar, and in which misestimations are unlikely to
fall. Or, to put it more simply, that there is a necessary lower
limit to underestimation, but no upper limit to overestimation.
Neither at an aggregate nor at an individual level was there any
evidence that a curvilinear model would fit the distance estimates
any better than a straight linear one.
Turning to the valence hypothesis, no relationship between
familiarity and distance estimation was found, nor could any
relationship between perceived distance and attractiveness be
discovered. (In the latter case, no correlation coefficent exceeded
0.2 .) Length of residence in the Los Angeles metropolitan area was
also used as a variable, and again, it appeared to play no part in
influencing distance estimations.
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Overall, then, the preceding results show a number of things.
Opinion is divided on the logarithmic/linear nature of cognitive
distance. Distance perceived in terms of events still looks like an
admissable hypothesis, but needs further verification. Distance
perceived in terms of time is little tested, but appears to be of no
significance. The effect of familiarity is under dispute, but the
attractiveness of a place seems not to explain error in estimating
distance towards it.
Finally, it is agreed that different methods of collecting data
yield different results, but not in such a way that one method can be
preferred to another. Also, owing to the spread and skew of
distributions of distance estimations, the aggregating of such data
into single means provides an unreliable indicator of cognitive
distances at an individual level.
This last is of importance to the geographer, who is accustomed
to dealing with populations rather than individuals. Individual
images tend to be the domain of the psychologist, and cannot easily
be viewed as significant or useful in geographical analysis.
However, the problem is easily overcome by essentially the same
procedure as was adopted in part III. The unreliability lies in the
analysis of data subsequent to aggregation, that is, the examination
of single means obtained from an amalgamation of unprocessed
estimations, which may vary widely. Rather than this, it is
important to analyse the data at the individual level, where each
subject can be dealt with on his own terms, and then aggregate the
findings, to see if any trends in the results are consistent from
subject to subject. ®
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2) EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In designing the second major experiment, a number of general as
well as particular aims were held in view. The general aims were
these.
(i) To conduct an investigation of cognitive distance in
which the distances involved are inter-city distances within a
significant region, and encompassing most of that region.
(ii) To conduct the investigation in such a way as to have
as many focal points as possible, rather than just one.
(iii) To use "ordinary people" as subjects, rather than
university students.
The region selected was Scotland, including the various islands
to West and North of the Mainland. Within this area, nine towns and
cities were selected; to these were added one town just outside the
Scottish border (Berwick on Tweed) and one city in N.E. England
(Newcastle upon Tvne) thus giving eleven centres in all. The
original intention was to conduct questionnaire surveys in each of
these centres in which people would be asked to estimate distances to
each of the other centres. As will be mentioned later, one centre
had to be dropped, leaving ten in all remaining.
While previous studies have produced matrices of estimated
distances for all possible pairings of a certain number of places,
this has always involved one set of subjects having to estimate all
the interdistances, thus invoking the problems with regard to the
estimation of remote distances already discussed. On this occasion
it was desired that a matrix of estimated distances should be
produced in which all the estimations should be made by people at the
point in question.
With regard to choice of subjects, the following procedure was
evolved. The first point to consider is that owing to the overall
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nature of these experiments (i.e. that they are concerned with
variations of estimated distance that are effected by place rather
than personal characteristies) the scrupulous nature of the sampling
methods used by sociological geographers is not important. The
experiment is so designed that any variation attributable to socio¬
economic factors will appear chiefly as background "noise", and can
be eliminated as such, since the techniques used in the data analysis
are specifically designed to analyse variation by place rather than
variation by person. What was most desired was a reasonably mixed
population of men and women who could easily be approached with
regard to filling in questionnaires, and who would be relatively
comparable from town to town. Practical factors were extremely
important, and it was necessary to find some environment in which the
subject would be able to co-operate relatively free from work or
domestic constraints. Taking these factors into consideration, it
was decided that the best population to sample would be that provided
by the community of public library users.
The procedure was as follows: the library authorities in each
town were contacted, and the project explained. Advice was then
taken on the selection of a local library to be used in the
experiment. If there were no local libraries in the particular town,
the main library was used. The priorities in the selection of
library were, in order of importance:
(a) library serves a varied population;
(b) library is reasonably busy;
(c) library is reasonably well-provided with tables and
chairs.
Advice was also sought on the particular library's busiest
periods; these were usually Friday evening and Saturday morning,
which were also the times when the population of library users was
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most varied, and so the questionnaire surveys were generally
undertaken at weekends.
The questionnaires were distributed by the author to users
entering the library, who were asked to fill in the questionnaire on
their own, and to hand it in to the library issue desk before they
left. One hundred questionnaires were distributed at each library.
The only variation from the procedure was in Stornoway, where the
library offered to distribute the questionnaires themselves.
The towns selected were as follows: Aberdeen, Ayr, Berwick on
Tweed, Dundee, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Inverness, Lerwick, Newcastle on
Tyne, Stirling and Stornoway. However, Glasgow City Libraries
refused to co-operate, even after intercession on the author's behalf
by Edinburgh City Libraries. Since by this time an ample amount of
data had already been collected, and since to adopt some other
approach would lay the experiment open to the charge of
inconsistency, Glasgow was dropped from the eleven centres. However,
the data on the estimation of distance to Glasgow from the other
centres were retained.
With regard to questionnaire design, the following points were
carefully considered.
(a) It should be as simple as possible for the subject to
understand. This more or less necessitated asking for distance
estimates to be given in miles.
(b) It should be kept reasonable short, particularly with
regard to impersonal questions (i.e. estimation of distance and time)
which would be considered boring by the respondent.
The particular aims of the experiment were as follows:
(i) to test the commutativity of cognitive distance;
(ii) to see if measurements of cognitive error can be
explained in terms of admitted ignorance on the part of the subject;
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(iii) to test the linearity or non-linearity of cognitive
distance at this scale;
(iv) to look for consistencies of under- or over-estimation
of distance to a particular place or between two particular places,
and to attempt to explain these;
(v) to look for evidence of cognitive barriers;
(vi) to test for a connection between perception of distance
and perception of time;
(vii) to test the "valence" hypothesis by examining the
relationship between cognitive distance and estimated familiarity and
attractiveness.
The questionnaire was designed with these points in mind. An
example of a questionnaire is included in the appendix. Each
contained the following questions, each of which was to be answered
for each of ten places (presented in alphabetical order).
Question 1: subjects were asked to estimate distances in miles.
The nature of the distance (whether direct or road) was left up to
the subject.
Question 2: subjects were asked to estimate the accuracy of
their answers to Question 1 by using a five-point scale.
Question 3: subjects were asked to indicate the mode of
transport they would employ in travelling to each place, assuming the
most likely circumstances for their travelling.
Question 4: subjects were asked to estimate (in hours) how long
it would take them to travel each journey.
Question 5: subjects were asked to estimate (using a five-point
scale again) how attractive they found each place (a) to visit (b) to
live in, assuming employment, etc, to be no problem.
Question 6: again using a five-point scale, subjects were asked
to estimate their familiarity with each place. A "1" indicated they
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had never visited the place, while a "5" showed they had lived there.
Other questions: various bits of personal information were
collected for the sake of completeness. These included sex,
occupation, birthplace and length of residence.
167
3) DATA ANALYSIS
The strategy employed in the analysis of the data was similar to
that used in part III. Descriptive statistics of each population of
data were obtained via the SPSS Frequencies programme, and then the
data for each subject were processed individually using regression
analysis, for which original programmes were written by the author.
Four sets of actual distances between all the various places
were obtained: road distances were provided by the Automobile
Association (with the marine parts of the journeys supplied by P&O
Ferries and by Caledonian McBrayne); rail distances were obtained
from British Rail; straight line distances were measured on a typical
atlas map (conical projection; Reader's Digest, 1961), and precise
great circle distances were calculated trigonometrically.
(i) Frequencies
The SPSS Frequencies programme was used to obtain descriptive
statistics for the distance estimates, familiarity, confidence and
attractiveness data. Table 4.1 shows the results for the distance
estimates; both mean and median figures are given (rounded to the
nearest mile) to illustrate the degree of skew, which is variable,
where the two figures are similar, skew is low; where the median is
less than the mean, skew is positive. Also given for comparison is
the actual road distance.
The skew is not highly revealing in itself. An instance such as
the Dundee to Berwick cell where the mean is accurate but the median
is lower, indicates that a large number of small underestimations are
being evened out by a few large overestimations.





AND ACTUAL ROAD DISTANCES
from j to Aber Ayr Berw Dund Edin Inve Lerw Newc Stir Stor
168 191 73 127 104 269 250 107 230
Aberdeen 170 190 70 125 104 250 240 100 220
186 184 67 127 105 193 236 117 217
165 105 107 73 154 269 150 64 194
Ayr 171 99 100 77 151 271 136 64 200
186 133 123 75 215 379 158 70 327
186 116 118 59 205 344 63 91 279
Berwick 182 101 116 58 200 333 63 86 297
184 133 114 57 216 377 63 88 328
69 114 114 60 126 259 183 55 199
Dundee 68 110 105 60 117 250 160 52 191
67 123 114 58 131 260 166 54 243
145 85 69 61 156 315 130 43 236
Edinburgh 140 80 70 53 141 299 120 38 220
127 75 57 58 159 320 109 36 271
104 202 226 140 167 230 288 142 148
Inverness 104 200 220 140 160 212 280 140 136
105 215 216 131 159 298 268 146 112
190 329 368 259 310 193 441 291 290
Lerwick 180 311 350 250 300 181 404 280 252
193 379 377 166 320 298 429 310 410
238 148 68 160 119 256 386 173 341
Newcastle 221 141 64 149 110 250 378 142 300
236 158 63 166 109 268 429 145 380
117 65 104 63 41 141 298 162 236
Stirling 115 60 98 54 35 140 281 150 201
117 70 88 54 36 146 310 145 258
197 286 370 230 288 119 213 413 247
Stornoway 199 261 369 243 278 100 205 398 231
217 327 328 227 271 112 410 380 258
In each cell upper figure is mean estimated distance
middle figure is median estimated distance
lower figure is actual road distance
(all figures in miles)
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Sometimes this is reasonably predictable - one might, for instance,
expect the residents of Berwick to be well informed on the distance
to Newcastle. However, one would not expect them to be so accurate
on the subject of the distance to Aberdeen. But again it must be
recalled that these are aggregate figures, and no indication of the
number of people within each sample that gave accurate answers. They
do not indicate the strength of an accurate image, but merely show
that the inaccuracies present have tended to even themselves out.
It is interesting to note that these figures more closely
resemble road distance than direct distance. It will be recalled
that the precise form of distance was not specified to the subject so
that he could indicate his own preference. The notable exception,
not surprisingly, is the distance between Stornoway and Lerwick,
which is almost entirely sea. The direct distance is 199 miles, and
thus the Stornoway figures are only slightly out. The Lerwick
figures are closer to the direct distance than the road distance (via
Aberdeen and Ullapool) but contain a sizeable overestimation. The
direct distance is also suggested by a few other figures (Lerwick to
Inverness, which has a direct air connection, is one), whereas some
fall between the two in such a way that it is impossible to tell if
one is overestimated or the other is underestimated. Dundee to
Stornoway is an example of this: the direct distance is 150 miles,
the road distance 243 miles, and the mean and median, 199 and 191
respectively, could refer to either (or both).
To clarify the results shown in table 4.1, table 4.2 has been
prepared. In this, where the mean estimated distance has been
greater than the actual road distance by more than two standard
errors, a plus records this overestimation; a minus indicates the
mean estimate to be more than two standard errors less than the




from | to Aber Ayr Berw Dund Ed in Inve Lerw Newc Stir Stor
Aberdeen - A A + -
Ayr - - - - - -
Berwick A ~ - A -
Dundee - A A A -
Edinburgh + + + A A + +
Inverness A - + + - + +
Lerwick A - A -
Newcastle A + - +
Stirling A + +
Stornoway "
See text for key
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minuses in the two Stornoway/Lerwick cells.) Where the mean estimate
is within half of one standard error of the correct mileage, an "A"
(for accurate) is recorded. To a certain extent these parameters are
in
arbitrary, but fairly helpful. In examing table 4.2 it should be
borne in mind that rows across represent images centred from each
particular town; columns down show the images of that town as
estimated by the others. Both Stornoway and Lerwick appear to be
viewed as too close; some of this may be due to the straight-line
distance influencing the results. However, a notable curiosity is
the plethora of underestimations associated with Ayr - both to and
from the town. Interestingly, the only town to overestimate the
distance to Lerwick was Aberdeen, Lerwick's main link with Scotland.
That this distance was accurately perceived by the Shetlanders is
scarcely surprising, as it is a matter of some concern to the
isianders.
The sample most prone to overestimation was that of Edinburgh.
While it would be interesting to postulate some sort of gravity
model, that distances down the urban hierarchy are overestimated, the
results for Newcastle do not outstandingly confirm this, nor do those
for Aberdeen.
What is notable about the Aberdeen figures is the extent to
which the distance to Aberdeen tends to be accurately estimated.
This should not be taken as evidence that Aberdeen generates a lot of
information related to distances, but rather that the trends to
overestimation and underestimation exactly balance one another out.
The most overestimated distances to any place are the distances
to Berwick and Newcastle, with three plusses each. This might
suggest the effect of the Anglo-Scottish border, but it should be
pointed out that one of the Berwick plusses is from Newcastle!
A test of commutativity was made as follows: mean distance
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estimates for each link in each direction were compared, and where
there was no overlap between one mean estimate plus or minus two
standard errors and the other one plus or minus two standard errors,
the two mean estimates were deemed to be significantly different.
(Note that this is really a test for non-commutativity.) Those links
that were considered to be non-commutative - nine out of a possible
total of 45 - are marked on figure 4.3 . Two things are notable;
firstly, the longer distances tend to be the non-comrnutative ones.
This may be partly due to the test employed - the longer the distance
the more room for significant discrepancies, notwithstanding the
standardising effect of using standard error as a parameter.
Secondly, all but one of the nine links cross either sea or the
Anglo-Scottish border. This might suggest that marine or political
barriers may have non-commutative effects, but it should be
remembered that the longest distances tend to be those crossing the
sea and the border simply because of the geometry of the chosen
points.
Table 4.4 shows the mean confidence or certainty expressed in
the distance estimates. The maximum possible value is 5.00, the
minimum possible 1.00 and the central point of the scale 3.00 . A
rough division is therefore possible of results less than 3.00
indicating "on average unsure" and results over 3.00 indicating "on
average confident". The figures are not particularly surprising.
All the samples were unhappy about estimating distances across water,
both to and from the islands. No figures greater than 3.00 appear in
the Lerwick and Stornoway columns, and the only figures in the
Lerwick and Stornoway rows to exceed average are those for Aberdeen,
Edinburgh, and for Stornoway, Inverness. Much the same is true of
distances across the Anglo-Scottish border. Whatever other effect













by | of Aber Ayr Berw Dund Ed i n Inve Lerw Newc Sti r Stor
Aberdeen 3.18 3.04 4.13 4.33 4.44 2.11 2.64 3.52 1.98
Ayr 3.09 2.82 3.17 4.15 2.89 1.92 2.76 3.19 1.92
Berwick 2.89 2.87 2.84 4.68 2.81 1.88 4.64 3.06 1.76
Dundee 4.19 3.40 2.75 4.07 3.36 1.97 2.80 3.59 1.95
Edinburgh 3.26 3.02 3.42 3.38 3.22 2.16 3.31 3.48 2.00
Inverness 4.34 3.04 2.72 3.25 3.92 2.28 2.59 3.40 2.49
Lerwick 3.97 2.45 2.27 2.97 3.06 2.73 2.30 2.37 1.84
Newcastle 2.96 3.97 2.86 3.78 3.37 1.94 2.61 1.75 1.32
Stirling 3.59 3.68 3.23 3.76 4.42 3.33 2.17 2.97 2.08




by j of Aber Ayr Berw Dund Edin Inve Lerw Newc Sti r Stor
Aberdeen 2.24 1.76 3.02 3.67 3.07 1.37 1.98 2.61 1.30
Ayr 1.91 1.42 1.70 3.49 2.13 1.02 1.85 2.51 1.11
Berwick 1.85 1.97 1.78 3.90 2.18 1.20 3.91 2.24 1.12
Dundee 3.07 2.27 1.84 3.72 2.42 1.05 2.06 2.57 1.17
Edinburgh 2.31 2.13 2.29 2.33 2.35 1.24 2.24 2.55 1,11
Inverness 3.30 2.19 1.77 1.95 3.55 1.30 1.77 2.67 1.81
Lerwick 4.00 1.89 1.57 2.26 3.72 2.33 1.80 1.83 1.17
Neweast1e 1.61 1.79 2.99 1.56 3.06 1.91 1.09 1.80 1.04
Stir!ing 2.70 2.72 1.88 2.44 3.77 2.56 1.30 1.95 1.27
Stornoway 2.43 1.67 1.14 1.81 2.75 2.95 1.00 1.24 1.86
Table 4.6(a)
MEAN ATTRACTIVENESS TO LIVE
by | of Aber Ayr Berw Dund Edin Inve Lerw Newc Sti r Stor
Aberdeen 3.54 3.36 2.07 3.96 3.28 2.60 2.18 3.24 2.56
Ayr 3.44 3.35 2.52 4.00 3.49 2.90 2.48 3.43 2.98
Berwick 3.39 3.59 2.71 4.00 3.72 3.12 2.40 3.29 3.16
Dundee 3.97 3.77 3.22 4.11 3.92 2.95 2.57 3.25 2.83
Edinburgh 3.60 3.22 3.20 2.22 3.16 2.69 2.38 3.12 2.42
Inverness 3.72 3.66 3.35 2.25 4.06 3.07 2.28 3.15 3.05
Lerwick 3.59 3.21 3.03 2.39 3.76 3.35 2.57 2.92 2.85
Newcastl e 3.21 3.14 3.34 2.88 3.50 3.42 2.77 3.03 2.79
Stirling 3.72 4.00 3.41 2.48 3.89 3.67 3.33 2.30 3.13
Stornoway 3.65 3.25 3.15 2.55 3.63 3.15 2.75 2.30 3.00
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Table 4.6(b)
MEAN ATTRACTIVENESS TO VISIT
by | of Aber Ayr Berw Dund Ed in Inve Lerw Newc Stir Stor
Aberdeen 3.98 3.65 2.33 4.51 3.80 3.43 2.25 3.58 3.46
Ayr 4.08 3.80 2.84 4.29 4.02 3.63 2.77 3.73 3.52
Berwick 3.90 3.98 3.02 4.60 4.08 3.92 3.07 3.85 3.95
Dundee 4.08 4.14 3.70 4.30 4.14 3.29 2.52 3.61 3.32
Edinburgh 3.92 3.69 3.49 2.41 3.70 3.52 2.55 3.49 3.56
Inverness 3.95 3.85 3.73 2.31 4.56 3.79 2.62 3.50 3.73
Lerwick 4.02 3.47 3.39 2.65 4.37 3.57 2.68 3.19 3.41
Newcastle 3.67 3.75 3.88 3.32 4.20 4.05 3.71 3.69 3.67
Stirling 4.21 4.21 3.62 2.64 4.40 3.98 4.00 2.69 3.92
Stornoway 4.00 3.38 3.33 3.00 4.40 3.71 3.29 2.71 3.29
estimation task more difficult.
Short distances, not surprisingly, are cognised as being more
accurately estimated, especially to large cities. Most of the
figures in excess of 4.00 appear in the Edinburgh and Aberdeen
col umns.
Presumably it is fair to assume that uncertainty is likely to
produce greater variation in results; in which case this could be
taken as an explanation of at least some of the results of the
commutativity test in figure 4.3 .
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the mean figures for familiarity and
attractiveness, and are worked on the same system as 4.4 . Note that
the minimum is actually touched in the Stornoway/Lerwick cell of
table 4.5, showing that none of that sample had ever been to Lerwick.
A general similarity between the pattern of table 4.5 and that of
table 4.4 can be observed. Possible remarks on table 4.6 include
noting that Aberdeen appears popular and also has an "accurate" image
in table 4.2, which might fit in with the hypothesis that attractive
places were more accurately located were it not that Edinburgh is
even more popular, yet has fewer "A"s. (For that matter, the "A"
results for Aberdeen and the highest figures in table 4.6 do not
entirely co-incide.) Dundee and Newcastle are the most unpopular
pi aces.
However, there is a limit on what can be gained from visual
inspection of this kind, and these tables are presented partly for
the sake of completeness. The data will be analysed in greater depth
1ater.
(ii) Which Distance?
Although the mean distance estimates come very close to the road
distances most of the time, this says nothing about the pattern of
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distances estimated by each individual subject. The problem is
essentially the same one as was encountered in part III when
answering the question as to whether estimates conformed more closely
to great circle or map distances, and the same logic can be applied
to solve it. The questions that must be asked are these: do the
estimates given by each subject conform more closely to road, map or
great circle distances, and do the estimates approach more closely a
linear or a logarithmic model? In order to answer these questions,
the estimates given by each subject were regressed individually
against road, map and great circle distances, and then the logarithms
of the estimates were regressed against the three corresponding
logarithmic standards. For each subject, the highest correlation
coefficient of the six was recorded, and a mark awarded to the
appropriate regression. Then, for each sample, the number of marks
each regression had scored (the number of subjects in that sample
favouring that regression) was totalled.
Table 4.7(a) shows the results; the figure in each cell is the
number of subjects in that sample whose highest correlation
coefficent was for that regression. Two things stand out in
particular. The first is that road distances provide the best
standard for all samples with the exception of Stornoway. This
confirms the previous results of table 4.1 . Great circle distances
came out only slightly better than map distances, and did rather
poorly by comparison in Ayr, Stirling and Stornoway.
The second important point is that the logarithmic regressions
appear to have consistently better support than the linear ones. Log
road and log map regressions received twice as much support as their
1 inear equivalents.
It was next decided to simplify the table by operating a sort of




Number in each cell is no. of subjects with appropriate regression
yielding highest value of r.
Road Log.Rd. Map Log.Map Gt.C Log.Gt.C Total
Aberdeen 6 28 1 5 6 46
Ayr 12 16 15 3 1 54
Berwick 28 30 2 3 1 64
Dundee 12 35 2 4 13 4 70
Edinburgh 15 21 5 4 7 4 56
Inverness 7 43 9 4 5 16 84
Lerwick 12 17 4 7 11 13 64
Newcastle 22 26 4 3 5 10 70
Stirl ing 8 26 8 22 3 67
Stornoway 2 5 10 3 1 21
TOTAL 122 244 37 72 55 66 596
2nd TOTAL 366 109 121
Table 4.7(b)
Road Log.Rd. Gt.C Log.Gt
Aberdeen 6 28 5 7
Ayr 13 18 4 19
Berwick 28 30 3 3
Dundee 14 35 13 8
Edinburgh 15 22 12 7
Inverness 8 45 13 18
Lerwick 12 17 15 20
Newcastle 22 26 9 13
Stirling 8 39 14 6
Stornoway 2 8 11
TOTAL 126 262 96 112
2nd TOTAL 388 208
Total linear = 222
Total logarithmic = 374
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experiment re-run. The result was table 4.7(b). We now find that,
of the two standards, great circle distances are most appropriate
with respect to the figures from Lerwick and Stornoway, while the
other samples all relate better to road distances. The implication,
that islanders are less likely to think in terms of road distances
than mainlanders are, is scarcely surprising.
About two-thirds of all the subjects gave estimates conforming
more to a logarithmic pattern. A look at the table also reveals that
the road distance camp is much more logarithmic in nature than is the
great circle camp. Those who think in great circle terms also seem
to be more inclined to think in linear, i.e. non-1ogarithmic terms.
All the same, in only three samples can cell pairs be found where the
linear score exceeds the logarithmic - the small great circle
contingents from Dundee, Edinburgh and Stirling.
The conclusions that were drawn from the aforegoing with respect
to the further course of data analysis were as follows: firstly,
that, as previously hypothesised, logarithmic standards tend to
produce a better modelling of the distance estimates than do linear
ones. Since in no samples did the "linear" subjects outnumber the
"logarithmic" ones (though the Edinburgh sample was a close run) it
seems justifiable to continue the practice adopted in part III and
confine the further analysis to logarithmic regressions. However,
despite the fact that the overall proportion of subjects favouring
great circle regressions above road distance ones was no greater than
the proportion of subjects favouring linear rather than logarithmic
regressions, it was decided to retain the great circle standards.
This was done for two reasons. Firstly, the distribution of
road/great circle subjects was such that the latter were in the
majority in two samples, Lerwick and Stornoway. Certainly in these
samples, it would be unwise to discard any consideration of direct
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distances. Secondly, whereas the tendency to 1ogarithmicity or
linearity is a general one for each subject, distance standards can
vary within the estimates given by each subject, as was shown in part
III. This makes the dichotomy of road and great circle distances
much less easily disposable than the linear/logarithmic one. In part
III the technique we called "parallel regression" was developed to
deal with the problem of map and great circle distances, and the same
technique can be applied to the question of road and great circle
distances in just the same way.
(iii) Overestimation and Underestimation
The next stage in the experimental procedure was to determine
which distances in the survey were significantly overestimated or
underestimated - these distances we will refer to as being
misestimated. As previously outlined, a parallel regression
technique was used in this analysis. The distance estimates for each
subject were converted into logarithms (on the grounds that, as
previously shown, a logarithmic model gave better results than a
linear one) as were the standard distances for road and great circle
routes. The individual subject's estimates were then regressed
against both standards, and the residuals calculated for each place.
Then, for each place, the lowest residual (in terms of absolute
value) was selected. The lowest residuals naturally tended to come
from the best regression, usually that with road distances. In such
cases, when residuals were found to be lower on the great circle
regression, although this usually seemed to indicate an estimation
made with reference to great circle distances, this interpretation is
not, theoretically speaking, invariably or necessarily true. The
regression line takes into account the set of estimations as a whole,
and is not simply related to any one estimation in isolation. When
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residuals were found to be lower on the great circle regression in
cases where the lowest residual were mostly from the road regression,
this was taken as an indication that the larger individual residual
on the road regression could to some extent be explained away by
providing a different overall perspective on the estimations as a
whole. This perspective is the great circle regression. In those
cases where large residuals could not be explained away in this
manner, where large residuals were found to be present on both
regressions, this was taken as strong evidence of a definite
misestimation on the subject's part, quite independent of road or
great circle interpretations of the data. For each particular
distance, a list of appropriate residuals was drawn up to see whether
the majority of these were negative or positive, negative results
indicating underestimation and positive results overestimation. The
significance of these results was assessed in two ways, firstly by a
calculation of the probability of getting a similar majority on one
side or the other by chance and secondly, as some sort of gauge as to
the significance of the size of residuals involved, the mean residual
was assessed to see if it lay more than two standard errors away from
zero. The results of this are expressed as table 4.8 . In each cell,
the left-hand symbol indicates misestimation significant at the 90%
level or greater using binomial probabilities, and the right hand
symbol indicates that the mean residual was more than two standard
errors away from zero. The plus symbol indicates positive residuals
and overestimation; the minus symbol indicates negative residuals and
underestimation.
Comparing table 4.2 with 4.8, it will be seen that the latter
has more profuse detail, and is generally more informative,
especially since it takes into account 1ogarithmicity, variations in
the cognitive mile, and so on. The only advantage of 4.2 is that it
Table 4.8
SIGNIFICANT MISESTIMATIONS
Aber Ayr Berw Dund Ed in Glas Inve Lerw Newc Stir Stor
Aberdeen - -- - + +
Ayr + + -h + - - - - + +
Berwick + + + - - - + + - -
Dundee - + + -- + +
Edinburgh + + + + + - - - - + +
Inverness - - + + + + + + + - - + +
Lerwick _ _ + + + + + - - + +
Newcastle + + - - - - + + -
Stir!ing + _ _ a. + + -- - - + + - -
Stornoway + + + + - - - + +
First symbol shows misestimation significant by frequency




records when mean distances happen to co-incide with actual figures;
but, as already discussed, this is not all that significant in
itself. The two tables have several features in common, but these
are better developed in the second one. Highly prominent is what
appears to be the effect of the Anglo-Scottish border: distances to
Newcastle and Berwick both tend strongly to be overestimated; only
the interdistance between the two is underestimated. However, there
is a similar, though less marked, tendency for distances to Aberdeen
and Dundee also to be overestimated. The distance to Aberdeen is
only underestimated by its close neighbour, Inverness. The places to
which distances tend to be underestimated are Lerwick, Ayr and
Glasgow, and, to a certain extent, Stornoway. Many of these results
do not consistently fit simple hypotheses. An attempt to explain
underestimation towards Glasgow with reference to its place in the
urban hierarchy would have to account for the absence of similar
effect vis a vis Edinburgh. However, one useful start will be to
seperate distances that are equally misestimated from either end,
that is, that are cognitively commutative. Table 4.9 has been
compiled by comparing the left-hand components of the cells of table
4.8; where cells are symmetrical across the diagonal with respect to
these components a "1" is recorded in the corresponding cells of the
"commutativity matix". This "1" indicates the distance in question
1—
to be either significantly overestimated in both directions,
significantly underestimated in both directions, or significantly
misestimated in neither direction, significance being assessed by
consistency of direction of residual. Using this rather more
stringent test of commutativity than was employed in devising figure
4.3, we find that only about one-third of all the distances are
cognitively commutative. These are mapped as figure 4.10 (a) and




Aber Ayr Berw Dund Edin Inve Lerw Newc Sti r st(
Aberdeen 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
Ayr 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Berwick 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
Dundee 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Edinburgh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inverness 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
Lerwick 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Newcastl e 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
Stir!ing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Stornoway 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 = Non-commutative estimations
1 = Commutative estimations






superficially similar to 4.3, showing non-commutative distances!
This illustrates the dangers of using mean figures as though they
represented the population consistently. Figure 4.10 should be
regarded as the more authoritative version.
There is no obvious pattern in the results, although it will be
noted that there is a particular lack of commutativity where the
Scottish lowlands are concerned - of the routes marked in figure
4.10(a), only two involve Ayr, one involves Stirling, and none
involve Edinburgh. (Note that Glasgow is not featured since only
estimates of distance to Glasgow were available.) It is difficult to
tell if this reflects some sort of "core" effect, but if it did, one
would expect Dundee to have at least as few commutative links as Ayr,
rather than as many as Lerwick. With only fourteen commutative links
to go round, it is difficult to tell to what extent the end pattern
is merely a product of chance. Of these fourteen links, four were
overestimations, four were underestimations, and six were neither.
This is no help in suggesting ways of predicting which distances are
likely to be commutative.
The two suggestions that do arise are firstly, that given the
high degree of non-commutativity, attributes of the end-points of the
routes may be significant; secondly, for the same reason, barriers
that do appear may not necessarily have the same effect when
traversed in either direction.
(iv) Regression Gradients
The next step in the analysis was to examine the characteristics
of the regression gradients produced by each sample. For each
subject the regression with the highest correlation coefficent (of
the two logarithmic regressions used earlier) was selected and the
•regression gradient recorded. The population statistics were then
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assessed for each sample.
The results were very consistent. Distributions usually had a
mean of about 0.9 , with a maximum value of 0.99 (never as much as
1.0) and a minimum value of 0.5 , occasionally lower. The
distributions were therefore negatively skewed and highly peaked.
One subject (from Stirling) in the whole experiment produced a
negative gradient. A summary of the figures is presented as table
4.11.
These results are very promising. They do seem to indicate a
remarkable consistency up and down the country, and suggest that in
terms of general distance estimation the relationship
1og ED = 0.9 1og AD + c
where ED is estimated distance and AD is actual distance provides a
reasonably reliable portrayal at this scale of distances. (The
constant c was invariably small, with typical values of + 1.0, or
less.) The lack of any gradients of value 1.0 or greater is also very
interesting, and certainly suggests that the cognitive mile is almost
invariably greater than a real mile. Certainly the consistency of
these results is much greater than was expected, and also
considerably greater than the corresponding results in part III, at
least with regard to consistency within each sample. This is perhaps
due to the greater familiarity that subjects would have with the mile
as a unit of distance than they would with a much larger unit (the
Edinburgh London distance, or its equivalent in miles).
However, though the above may deal with the general pattern of
distance estimations, it is still necessary to further pursue the




It now becomes appropriate to turn to the various elements that
make up the loosely-termed "valence" hypotheses. This is ultimately
a question of assessing the extent to which it can be said that
variations in distance estimation are explicable by considering
perceived attributes of the place to which the distance is estimated.
These perceived attributes boil down to familiarity (in terms of
experience) and desirability, or attractiveness. This latter, it
will be recalled, was subdivided in the questionnaire into
attractiveness to live (ATL) and attractiveness to visit (ATV). This
also seems an appropriate place to consider another
semi-psychological attribute, this one referring to the distance
itself - the subject's confidence in his or her ability to estimate
the particular distance.
The following hypotheses were proposed: (a) accuracy of
estimation is proportional to estimated confidence; (b) accuracy of
estimation is proportional to estimated familiarity; (c) distances to
places perceived as being more attractive are also more accurately
estimated; (d) more familiar places will tend to be estimated as
being closer, if anything, than less familiar ones; (e) similarly,
distances to more attractive places will tend to be underestimated.
The two different types of attractiveness yield hypotheses (cl)
and (c2), and also (el) and (e2). Hypotheses (b) and (d), and (c)
and (e) should not be taken as being contradictory. The idea is
rather that a familiar place will tend to be more accurately located,
but if misplaced, it will tend to fall on the near side, and
unfamiliar places will tend to be located less accurately and further
away (this is suggested by Day).
The technique used in this analysis was quite simple. For each
subject, two sets of residuals representing misestimation were
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obtained: the set already used in section (iii) from parallel
regression, and the absolute values of these (i.e. all the signs were
eliminated from the residuals in producing the second set, while the
magnitudes remained unaltered). The first of these two sets was
taken, as before, to represent over- and underestimation on the part
of each subject; the larger the positive value, the more
overestimation, the 1arger the negative value the more
underestimation. The second set was regarded as simply representing
the degree of inaccuracy. The larger the modulus residual, the more
the estimation deviated from its "correct" position on the regression
line. To test the hypotheses relating to level of accuracy only,
that is, (a), (b) and (c), the second set of residuals was correlated
with the relevant variable. In hypotheses where direction of
misestimation was important, the first set was used; these being
hypotheses (d) arid (e).
From each sample, the number of subjects having significant
positive or negative correlations was recorded. This was usually low
(see table 4.12). Secondly, the directions of correlation were noted
irrespective of significance. The number of subjects with positive
correlations was compared to the number of subjects with negative
correlations in each sample, and the significance of the result
assessed in the usual manner. The implications of the two steps
should be noted: the first stage shows the number of subjects of whom
it is true to say that large amounts of their misestimations are
actually explained by the hypothesis under test. The second stage
merely indicates whether it is possible to say that, within the
sample in question, there is a general tendency in the direction
suggested by the hypothesis. The significance figures here will only
indicate the tendency to be consistent, not to be strong.





ModRes ModRes ModRes ModRes Res. Res. Res.
v. v. v. v. v. v. v.
CON FAM ATL ATV FAM ATL ATV N
Samp! e +ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve +ve - ve +ve -ve +ve -ve
Aberdeen 1 5 2 5 7 2 1 2 1 4 2 2 4 2 46
Ayr 2 1 4 1 4 4 5 3 2 4 4 4 54
Berwick 1 5 3 5 1 6 6 2 4 3 3 7 64
Dundee 4 8 4 6 5 10 6 11 2 4 3 5 4 7 70
Edinburgh 2 4 4 1 6 6 6 9 2 4 6 5 3 7 56
Inverness 1 18 3 7 8 4 8 5 4 3 3 5 7 6 84
Lerwick 1 10 12 6 4 6 5 7 1 9 5 8 64
Newcastl e 8 1 7 6 5 7 8 6 6 7 7 10 7 11 70
Stirling 1 4 3 7 7 4 5 7 2 5 6 6 5 7 67
Stornoway 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 21
KEY




ATL = Attractive to live
ATV = Attractive to visit
N = No. of subjects in sample
Significance is assessed at the 90% level.
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- = no. of negative correlations significant at 90% level
-- = no. of negative correlations significant at 95% level
+ = no. of positive correlations significant at 90% level




table 4.12; the second part in table 4.13 . Note that all five
hypotheses are structured so as to be supported by negative
correlations. Positive correlations contradict the hypotheses.
Table 4.12 shows that the total number of subjects in each
sample whose misestimations are explained to a significant degree by
any of the five hypotheses is low; therefore we must turn to table
4.13 for any more positive evaluation of the results. The tendencies
shown in this table, as can be seen, support hypotheses (a) and (b)
to a fair degree, and the rest little, if at all. It should be noted
that hypotheses (a) and (b) are, in fact, closely related.
Confidence in estimation is, not all that surprisingly, linked to a
certain extent with familiarity. Certainly, when familiarity and
confidence figures for each subject were correlated with one another,
the results were found to be generally high, normally significant at
the 90% level at least (values of r at around 0.6) and occasionally
with r values in excess of 0.9, though some low, and even negative
values of r did occur.
The conclusions of this test of valence would therefore seem to
be as follows. There is a tendency in the data for distances to more
familiar places to be more accurately estimated than those to less
familiar ones, and the subjects seem by and large to recognise this
fact in assessing their estimates. However, this is only a tendency,
and it cannot be said that large amounts of misestimation can be
accounted for in this way. There is little support for the
hypothesis that unfamiliar places tend to be over- rather than
underestimated in terms of distance. The data show that there is no
support at all for the hypothesis that more attractive places are
more accurately located, and insignificant support for the hypothesis
that more attractive places tend to be underestimated in terms of
distance.
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It is perhaps worth noticing that the two samples which showed
the least support for any of the hypotheses in this section were also
the two largest urban centres. This could suggest that the extent to
which familiarity influences accuracy may depend on the sort of urban
centre from which the sample is drawn, but obviously, there is far
too little data to assess such a contention.
A further test of the possible effects of attractiveness was
made as follows: referring to table 4.8, the total plusses and
minusses in each column were summed and expressed as a single
differential. This differential was then taken as an index of the
extent to which the distance to the place in question was
underestimated. The eleven places were then ranked by differential,
the lowest (most underestimated) first. The figures from table 4.6
were then also totalled by column, and the eleven places ranked by
overall attractiveness, highest (most attractive) first. The rank
orders were then compared (see table 4.14). Mere visual inspection
suffices to show that apart from the fact that Newcastle and Dundee
occur at the bottom of all three lists, there is evidently no
consistent comparison. Values of Spearman's r were calculated, and
though these are positive, they are low. For the comparison between
distance estimation and attractiveness to live, the figure was 0.136;
for attractiveness to visit, 0.200 .
In conclusion we tend to agree with Canter (1975) that the
valence hypothesis has little to be said for it.
(vi) Time and Distance
Since travel time and distance are both measures of separation
and tend to be proportional to one another, the task of determining
any relationship between estimated travel time and cognitive distance
is a difficult one. To simply correlate estimated distance and
196
Table 4.14
ATTRACTIVENESS BY RANK ORDER
Rank Order Rank Order Rank Order
PI ace Underestimation ATL ATV
Aberdeen 8 2 2
Ayr 2 3 4
Berwick 9 5 5
Dundee 10 9 10
Edinburgh 6 1 1
G1asgow 3 10 9
Inverness 7 4 3
Lerwick 1 7 6
Newcastle 11 11 11
Stirling 5 6 8
Stornoway 4 8 7
~\ r\~i
estimated time might produce high figures, but this would not show
that either was derived in any way from the other, merely that they
are two different measures of the same thing.
It could be argued that time is the more fundamental of the two
from the human point of view, both in primitive societies (vide the
phenomenon of eskimo maps, which record direction and travel time
only) and in modern ones (this was discussed in part II). It would
therefore seem instructive to attempt to investigate the hypothesis
that distance estimates are time-based.
Canter (1975) found a solution to the methodological problems
surrounding the time/distance problem by basing his experiment on the
London Underground where precise and absolute figures for actual
travel time could be obtained. He found no support for the above
hypothesis, that travel time was being used as a basis for distance
estimates.
At this point it might be as well to distinguish here between
estimation of distance and calculation of distance, although the
latter is but a more accurate version of the former. There are two
ways in which distance estimates can be based on time; the first is
the subjective assessment of a journey, in which recollection of the
length of time taken over travelling is instrumental in reducing or
augmenting the subject's distance estimate. In the case of two
journeys equal in mileage, the one which takes longer to traverse
would be estimated as being the longer of the two distances. The
second sort of case is confined to instances when the subject knows
to a reasonable degree of accuracy the speed at which he travels, and
is actually able to calculate the distance from a combination of time
and velocity information. This latter is not relevant in Canter's
experiment, since few passengers have information on the actual speed
of Underground trains. In fact, calculations of this sort are not
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easily investigate in this sort of study, partly since they are not
easily distinguished from other sorts of estimations, and partly
since they tend to simply make up the more "objective" part of the
results that is relatively free from misestimation. After all, the
study of cognitive distance is generally directed to discovering why
people get distances wrong, not why they get them right. The
subjective influence of travel time is a cause (or at least, a
possible cause) of misestimation, whereas the "objective" influence
of travel time as the basis of accurate calculations is unlikely to
be so (subject to such imponderables as calculations based on bizarre
velocity figures). Consequently, following Canter, we will confine
ourselves to attending to an investigation of the more subjective
side to temporal influences on distance estimation.
However, the methodology devised for the present study was
different from that employed by Canter. Rather than relying on
absolute travel time, it took as its basis large-scale variations in
absolute travel speed. The basic hypothesis is that if distance
estimates are being influenced by travel time, those people who take
less time to travel a distance should produce relatively lower
estimates of distance. Therefore, those people who travel by faster
means should be more prone to giving distance estimates that are in
overall smaller than those given by slower travellers.
The first stage in the analysis was therefore to look for a
relationship between the general size of time estimates and distance
estimates. This was done by computing an average time estimate for
each subject (from the ten estimates made by that subject) and an
average distance estimate. These two components were then correlated
for each sample. High correlations were looked for as indicative of
a relationship between travel time and the magnitude of distance
estimates, although this could still conceivably indicate that
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cognitive distances were influencing the size of time estimates,
rather than vice versa.
However, high correlations were not forthcoming. Out of ten
samples, only two had significant correlations at 90% or better.
These were Berwick and Lerwick, which yielded r values of 0.34 and
0,33 respectively, both significant at the 99% level. Of the others,
Stornoway gave a negative correlation of -0.16 .
However, this result is not really significant in itself. The
lack of low correlations between the scales of the two different sets
of estimations need not indicate that there is no relationship
between the relevant cognitions (as opposed to estimations). Once
again, the best way to tackle the problem is to use residuals as the
truest measure of the misestimation (or misperception) of distance,
rather than the mileage figures.
The following hypothesis was formulated: that if a subject would
normally fly when making certain journeys (therefore taking
relatively little time over travelling) and would normally travel
overland when making certain other journeys (therefore taking
relatively greater time), then he will be more prone to
underestimating the former set of distances relative to the latter.
In the case of most of the sample groups, very few of the distances
in question were ones in which the possibility of air travel arose.
However the Lerwick sample presented a special case, in that all the
distances in question involved the possibility of air travel. (This
may be a reason why the Lerwick sample was one of the two that gave
positive results in the preceding correlation test.) Therefore this
group was singled out for further experimentation. The Stornoway
position is similar in its isolation, though less extreme, but the
small size of the Stornoway sample restricted its use in this
context.
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In the experiment, for each subject in the Lerwick sample, the
ten distances involved were divided into those which the subject had
indicated he would fly, and those that he would have travelled by sea
and land. Then the regression residuals previously obtained from the
parallel regression experiment were processed, so that the average
residual for "air distances" and the average residual for "sea/land
distances" were calculated and compared to one another. The
hypothesis as tested would predict that the residuals associated with
air distances would tend to be lower than the residuals associated
with sea distances, showing that the subject had a tendency to
underestimate the former.
Of the 66 Lerwick subjects, only 49 yielded results that allowed
such a comparison to be made (after exclusion of those subjects who
were totally consistent in their travel habits). Of these, 40 turned
out to have lower average residuals with respect to distances
travelled by air, and only 9 showed a contrary tendency. This result
is highly significant (at greater than 99.99%). The hypothesis is
therefore confirmed, since it seems that the faster speed of air
travel, in reducing travel time, is an influence on the perception of
distance, and is associated with a tendency towards underestimation.
There is an apparent objection to this result, namely that
distances flown should naturally be estimated as relatively shorter
compared to distances travelled over sea and land, since air routes
are shorter than overland routes. However, this disparity between
direct and crooked routes has already been compensated for by the
parallel regression technique, so the objection is not really valid.
This can be shown by examining the mileage estimates, which one would
expect to follow a similar trend were it the shorter air distances
that were causing the result. Indeed, it is in the mileage figures
that one would expect the effect to be most marked, since the
?01
Table 4.15
AIR/SEA TRAVEL FROM LERWICK
(Comparisons of mean distance as estimated by air and sea travellers,
together with standard errors)
Lerwick AIR SEA
to: Distance S.E. Distance S.E
Aberdeen 190 09 190 09
Ayr 325 35 332 13
Berwick 391 41 363 13
Dundee 277 41 255 07
Edinburgh 313 13 306 10
G1asgow 323 13 324 11
Inverness 193 13 186 16
Newcastle 394 22 456 20
Stirling 302 29 286 08
Stornoway 263 17 306 28
(All figures given to nearest whole number.)
residuals have had the disparity between direct and road distances
strained out, whereas the raw mileage estimates have not. For each
distance, the average mileage estimate given by the air travellers
was calculated and compared to the average estimate given by the sea
travellers; the results of this are presented as table 4.15 . As can
be seen, the figures associated with air travellers are not
significantly lower; if anything, they tend to be slightly higher.
This strongly suggests that the shorter distances of direct air
routes are not the cause of the underestimation of distances
travelled by air (as was previously described in this experiment).
The experiment was repeated using the Stornoway group, but
appropriate comparisons could only be made amongst 13 subjects. The
results were that 9 gave results confirming the hypothesis (lower air
residuals) and 4 gave converse results. With only this small number
of subjects the experiment cannot be regarded as significant.
While the above experiment is both small and simple, the results
are noteworthy in two respects. Firstly, this is the first
experimental evidence in favour of the hypothesis that experienced
time is contributary to perceived distance. Secondly, the fact that
the results did show a significant tendency in the predicted
direction is encouraging in the consideration of the general
hypothesis that spatial variables, especially those that may be
considered as dimensional parameters of physical space, are
influential in guiding the translation of objective space into
cognised space.
(vii) Barriers
Once again we come to the problem of barriers. Can it be shown
that conceptual "events", located in space, and loosely summed-up by
this word "barriers" have an effect on whether a distance is
203
overestimated or underestimated?
The Anglo-Scottish border has already been discussed earlier in
the text; it has also been suggested that barriers may be
non-commutative. To further investigate this, four different
"barriers" were hypothesised in the study area. These were: the
previously-mentioned border, the north-south watershed dividing the
east coast from the west, the Grampian mountains, and those arms of
the sea (the Minch, Pent!and Firth, etc) that separate the islands
involved in the survey from the mainland.
Each of these was investigated in turn. The distances that
traversed each barrier were assessed as overestimations or
underestimations with reference to the left-hand components of table
4.8 . The results were then totalled, once for distances crossing the
barrier in one direction, then for the other direction. The results
are given in table 4.16 .
With the number of figures available, it is difficult to
calculate a statistical significance, but visual inspection is
sufficient to reveal some interesting results. One is that in all
four cases the results are very different depending on the direction
in which the barrier is traversed. The Scottish border has no effect
in a northward direction, but is associated with heavy overestimation
going south. With regard to the watershed that divides the two
coasts, the proportion of overestimation to underestimation is
virtually reversed as one changes direction, though with half the
distances in either direction falling into the "not significant"
category. The Grampians exert an effect similar to the border: going
north there is no discernable effect; going south, overestimation is
predominant. The sea has another partial reversal effect - though
many distances are not significantly misestimated, those that are,




Barrier Direction Overests. Underests. Not Significant
Anglo-Scottish going N 5 7 6
Border going S 13 3
Scottish going E 7 7
Watershed going W 2 9 10
Grampian going N 3 2 7
Mountains going S 10 4
Minch & going N 7 9
Pent!and Firth going S 8 3 7
Numbers indicate number of distances crossing each barrier that were
significantly overestimated, significantly underestimated, or
neither.
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southwards. It is interesting to note that the marine barrier does
seem to exert a positive barrier in one direction, despite the
conclusions reached in part III regarding the effects of sea.
The fact that all four hypothesised barriers have markedly
asymmetrical effects would seem to be highly significant. The first
thing it suggests is that mere physical occurences do not of
themselves constitute perceptual barriers. They have to be
interpreted as such, (after all, a divide such as the Anglo-Scottish
border is not much of a physical occurence anyway) and they may be
interpreted differently depending on which side of the fence the
subject is. The second point arising is this: if one categorises
each side of the four barriers as either more or less "central" in
demographic/economic terms then one finds the interesting property
that overestimation is always in the direction of greater centrality,
e.g. across the mountains towards the lowlands, etc. The suggestion
is that marginal areas are more acutely aware of the things that
separate them from more central areas, while subjects in central
areas are much less concerned about or ignorant of the barriers that
lie between themselves and the periphery. Furthermore, though this
effect of overestimation towards the centre seems to work in the
cases of significant barriers (at least, the four tested), where
distances cross no such barrier the effect is net so marked. For
instance, it is Edinburgh that overestimates the distance to more
peripheral Dundee and Aberdeen, and not vice versa. This is an
interesting point which possibly warrants further attention.
(viii) Conclusion
We can conclude this part with a retrospective look at the
original aims of the experiment. In doing so it may also be possible
to sort out some of the divergent results obtained from different
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techniques.
The question of commutativity was one of the topics on which
contradictory results were obtained. When using mean mileage figures
(aggregated over the whole sample), a fairly stringent test of
non-commutativty yielded positive results in a minority of
circumstances. These were usually distances which were both long and
difficult to estimate. However, when the terms were re-defined so
that commutativity was measured in terms of relative cognition rather
than absolute estimates, the pattern changed, and it appeared that
only a minority of links were viewed in the same manner from either
end. Not only is the first method of analysis theoretically weaker
(it does not benefit from the standardising effects of regression
analysis), but the latter approach seems much more relevant to the
topic as a whole, and the conclusions to be drawn are that the
distances as surveyed were not perceived in a commutative fashion in
the majority of cases. In the minority that were, it is impossible
to discern any common determinant factor that could be used to
predict commutativity.
The use of confidence estimation in an attempt to explain
inaccuracy of estimation by the subject's own admitted ignorance was
more succesful at this scale than at the global level. However, the
tendency for low confidence figures to accompany high residuals was a
tendency only, and the total amount of explanation of misestimation
was not high. Degree of confidence was closely related to
fami1iarity.
As with the global distances, a non-linear logarithmic model
turned out to explain distance estimates better than a simple linear
one. It is strongly suspected by the author that this is a result of
estimation rather than cognition.
Consistent overestimation of all distances by a subject group,
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would, in relative terms, be overestimation of none of them.
However, consistent overestimation of the distance to a particular
place by all the subjects in a group, or, for that matter, all the
other subject groups, is quite possible. Within each subject group
distances that were consistently misestimated were readily
identifiable; the degree to which other subject groups also
misestimated the distance to the same place varied considerably.
With regard to the problem of the same distance being viewed by two
different subject groups (at either end - this is the commutativity
test again), as has been mentioned, the majority of cases showed
differences in misestimation.
Four potential cognitive barriers were examined, and all yielded
interesting results. Of the four, one was an obvious physical land
barrier (the Grampians and Scottish Highlands), one a physical
barrier of the marine variety, one a barrier partly physical and
partly cultural (the watershed) and the last was a
political/cultural/national boundary. All four were similar in that
they had different effects depending on the direction from which they
were viewed. This is a significant point, and is possibly the result
with the highest potential for further research study. In
particular, it would be interesting to know a lot more about exactly
how people perceive and react to barriers of different sorts.
The relationship between estimated distance and time was
examined. Within the limitations of the experiment, the results were
suggestive of an influence exerted by experienced time upon perceived
distance.
The influence of familiarity and attractiveness on cognitive
distance was examined, and it was found that though there was a
significant tendency in the data for more familiar places to be more
accurately estimated in terms of distance, attractiveness played no
role at al1.
By and large, the results of this experiment tend to confirm
those of the previous one on global distances where the two can be
compared. It expands on the findings in significant areas by the
inclusion of extra tests on such matters as commutativity,
time-distance, familiarity and attractiveness, and also in the






In summing up, we must return to the original aims of the thesis
to see to what extent they have been fulfilled.
It was of prime concern to establish that a purely geographical
methodology was a viable approach to the problem of cognitive
distance. In order to do this, it was necessary to find significant
patterns of misestimation that were related to place rather than to
inter-personal variations. The fact that at both scales of
investigation in the preceding work it was possible, in the majority
of cases, to speak of a particular distance being significantly
overestimated or underestimated by the sample as a whole seems to
indicate conclusively that geographical variables do indeed have an
important effect on the cognition of distance. A geographical
approach to the subject is therefore definitely relevant. This does
not mean that a psychological or sociological approach is not valid,
but any further research on psychological or sociological lines will
have to take into account the fact that geographical variables have a
sizable effect which may have to be compensated for if purely
psychological variables are to be investigated.
The next point to consider is the extent to which some sort of
comprehensive geographical theory can be constructed from, or is
suggested by, the preceding material.
Firstly, we must concern ourselves with the general relationship
between cognitive distance and physical distance at the two scales
examined. In all the experiments conducted the results showed that
this could best be expressed by the formula
1 og y = a + b.log x
where x is physical distance, y is cognitive distance, a is a
constant (usually small), and b lies, on average, within the range
0.85 to 0,95 . The experiments at the greater scale tended to give ,
on average, lower b values means, and more divergence about the mean;
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the Scottish experiment gave higher and more consistent b values.
(This may, of course, reflect in part the different techniques
employed in the two experiments.) What was most striking was the
similarity of results between each sample group in both experiments.
As for the values of the constant a, these, on brief inspection,
tended to be small and uninteresting.
The implication of these results is that the perception of
geographical distance would seem to reflect a curved cognitive space,
rather than a Euclidean one. This has its counterparts in existing
geographical canon, for instance in the use of logarithmic map
projections to show population migration (Hagerstrand, 1957).
However, it cannot be positively determined as yet whether this
effect is really a product of the nature of cognitive space, or
whether the curvilinear trend has crept in from the estimation
processes instead. At least, from a pragmatic point of view, we can
say that whether or not minds actually cognise space as being curved,
they appear to behave as though they do, which is useful in itself.
As previously discussed, an interesting experiment would be to give a
sample of subjects a distance estimation task similar to the
preceding ones, but to have them complete the questionnaires while
looking at a large wall map showing the location of all the places
involved. Instructing the subjects to use this map as their frame of
reference would eliminate the cognitive element entirely. If the
results were still in a logarithmic form this would indicate that the
1ogarithmicity is a product of the mechanisms of estimation rather
than cognition. Unless, of course, one takes the psychophysical
perspective of maintaining that the results would indicate
distortions in visual perception. However, whatever the origin of
this curvilinearity, it would seem to be a basic necessity of any
predictive model of distance estimation.
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Given this regression equation as the underlying basis of
cognitive distance patterns, how do we explain the various
divergences from this? The hypothesis that apparently significant
misestimations could be explained by sheer ignorance of an admitted
kind on the part of the subject was tested in both experiments and
was proved unsatisfactory in both cases. There was a tendency in the
Scottish experiment results (but only a tendency) for misestimation
to increase with unfamiliarity, but this did not explain the
direction or amount of misestimation.
Using place characteristics as explanatory variables produced
little in the way of positive results. In the Scottish experiment
estimated attractiveness was used as a variable, but no significant
relations between this and estimated distance could be discerned.
Using such variables as urban size was considered, but even visual
i
inspection of the results was sufficently revealing to dissuade the
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author from proceeding further in such a direction. It will be noted
that place characteristics, perceived or otherwise, are point
variables rather than spatial variables; they therefore do not relate
directly to the distances in question. In this respect their failure
to account for variations in cognitive distance may well be
significant. The suggestion is that estimates of distance, as
spatial measures, are more influenced by other spatial factors than
by non-spatial variables. These various spatial factors were
discussed in part II, and included the viewing of time and matter as
spatial parameters, as well as a consideration of the geometry of
space. We can turn first to geometry.
Most of the material relating to metric geometry and cognitive
space was gathered in the Scottish experiment rather than the global
experiment. Even so, there were certain aspects of the question that
could not effectively be tested given the experimental conditions.
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The metric property of non-degeneracy, for instance, cannot be taken
for granted. It is possible for two distant points to be cognised as
having effectively no distance between them under circumstances where
the subject is aware of their distance from his location, but has no
cognition of their positions relative to one another. However, it is
unlikely that any subject is actually going to estimate the distance
between, say, Samarkand and Tashkent as zero miles, since this goes
contrary to common sense. Nevertheless, if the subject is unable to
distinguish between the two locations, the Samarkand-Tashkent
distance becomes effectively degenerate. This condition is
approached in the results of one urban study previously mentioned
(Brown, 1974).
Non-negativity is rather easier to establish since the idea of
negative distance has no significance in cognitive studies to date.
The triangle inequality, though, suffers again from the problem that
it cannot be accurately tested without asking subjects to estimate
remote interdistances, and the author has been reluctant to do this
for reasons previously discussed. A useful topic for further
research would be the study of the relative accuracy of remote
interdistance estimations compared with estimates of distance from
the subject, and this could be combined with a specific test of the
triangle inequality. Also of interest in this context would be a
detailed study of the differences in estimations made by subjects
resident in their native city to those made by subjects resident in
non-native cities. Some approach could be made to the the question
of the examination of the triangle inequality by a re-examination of
table 4.1; it will be seen that in these figures it generally holds
(not unsurprisingly, in most instances), but with exceptions. The
Aberdonians1 mean estimate of the distance to Berwick exceeds the sum
of their mean estimate of the distance to Dundee and the Dundee
residents' mean estimate of the distance to Berwick. In the reverse
direction the triangle inequality does hold - but by a margin of only
one mile. But these calculations mix subject groups in such a way as
to produce results that tend somewhat towards the hybrid.
Furthermore, Aberdeen, Berwick and Dundee only form a triangle in
Euclidean space. In the network space of Scottish roads, Dundee is
directly on the line between the other two. With but a shift in
perspective, a triangle becomes a straight line, illustrating the
complexity of the problem.
The analysis of symmetry is altogether more reliable. This is
another topic that has beeen difficult to test, since to ask subjects
to estimate the distance from Edinburgh to London and then to ask
them the distance from London to Edinburgh is not likely to enhance
the experimenter's reputation for common sense. Even if some time is
allowed to elapse between questionings, results are not likely to be
very different. Stea (1969a) attempted to solve the problem by
splitting his sample randomly and asking one half the distance "to"
each place, and the other half the distance "from" each place; this,
though, still suffers from the problem of estimation of distance from
a remote place; it is also impossible to tell whether or not a
subject might, when asked the distance from a remote place to his
location, invert the question before answering it. But in the
Scottish experiment, it was possible to use a comparison between
different subject groups at different ends of a particular distance,
owing to the technique used to assess distances as significantly
under- or overestimated by a particular group. By using
"misestimation status" rather than mean distance estimates, valid
comparisons could be made, and these showed a tendency against
symmetry. That is to say, if a distance AB was significantly
underestimated by the residents of A, on average it would not be
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significantly underestimated by the residents of B. In relative
terms at least, therefore, cognitive space, as measured by the
experiment, would seem to be asymmetrical.
Turning now to the matter of what was referred to as
"dimensional substitution" in part II, it will be recalled that this
was seen as the perception of space being influenced by variables
which were themselves inherently spatial in nature. The potentially
important "spatial" variables were considered to be time and matter;
in this context time takes the form of travel time, and the influence
of matter is a function of "perceived matter", "perceptual events" or
"perceptual barriers".
Considering the widespread nature of "conventional" time/space
substitution, it was hypothesised that travel time might be an
influential factor in distorting distance cognitions. The experiment
conducted in Part IV, though localised, did produce significant
results in the direction predicted by the hypothesis. There is scope
for further experimentation of a "controlled" kind, in which
different groups of subjects would be asked to traverse the same
distances at different speeds and then asked to estimate the
distances in question. Such an experiment would be far more likely
to produce significant results than one in which subjects are merely
asked to estimate travel times.
While it would be an exaggeration to say that the results of the
Lerwick experiment suggested that distance was perceived purely in
temporal terms, the results do indicate a temporal influence on
distance perception. This is consonant with the hypothesis of
"dimensional substitution", which process should not be regarded as
necessarily absolute arid exclusive.
Looking at barriers and events, although the results in this
direction have been promising, there has been a certain difficulty in
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qualifying and quantifying exactly what constitutes a "perceptual
event". The system used in the global experiment produced
surprisingly good results considering the crudity of the measures
used. In the Scottish experiment, rather than the application of a
similar correlation technique, a comparitive approach was adopted to
see if hypothetical barriers had the same effect when viewed from
either direction. The results of this showed that perceptual
barriers were strongest when viewed from the less "central" side, at
least at the scale and in the context of the experiment. Certainly,
the effects observed were markedly asymmetrical. This implies that
geographical features have different effects on distance estimation
that depend on the view taken of the particular feature. This, in
its turn, may depend on the location of the subject.
This is very important, and is perhaps one of the results of
this work that most merits further investigation. There is a
potential for controlled "laboratory" type experiments in which
certain distances are either chosen or constructed in order to
consist of a discrete number of events of a particular kind. The
reaction of subjects to these distances (in terms of estimations) can
then be compared to the pre-determined number of events, and also the
subjects' reaction to the type of event can be investigated at the
same time. By attempting to hold various features constant, and test
one variable at a time, it may be possible to ascertain more
definitely what sort of perceived barriers and events most contribute
to cognitive distance, and to what extent. At the same time we must
note that the objective "contents" of a particular amount of space
are not the same as the subjective or cognised contents. The extent
to which these cognised contents vary from objective reality may vary
geographically, in terms of location of subject group (as was
suggested by the experiment) but it may also vary sociologically
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(which was not investigated at all). One recalls the cognitive
mapping experiments of Orleans in which subjects of higher social
class were found to have more detailed cognitive maps (Orleans,
1967). An experiment involving cognitive mapping carried out by
Canter suggested that those who made more detailed maps also made
more overestimations of distance (Canter, 1975). However, social
factors seem incapable of accounting for the striking differences in
over- and underestimation found in the Scottish experiment.
Considering the noted apparent effects of "centrality" it would
appear that social variations can only be part of the story; a
hypothesis that accords greater awareness of barriers to those on the
remoter side of them looks to be at least plausible.
Overall, then, the single most important conclusion of this
study is probably the fact that it definitely seems that the
relationship between cognitive and physical distance is best
accounted for in terms of the geometry and nature of cognitive space,
rather than in terms of non-spatial variables. This includes the
hypothetically spatial parameters of time and matter, both of which
showed influences in the predicted direction. This result confirms
that cognitive space is a viable and useful concept, and it is
therefore potentially fruitful to make comparisons between cognitive
space and philosophical theories of physical space.
These comparisons can, if desired, be two-way. From the
theories discussed in part II we drew much inspiration for the
direction of experiments in parts III and IV. It is equally possible
to argue that, since true objectivity is never possible, the
characteristies of space as perceived make a useful yardstick by
which to evaluate theories of the characteristics of physical space
itself. This may seem a vulgarly democratic way to approach
philosophy (and it would have been deplored by Newton), but at the
°18
very least it gives a new slant to "the esse is the percipi".
The resulting perspective is one of a space that owes little to
absolutism or to Euclid, but rather leans towards Berkeley and
Descartes. It is a space that appears to have a geometry both curved
and irregular. It is a space towards which patterns of matter seem
to contribute significantly, as do variations in experienced travel
time.
Physical space has usually been considered by philosophers to be
a very pure stuff, and our cognitve space is loose, variable, and
anything but pure. To many it may seem that to adopt a perspective
on the former based on analysis of the latter is a terrible
hypostasisation. But the relationship between the two does exist.
Cognitive space cannot escape considerations of physical space. The
extent to which one accepts the possibility of a relationship in the
other direction depends on one's individual attitude towards matters
of objectivity and subjectivity.
The work is not yet over; much more testing will be necessary
before it becomes possible to say that a theory of cognitive distance
has been completed. I hope that this study has pointed out some of
the directions further research should take, and that it has
contributed to solving the methodological problems of such further
research. There is more to be done yet before we fully understand
the perception of geographical distance and the philosophy of space.
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UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
DISTANCE ESTIMATION QUESTIONNAIRE (Sec- next sheet also)
The following places are arranged in a random order. (Column l)
(i) Re-arrange them in order of increasing distance from Edinburgh.
Use Column 2 for this.
(ii) Taking the shortest distance from Edinburgh to London as one unit,
estimate the shortest distance from Edinburgh to each place on the
list in terms of Edinburgh/London units. Give your answers as a
single figure in each case. (e.g. \ - distance is half as far as
Edinburgh to Londonj 12 = distance is twelve times as far.) Use
column 3 for your estimates.
(iii) Evaluate how accurate you think each of your answers is. Give your
answer as a single figure from one to ten, on the scale 1 = pure
guess, no idea how far it is ... 10 = certain that this is very
accurate. Use column for these answers.
(iv) If you think you know the actual mileage to any of the places,
write the number of miles in column 5- If you do not know the
mileage, leave a blank. DO NOT ATTEMPT TO ESTIMATE MILEAGE'S IN
COLUMN 5.
(v) If you think you know the mileage to London, write the figure in
this space: DO NOT ESTIMATE THIS DISTANCE.
(vi) Tick any cities appearing in column 1 that you have visited.
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column U Column 5
RANDOM LIST RANKED LIST DISTANCE CONFIDENCE MILEAGE
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
SCOTTISH TOWS QUESTIONNAIRE
Please answer the following questions on your own; it is important that you
do not consult any sources or anyone else. You do not need to take long
over any of the questions. Were applicable, please record your answers In the
boxes provided.
(l) How far away from here (in miles) would you say the following places were?
Ayr . &
Aberdeen 1 zo






Newcastle on Tyne ./.$?.
Stornoway (Lewis) J!QO
(2) How accurate do you think your answers to Question 1 are?
Give each town a number on the following scale:
5 •" very accurate U = fairly accurate 3 = moderate
2 = poor 1 = just a guess
Ayr 1 3 :
Aberdeen
~







Lerwick (Shetland) i i |





If you had to travel to each place in the near future, how would
you travel? Give your answer as a number on the following scale:
1 - car 2 = rail 3 = bus h = car/boat



































How attractive do you think these towns are, (a) to live in (assuming
employment, education etc., to be no problem) and (b) to visit?
Use the following scale for your answers:
5 = very attractive 1+ = fairly attractive
3 = no opinion 2 = fairly unattractive 1 = very unattractive.
(a) (b)
To live in To visit
Ayr bj; nn
Aberdeen ; ' ! g, :
Berwick on Tweed L4__ !>_
Dundee ! / • i / >
Edinburgh ! <3 S <~5"'
Glasgow . / ' 2. ■
Inverness j / \ ' U'j
Lerwick (Shetland) 1 / ' ;3 '
Newcastle on Tyne P/ i I A3. j
Stornoway (Lewis) «; /~P j 3 •
(6) How well do you know each town? Use the following scale for your
answers:
5 = have lived there ^ = have been there frequently
3 = have been there fairly often











(7) What is your occupation?
(8) What is your sex?
(9) Where were you born?
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